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PROPER NAMES AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 
ABSi'RACT
In  t h i s  e s say  a theory  o f  proper names i s  developed and 
app l ied  to  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of q u a n t i f i e d  modal lo g i c s  and to  a 
d i s c u s s io n  of  problems concern ing  i d e n t i t y  across  p o s s ib le  worlds .
The theory  i s  then used to  a id  d i s c u s s io n  of  e s s e n t i a l i s m ,  empty 
s i n g u l a r  te rms ,  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  ep is t em ic  c o n te x t s ,  and F r e g e ’ s 
problem with  i d e n t i t y .
In  the  f i r s t  c h a p te r ,  a f t e r  a p re l im in a ry  d i s c u s s io n  of 
R u s s e l l ’ s and F r e g e ’ s t h e o r i e s  o f  names, a theory  i s  developed.  I t  
i s  argued t h a t  in  the  g iv in g  of  a name a r e l a t i o n  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
between the  name and what i s  named. That r e l a t i o n  i s  the  sense of  
the  name. I t  i s  a l so  argued t h a t  names can be g iven  to  imaginary ,  
f i c t i o n a l ,  and o t h e r  such n o n - e x i s t e n t  things..
The second c h a p te r  i s  devoted to  a d i s c u s s i o n  of  Quine’ s 
programme f o r  e l i m i n a t i n g  s i n g u l a r  te rm s .  I t  i s  t h e r e  argued t h a t  
the  programme cannot be j u s t i f i e d .
The t h i r d  c h a p te r  c e n t r e s  around the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  
l o g i c a l  systems to  dea l  with  i d e n t i t y  ac ross  p o s s ib le  wor lds .  I t  i s  
assumed t h a t  once a name i s  g iven  and i t s  sense the reby  e s t a b l i s h e d  
th e  name i s  a r i g i d  d e s i g n a t o r .  Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l  systems are  c o n s t r u c te d  
w i thou t  modal o p e r a to r s  y e t  in  terms o f  which c ro s s  world i d e n t i t y  
can be d i s c u s s e d .  Modal o p e r a to r s  are  then  in t roduced  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
a d i s c u s s io n  of  e s s e n t i a l i s m  and I d e n t i t y .  At each po in t  the formal 
systems are  c o n s t r u c te d  in  accordance  with c l e a r l y  s t a t e d  assumptions  
about c o n s ta n t  s i n g u l a r  te rm s ,  the  domains o f  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n ,  and the  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  modal o p e r a t o r s .
The f o u r th  c h ap te r  i s  a d i s c u s s io n  of e s s e n t i a l i s m .  There 
i s  a d i s c u s s io n  of  r a d i c a l  change from world to world and of  
g iv in g  accounts  of such changes,  and a d i s c u s s io n  of the  id ea  t h a t  
primacy should be given to  the  sense which a name has in  one p a r t i ­
c u l a r  world.
The f i f t h  c h ap te r  i s  a d i s c u s s io n  of empty s i n g u l a r  terms 
and f r e e  l o g i c s .  There i s  a d i s c u s s i o n  of  the  na tu re  of  the  va lues  
o f  empty s i n g u l a r  terms in  the  formal semantics  of  f r e e  l o g i c s ,  and a 
d i s c u s s io n  of tiie o b j e c t u a l  and s u b s t i t u t i o n a r y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of 
q u a n t i f i e r s .
The f i n a l  c h a p te r  i s  a d i s c u s s io n  of  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  and 
i d e n t i t y  i n  e p i s t em ic  l o g i c .  I t  i s  argued t h a t  the th eo ry  of  proper 
names developed i s  of use i n  c l a r i f y i n g  q u es t io n s  about q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  
i n t o  ep i s t em ic  c o n te x t s  and about F r e g e ’s problem with  the  c o g n i t iv e  
va lues  of  •- a" and = b" when both are  t r u e .
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F ic t io n a l  c h a rac te r s ,  animals or places  are often  given
names. Those names, such as "Pickwick” , "Pegasus” or  "C a i rP a rav e l" ,
are then used when we t a lk  about such f i c t i o n s .  A philosophical
considera t ion  of the use of such names has ra ised  the question ,  How
can we t a l k  about something which does not e x i s t ,  since there  i s
nothing about which to  talk?
At f i r s t  sight th is  quest ion may strike us as ambiguous
because of a kind of play upon the words "something” and "nothing".
So l e t  us consider b r i e f l y  the way in  which Russell came to the
conclusion th a t  the names of f i c t i o n s ,  and probably most o ther  names
a lso ,  are d isguised d e s c r ip t i o n s .  The way in which Russell proceeded
w i l l  give point to the quest ion posed above,
"A name," says Russell, " i s  a simple symbol, d i r e c t l y
designa ting  an ind iv id u a l  which i s  i t s  meaning, and having t h i s
meaning in  i t s  own r i g h t ,  independently of the meanings of a l l  o the r
w o r d s , F o r  Russe l l ,  the bearer  of a name i s  the meaning of t h a t
name, Russell  a lso  assumes th a t  in  a genuine sub jec t -p red ica te  
0proposit ion'-  the  meaning of the sub jec t  term i s  whatever i s  desig ­
nated by t h i s  term. Under R u sse ll 's  assumptions the assertion  
"Socra tes  i s  wise" can be analysed as saying of the bearer of the name 
'S o c r a t e s ’ t h a t  he has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of being wise.  But i f  the 
bearer  does not e x i s t  then the subject term i s  meaningless and the 
a s s e r t io n  meaningless.  Only i f  the bearer  e x i s t s  can the a s s e r t io n
Russe ll ,  In t roduct ion  to Mathematical Philosonhv. Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1920. P. 173.
9"'As opposed to the A risto te lian  so ca l led  " su b jec t -p re d ic a te  
p ropos i t ion” .
XV
be e ith er  true or fa l s e .  How then could we assert meaningfully that 
Excalibur was brandished, or t h a t  the round square does not ex ist?
The quest ion i s  even more acute in the  case of the round square 
because we can hardly be a s se r t in g  that there  i s  an ob jec t  which i s  not.
Russell  iiolds t h a t  the meaning of a proper name i s  i t s  
bearer. This i s  a key assumption. I f  there  i s  no bearer  e x i s t e n t ,  
as in  the case of f i c t i o n a l  c h a rac te r s ,  then the name i s  meaningless,  
and tiie a s s e r t io n s  in which such names occur are meaningless.  Since 
we cannot agree that assertions about f i c t i o n a l  charac te rs  and such 
l ike  Eire meaningless i t  follows th a t  e i t h e r  Russell  was mistaken 
about proper names or,  as he was to suggest ,  most of the terms which
we c a l l  proper names are not proper names a t  a l l .  Most of what we
c a l l  proper names Eire r e a l l y  d isguised  d e sc r ip t i o n s ,  says Russe ll ,  
so t h a t
whenever tlie grammatical subject  of a p ropos i t ion  can 
bo supposed not to e x i s t  without rendering the proposi­
t io n  meaningless, i t  i s  pla in  t h a t  the grammatical
sub jec t  i s  not a proper name, i . e . ,  not a name d i r e c t l y
represen t ing  some ob jec t .  Thus in  a l l  such cases,  the 
propos i t ion  must be capable of being so analysed t h a t   ^
what was the grammatical subject  sh a l l  have d isappeared . '
Russe l l  then proposed analyses in  terms of d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s .
Our concern in t h i s  essay i s  with proper names. V/e 
w i l l  not be much concerned with the theory of descriptions as such.
Our main concern w i l l  be to  consider the s t a tu s  of names in  language 
Eind what can be said about t h e i r  meaning.
We begin to develop a theory of proper names by d iscuss ing  
R u ss e l l ' s  assumptions and F reg e ' s  th e o r i e s .  In the course of d i s c u s ­
sion we w i l l  consider R u s s e l l ' s  idea t h a t  i f  a sentence i s  lo g ic a l ly  
of the su b jec t -p red ica te  form, "then the very f a c t  of i t s  being
Russe l l .  P r in c in ia  Mathenn t ica  Vol. 1, 2nd Ed. Cambridge U nivers i ty  
P re s s ,  1925, p. 66,
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  having a meaning guarantees t h a t  there is, something 
re fe r red  to by the lo g ica l  (and grammatical) subjectV^ A theory of 
proper names w i l l  then be proposed, a theory somewhat in the s ty lo  of 
F rege ' s  theory with emphasis on the sense of names*
Even so, a theory of proper names would be somewhat 
redundant i f  i t  were possib le  to purge a language of a l l  names. So 
we discuss Quine’s programme for the  e l im ina t ion  of s ingu la r  terms.
The theory of proper names w il l  then be applied to 
discussions of several quest ions  of cur ren t  in terest  in the philosophy 
of log ic .  F i r s t  wo discuss the problems of i d e n t i t y  across  possible  
wor lds , then essen tia lism , f ree  logic  and quantification in to  
epistemic  con tex ts .  At the conclusion of the l a s t  d iscuss ion  the 
theorv i s  applied to one of F ren e ' s  problems about i d e n t i t é .
Linsky, Refer r i r .o . Routledge and" Kogan Paul,  London, 1967, n. 87.
CHAPTER ONE 
THE MEANING AND REFERENCE OF NAMES
R u sse ll’s two assumptions about proper names were th a t  (a) 
the  meaning of a proper name Is  i t s  bearer, and (b) the only bearers  
of  proper names to be countenanced are real or ex i s t in g  o b jects . We 
consider f i r s t  the notion th a t  the meaning of a proper name i s  i t s  
bearer.
One i s  tempted to say stra igh t away t h a t  R ussell i s  
p la in ly  mistaken when he says t h a t  proper names have any meaning at 
a l l .  I f  one were asked what was the meaning of some proper name, 
such as "Robin", one would be l i k e l y  to  reply e ith er  t h a t  names don’t  
have meanings, or to reply by asking the questioner  what the point  of 
h is  question was. Of course, the  questioner might be asking the kind 
o f  etymological  question which can be given an answer such as "'Robin 
means 'courageous and j u s t * " ,  or "'Emmanuel’ means ’God with u s , ' "  
There i s  a lso  the weak sense i n  which " B i l l "  means "male", but then 
" B i l l "  has been used as the sh o r t  name f o r  women named "Wilhelmina".
The tempta tion to  say that R ussell i s  simply mistaken 
can be resisted  i f  we take in to  account some comments which he makes 
about the use of the term "meaning". In his l e c tu res  on Logical 
Atomism he says
As to what one means by 'meaning*, I  w i l l  give a 
i l lu s t r a t io n s .  For in stan ce, the word 'S o cra tes', you 
w i l l  say, means a certa in  man; the word 'mortal* means 
a certa in  qu ality ; and the sentence ' Socra tes  i s  mortal' 
means a certa in  fa c t .  But those th ree  s o r t s  of meaning 
are e n t ir e ly  d is t in c t ,  and you w i l l  ge t  i n to  the most 
hopeless contradictions i f  you th ink the word 'meaning* 
has the  same meaning in  each of these three ca ses . I t  is  
very important not to  suppose t h a t  there i s  j u s t  one thing 
which i s  meant by 'meaning', and that therefore there i s  
ju s t  one sort of r e l a t i o n  of the symbol to what i s
symbolized . . . . i n  the  ease of  a name, t he re  i s  only
one re la tio n  t h a t  i t  can have to what i t  names. A name
can j u s t  name a p a r t i c u l a r ,  or, i f  i t  does not, i t  i s
not a name a t  a l l ,  i t  i s  a noise.^
So i t ' s  reasonable to say t h a t  R u sse ll's  account of
proper names i s  t h a t  they simply designate in d iv id u a ls . There are
other points  in  h i s  account of proper names, but they need not
concern us j u s t  now because they bear c h ie fly  on the  s t a t u s  of what
i s  designated, and the rela tion sh ip  between the user of a proper name
and what i t  d esign ates. We can u sefu lly  label R u sse ll's  account of
proper names as a S imple Re fere ni.i a.l theory. The term "Simple" is
used in  order to h ig h l ig h t  a contrast which can be drawn between
R u sse ll's  account of proper names and Frege ’s account.
Theorjes^of
Before going on to consider Frege's account of proper 
names we need to  be c lea r  about what the l a rg e r  story  i s  i n t o  which 
these various accounts of proper names f i t .  The larger story w i l l  be
some theory of meaning. I t  w ill  s u f f ic e , for our purposes, to adopt
2what Dummett says about th eories of meaning i n  h i s  study of Frege. 
Although what Dummett says i s  s p e c if ic  to Frege's work, we can 
gen era lise  from what he says without prejudicing any contrasts we 
may want to h ig h lig h t, i n  th is  essay , between Frege and other 
philosophers such as B u sse ll.
What Dummett says can be put as fo llo w s. F i r s t ,  for any 
theory of  meaning the sentence i s  the un i t  of meaning. Secondly,
^"The Philosophy of Logical  Atomism" in  Logic and Knowledge, Ed. R.C. 
Marsh. Allen & Umvia, London, 1956, pp.l86«187.
?'Michael Dummett, Frege; Philosophy o f Language. Duckworth, London, 
1973. ~ "
a theory of meaning must be based on an analysis which does "not
s top shor t  a t  the sp e c if ica t io n  of which sentences are  well  formed;
i t  must explain a lso  how the meaning of each sentence ( i s )  determined
from i t s  i n t e r n a l  structure . . . . i t  must be a semantic, and not
merely a sy n ta c tic , analysis."^  T hirdly, a d estin ation  can be drawn
between the sense and the tone of a sentence or  express ion; " to
the sense of a sentence belongs only t h a t  which i s  relevant to
determining i t s  t r u t h  or f a ls i t y ;  any feature of i t s  meaning which
cannot e f f e c t  i t s  truth or  f a l s i t y  belongs to  i t s  tone. Likewise,
to  the  sense of an express ion belongs only that which may be relevant
to the truth or f a l s i t y  of a sentence in  which i t  might occur;  any
2element of i t s  meaning not so relevant as part of i t s  tone." An
example of express ions  with the same sense but d if fe re n t tone i s  the  
p a i r ;  "and" and "bu t" .
R u s s e l l ’s account of proper names can be seen as saying 
t h a t  the sense o f a name c o n s i s t s  j u s t  i n  i t s  having a certa in  referen t  
But t h i s  account does not s a t is fy  Frege.
Ejm e-jM JdentitX
I f  proper names simply designate ind iv idu als and have no 
o the r  v i t a l  c h a r a c ter is tic , then there i s  s problem which a r ise s .
The problem concerns id en tity -p rop osition s such as "Cicero i s  Tully" 
and "The morning sta r  i s  the evening star ."  About i d e n t i t y  Frege 
asks, "Is  i t  a rela tion ?  A r e la tio n  between o b jec ts , or between names 
or  signs of objects?" The f i r s t  a ltern a tiv e , that id e n tity  i s  a
^Ibido, p. 2c
^'Ibidc, p. 2c 
3G. Frege, "On Sense and Reference" in  Translat ions from the Philosophical 
^frlH nqs,of Gottlob  Frege,  Eds. P. Geach and M. Black. Basi l  Blackwell ,  
Oxford, i960, p. 56,
r e l a t i o n  between o b jec ts , i s  very much in  accord with what Russell
says about a s s e r t io n s  containing proper names. Since "Socrates i s
wise" can be analysed as saying of the bea re r  of the  name "Socrates"
t h a t  he has the c h r a c t e r i s t i c  of being w ise, "Cicero i s  Ta l ly"  should
bs analysed as saying of the bearers  of the names "Cicero" and "Tul ly”
that they have the ch a ra cter is tic  of  being id en tica l with each other.
Taking the  f i r s t  a ltern a tiv e  Frege says.
Now i f  we were to  regard eq u ality  as a re la tio n  between 
t h a t  which the names *a* and 'b' d esignate , i t  would seem 
t h a t  S“ b could not d i f f e r  from apa ( i . e .  provided s™b 
i s  tr u e ) .
Blit i s  d if fe re n t from "Srk"« The d ifferen ce that concerns
Frege here i s  not simply a sy n tactic  d ifferen ce but a d ifferen ce  in
terms of inform ation. "a.~a" conveys qu i te  d i f f e r e n t  information from
the information conveyed by "^b". "The two sentences," says Frege,
2"do not have the  same cogni t ive  value", and t h i s  i s  ju s t  what i s  
meant by saying t h a t  the  information conveyed by one i s  d iffe re n t
from the information conveyed by the other.
As Dummett says.
The notion of ’ in fo rm at ion’ being appealed to here does 
not requ i re  any e lab o ra te  e x p l ic a t io n ;  I  acqui re  
information when I learn something which I  did not 
previously know, and Frege i s  asking how i t  i s  possib le  
that I  may be in  a po s i t io n  to know the sense of an 
id en tity -sta tem en t, i . e .  to understand i t ,  and yet 
learn something t h a t  I  did not know before by being to ld  
t h a t  that statement i s  tr u e .3
I t  i s  important to  r ea lize  t h a t  im p lic it  i n  F reg e ’s 
c r i t i c i s m  of a simple referen tia l account of the sense of ’a/ and
*b’ i n  ”^“ b" i s  the  notion t h a t  "a theory of meaning i s  a theory of
^Ibid. p. 56.
OOp.c i t .  p. 95,
understanding. What wo have to give an account of i s  what a person
knows when he knows what a word or expression means, t h a t  i s ,  vdien
he understands Now, i f  when a person understands being
a name he knows i t s  referen t, and s im ilar ly  fo r  ' b ' ,  then that person
w i l l  know that ^ r b .  " I f  the sense of  a name c o n s i s t s  merely in  i t s
re fe rence ,  anyone who understands two names having the same r e f e re n t
omust know t h a t  they have the  same r e fe r e n t ." ’
Although th is  looks lik e  a most powerful c r i t i c i s m  of 
R u sse ll's  account of proper names, R ussell has a ready rep ly .  The 
reply i s  contained in  the follow ing statements of R u sse ll's :
For a lo g ic a lly  p e r fec t  language, there  w ill  be one
word and no more fo r  every simple o b j e c t , . . ,
. . . a l l  the  names th a t  i t  would use would be p r iva te  to  
t h a t  speaker and could not enter in to  the  language of another speaker.^
Russell  r ea lly  does meet Frege head-on here. Real proper 
names would be able  to  be used only by people who know the referent 
of  the name, and i d e n t i t y  statements would be non -existen t because 
they would be u s e l e s s .  I t  i s  j u s t  because Russell  conceives of  an 
i d e a l  language in  t h i s  way that h i s  account i s  u n r e a lis t ic , but i t  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t .  We w ill  r e tu rn  again to t h i s  question of  the user  of 
proper name having to  be acquainted with the  name's referen t.
Taking the  other a ltern a tiv e , t h a t  i s  t h a t  id en tity  is  
a re la tio n  between names, Frege argues t h a t  "a~b" i s  ju s t  not an 
assertion  about words. I f  we take "apb" to say th a t  the name ' a /
^Ibido p. 92. 
h h i d c  p. 95.
^ O p .c i t , ,  p. 197.
^ Ib id .  p. 198.
and the name are names for the  same thing then, according to Frege,  
m  would be saying no more than t h a t  we had a r b i t r a r i l y  agreed to  use 
these words as names for the same ob ject, whatever t h a t  object might 
be. "In that case the sentence ^=b would no longer r e f e r  to the 
sub jec t  matter, but only to i t s  mode of designation; we would express 
no proper knowledge by i t s  means. But in  many cases th is  i s  ju s t  
what we want to
Frege then presses his  argument even further and says t h a t  
we cannot, anyivay, look upon names simply as objects of some s o r t ,  
for example, typographical  ob jec ts . We have to take account both 
of what a name r e f e r s  to ( i t s  re fe rence)  and the way in  which a name 
designates an object ( i t s  sen se). I t  i s  not a ltogeth er c l e a r  ju s t  what 
Frege is  ta lk ing  about when he ta lk s about the mode of designation .
He says;
I f  the sign 'a* is  d istinguished from the sign  only 
as object (here, by means o f i t s  shape), not as sign ( i . e .  
not by the manner in  which i t  designates something). The 
cogn itive  value of becomes e s s e n t ia lly  equal to that 
of apb, provided a=b is  true. A d ifferen ce  can a r i s e  
only i f  the d ifferen ce  between the signs corresponds to 
a d ifferen ce  in  the mode o f presentation of that which i s  design ated .2
One way of  seeing Frege's argument and poin t here i s  to  
see  him as saying t h a t  names cannot be d istinguished one from the 
other simply by means of syntax. and 'b ' are not d iffe re n t names 
simply because they are two d iffe re n t items on a l i s t  of prim itive  
symbols. So i f  they are d iffe re n t names t h e i r  d ifferen ce  must l i e  in  
th e ir  having d ifferen t re la tion sh ip s with the one th ing  to which both 
r e fer . As Dummett exp la ins ;
^OpoCit. p. 67 
^Ibid. p. 57
Hence two names may have the  same r e f e re n t  but d i f f e r e n t  
senses: with the two names are assoc ia ted  d i f f e r e n t
methods of id en tify in g  some objec t  as the r e f e r e n t  of 
e i t h e r  name, although i t  happens t h a t  i t  Is  the same 
ob jec t  which s a t i s f i e s  the  two pairs o f conditions of 
such id e n t if ic a t io n ,!
Frege then explains th at,
The regular connection between a s ign ,  i t s  sense, and i t s  
reference i s  of such a kind t h a t  to the sign there
corresponds a d e fin ite  sense and to t h a t  in  turn a
d e f i n i t e  reference, while to  a given re ference  (o r  object) 
there does not belong only a s ing le  slgn ,^
In  th is  way the sense o f a proper name has i t s  place in  determining
the truth-value of any sentence in  which the proper name occurs,
"The sense o f a word — as opposed to any other ingredient i t s
meaning may have — c o n s t i t u t e s  the  contribution which i t  makes to
determining the t r u t h -c o n d i t io n  o f sentences in  which i t  occurs
p recise ly  by a sso c ia t in g  a c e r t a i n  reference with i t . " '  Yet, even
though the sense of a name asso c ia tes  a c e r t a in  reference with i t ,
for each name there w i l l  be a d iffe re n t way of assoc ia tin g  i t s
referent with i t ,  and because of  the differen ces between these ways
of associa tion  the names w i l l  be d if fe r e n t .
Names aM _me&nim
From what Frege says about id en tity  taken as a re la tio n  
between names i t  i s  not a ltogeth er c lear  that he i s  not ju s t  wrong. 
He expounds t h i s  a ltern a tiv e , as we have seen, as "What i s  intended 
to be said by | p b  seems to be that the signs or names ’a ’ and 'b* 
des igna te  the same th ing ,  so t h a t  those signs themselves would be
^Op.c i t ,  p, 95
^Op.cito po 58 
3Dummett, o p .c i t ,  p, 93,
under discussion; a re la tio n  between them would be asserted."^ His 
cr it ic ism s of  th i s  approach are  (a)  that- i t  makes names q u i te  arb i­
trary , and (b) that i t  makes a-'b no longer " r e f e r  to  the  subject
2matter, but only t) i t s  mode of designation ,"  '
I t  i s  not a l to g e th e r  c l e a r  ju s t  what F r eg e ’s f i r s t  
cr it ic ism  amounts to , but i t  i s  hard to see how one can avoid the 
conclusion t h a t  names are a rb itra r ily  chosen end given to people, 
places and th ings, e t c .  I t  may be that t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  springs partly  
from Frege's in c lu sion  of d e f in ite  d escr ip tion s, such as "the 
morning star", in  the general category of proper names. But even 
i f  th is  c r it ic ism  does spring partly from the way in  which d e f i n i t e  
descriptions are categorised i t  i s  hard to see how the cr it ic ism
survives Frege's own example of a mountain with the two names 'A f la '
3end 'A teb', These two names are a rb itra r ily  chosen, even made-up, 
words. Once chosen and declared to be names then the words can be 
used by any speaker of the language to r e f e r  to  some p a r t i c u l a r .  Words 
can be declared to be names by any one of several ways such as by 
being used i n  a r ite  such as baptism, or by some declaration  of an 
overt kind l ik e  "The man, whose name was 'B r in k le th o rp e ' ,  , . or  
j u s t  by being used in  litera tu re  with a c a p i t a l  f i r s t  le t t e r .
Although the choice o f some word as the proper name of some particular  
may be quite arbitrary, t h a t  i s  not to say tha t  there  i s  a subsequent 
randomness about the use of  such words or the category to which they 
are seen to belong. "P e te r" ,  "Rover" and "Ateb" have a q u i te  f irm 
status as names, and as t h ree  d ifferen t names.
^Op.c it .  p. 56 
^Ibid. p. 57
3 Dummett, op .e i t .  p. 97<
And while we are  d iscuss ing  the sy n tac t ic  category of 
names, and d istin gu ish in g  between how a word comes to be included 
i n  the  category and what status the word then has in  a language, we 
need to note a lso  t h a t  a name is  not merely a phonological or typo­
graphical ob ject, token or even type,
III most languages a, i s  the same name as a, and b i s  a 
d ifferen t name. In most languages we t e l l  t h a t  a name ^  i s  the  same 
name as the name a, because the typographical tokens are both of the 
same typographical type. S im ilarly , we distin gu ish  n from b typo­
graphically , This p ra c t ic e  can be the  source of a confusion. We 
could confuse the nature of the s im ila r it ie s  and d ifferen ces between 
typographical  marks (or spoken words) with the nature of the s im ilar­
i t i e s  and d ifferen ces between names.
There are the sorts o f languages suggested by Searle^ in  
which the re  i s  some convention for changing the typographical  or 
phonological  objec t  in  order as we use a name. For example, the f i r s t  
time we use some given name we use the  mark * V \  the second time the 
mark "b",  the t h i r d  time the mark "ej% and so on.
So, in  t h i s  sense,  Frege i s  correct when he says that we 
cannot look upon names simply as typographical o b jects , or objects of 
some other sim ilar so r t . But, although we cannot look upon names as 
objects o f that kind, i t  does not fo llow  that we cannot take ”s5"b" 
to  be saying something about names i n  th eir  role in  a language as 
names. Hence, i f  we take i t  at the outset t h a t  i t  i s  names that we 
a re  talking about, not typographical  o b je c t s ,  then ".s-b” can be about 
names as such, and not be about typographical  o b jects .
Frege himself  uses the term "sign" when t a lk in g  about
Searle "Proper Names". Mind. 67, April  1950, p, 167.
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names. We could say t h a t  the re  i s  a c la ss  of signs which i s  the c la s s  
of names. These names are to be d istinguished  sy n ta c tic a lly . They 
are, in  fa c t , a s e t  of syn tactic  o b je c t s .  But then,  i t  might be 
objected that we ere  s t i l l  l e f t  with the problem of how "John" and 
"James" are r ea lly  two d is t in c t  elements in  the s e t  of  names. Our 
arguments to show that one name can be expressed typographically (o r  
phonologically) in  several d ifferen t ways w ill  only give added force  
to  the ob jec t ion  that perhaps "John" ( in  the typographical sense) i s  
expressive of the same name as "James" in  the typographical  sense.
Frege would say that they are d i f f e r e n t  because th eir  senses are 
d iffe r e n t . I f  there i s  no need to provide other than syn tactic  
c r ite r ia  for sameness o f names then Frege's bringing in  of the senses 
o f names i s  unnecessary. I f  there i s  a need to provide other than 
sy n tactic  c r ite r ia  for sameness of names then Frege's bringing in  
of  the  senses of  names i s  dangerous to h is  own account. I t  i s  
dangerous because there  i s  not usually  some one way of associatin g  the 
referent of a name with the name which i s  understood by a l l  those who 
use the name m eaningfully.
This la s t  poin t  i s  not t h a t  the notion of a name's having 
sense and re fe rence  i s  somehow se lf -d e fe a tin g . Provided vie accept 
t h a t  the re  are names, and t h a t  the syntax of the language ind icates  
which names are which, then the notion of these names' having both 
sense and reference i s  not unreasonable, and i t  i s  a lso  not unreasonable 
to agree t h a t  the  sense of a name may vary from speaker to  speaker. 
"Frege , . . was p er fectly  w ell aware of the v a r i a t io n s  in  sense 
a ttached by ind iv idua ls  or a t  d iffe re n t times to the  same expression , 
and of the haziness  of the senses so attached,"^ The poin t a t  i s sue  i s
D^ummett, op.c it. p,103.
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t h a t  we cannot use e i t h e r  sense o r  reference  as c r i t e r i a  fo r  i d e n t i t y  
of  names them selves. Here we have to r e ly  on s y n ta c t i c  c r i t e r i a .
We now come to  F rege ' s  second c r i t i c i s m .  His c r i t i c i s m  i s  
t h a t  i f  we say t h a t  "jgrk" says t h a t  what i s  named by *.a' i s  a lso  
named by ' b ' ,  then "s.“ b" no longer refers to the subject matter but 
only to i t s  mode of designation . From th is  i t  would follow  that no 
real information would be imparted about the r e f e re n t s  of end %% 
I f  there i s  an argument here i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  in v a lid , 
but more im portantly, i t  i s  ju s t  not true that i f  we say that 
says t h a t  what i s  named by ' a /  i s  a lso  named by 'b*,  then no
longer refers to the sub jec t  matter but only to i t s  mode of designa­
t i o n ,  Apart from the f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  strange to hear Frege ta lk ing  
about what "a-b"  i s  referring to  in  terms of p articu lars, there i s  a 
form alization of which i s  i l lu m in a t in g .  I f  we l e t  mean
"x names y". then we have the following fo rmal iza t ion  of the view 
c r it ic is e d :
& =  b =  N' b \ K
The definiendum
can be read as
"The i tem which 'Ij* names i s  named by ' a . ' , "
I n  t h i s  case the subject matter, i . e .  the item named, i s  most cer ta in ly  
d iscussed  and the in format ion imparted i s  not equivalent to  a 
lo g ic a l  tru th . There i s  proper knowledge about the  referent in  "spb" 
of  'a 'and  of 'b.%
Although F r eg e ' s  c r i t i c i s m  of the  simple reference account 
of  proper names has point, i t  i s  not c l e a r  t h a t  much credence can he 
put upon h i s  c r i t i c i s m  of the  view t h a t  "apb" says that what 'a* names 
i s  a lso  named by ' b ' .  The c o n t r a s t  between R ussell and Frege i s  
brought to  l i g h t ,  but any o the r  c o n t ra s t  i s  unclear .  But on r e f l e c t i o n
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i t  i s  not surprising that Frege's c r i t i c i s m  of the "naming" view 
should f a i l ,  because Frege's own account of proper names in  terras of 
sense and reference i s  very s im i la r  to the "naming" view.
We have seen how the sense of a name, for  Frege, co n sists  
not merely in  i t s  reference, but in  a p a r t i c u l a r  way o f id en tify in g  
an ob jec t  as the  referent of the name. At the r i s k  of suggesting 
something sim ilar , i t  i s  c lear  t h a t  one common way of id e n t i fy in g  
the objec t  to which a name refers i s  to f ind out which object has 
been so named. Given t h a t  there i s  a syntactic  category o f names, 
when an assertion  i s  made using one or more of these names i t  i s  
ju s t  assumed that each name used has been given to something. I f  
a name is  given to something or someone then the naming rela tion  
has been estab lished  between some one element of the category (or 
s e t )  of names and a th ing, place or person.
Name giving and acquaintance
Several th ings  need to  be noted about the  naming r e l a t i o n ,  
F i r s t ,  although i d e a l l y  the naming re la tio n  i s  a func t ion  from a 
domain of names (the  arguments) to a domain of what i s  named (the  
va lues) ,  in  natural languages t h i s  i s  not the  case . There are, for  
example, many people who have the same name. N evertheless there i s  
a tendency in  everyday l i f e  for people to  be given names which w ill  
bring the ordinary language naming r e l a t i o n  c lo ser  to  the  i d e a l .  So 
we ge t  the notion of a person's " f u l l  name", a notion which seems to 
give expression to the  hope that no two people w i l l  have the same 
f u l l  name. Array s e r ia l  numbers work th i s  way a l so .
Secondly, the ac t  of g iv ing something a name i s  qu i te  
p r im i t iv e .  But X agree with Geach when he says .
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John Austin seems to have held t h a t  naming i s  a 
momentous a ct, which ju s t  not anyone casu ally  can 
perform; i t  would take the r i g h t  person in  the r i g h t  
circumstances using the r i g h t  performative formula; and 
I  am not a t  a l l  sure t h a t  he would have counted me a 
v a l id ly  ordained namer, or my baptismal formula fo r  
Pauline as a valid sacramental form. Well anyhow, I claim the r ig h t s  to  r e f e r  to any young lady of my acquain­
tance by the name "Pauline" fo r  the course of t h i s  
discu ssion ; and I th ink the d ifference between such use 
of a name jprq ha^ v ice and the more o f f i c i a l  conferment
of a name i s  only of leg a l or an thropolog ica l ,  not of
lo g ic a l, importance.%
Thirdly, we must not confuse the giving of the name with 
i t s  subsequent ro le as an argument for the naming re la t io n . At the
same time I t  i s  v i t a l  to remember that names call be given in  o the r
than the o f f ic ia l  se ttin g s  of such things as ch risten in gs, or  the 
launching of sh ip s, or the claiming and naming of te r r ito r ie s  by 
explorers. When log ic ian s claim t h a t  genuine proper names must name 
some ex istin g  objec t  or particu lar i t  seems to me t h a t  they are fo r ­
gettin g  that there i s  a vast  range of s itu a tio n s in  which names are 
given.  I f  the giving of a name does e s t a b l i s h  the naming re la tio n  
between a name and something named then i t  w i l l  not be untov/ard to 
consider some cases of the g iv ing o f names.
There are three s o r t s  of cases which are o f i n t e r e s t .  
There are those cases where, i n  the presence of the p a r t i c u l a r ,  a 
name is  given i t .  The b e s t  example i s  that of a ch risten in g . Here
there i s  no doubt about e ith er  who i s  named or  t h a t  the parson so
named e x i s t s .  There are, secondly, those cases where, in  the absence 
of  the particu lar but in  the knowledge, or  at l e a s t  the b e l i e f ,  t h a t
i t  e x i s t s ,  a name i s  given i t .  Such a case i s  the case of the  giv ing
of the name "Vulcan" to  a p lanet which some astronomers believed 
ex isted  in  an o r b i t  in s ide  Mercury's. This i s  an in tere stin g  case.
^P. T. Geach, Logic M at te r s . B as i l  Blackw ell, Oxford, 1972. p. 154,
14
because once the name was given both those who believed Vulcan 
ex isted  and those who d id n 't used the word "Vulcan" as a name. There 
are a range of  v a r i a t io n s  in  these cases through those who know t h a t  
the p a r t i c u l a r  e x i s t s ,  and those who claim to know, and those who 
be l ieve  tru ly , and those who b eliev e  fa ls e ly , to those who guess or 
p ostu la te . There i s  no need to go through every var ia tion .
Thirdly, there are those cases where, in  the knowledge t h a t  
what i s  to  he named does not e x i s t ,  a name i s  given . This i s  the 
case ty p i f i ed  by the w riter of f ic t io n  giving names to the characters, 
animals, objects and places in  h is work.
Several th ings  need to  be noted about these  various cases 
of the giving of names. F ir s t ,  the re  i s  the in terestin g  feature of 
ordinary language t h a t  one can take some new word, invent i t  as i t  
were, and by the ac t  of  name-giving that word becomes part of the 
syn tactic  category of names. F r e g e ' s  'Ateb' and 'A fla' are cases in  
point. There are, of course,  already a large stock of words in  
o rd inary  language which can be put toge the r  in  various combinations 
to  make up a f u l l  proper name. But, by name-giving a word becomes a 
name. Secondly, although in  one kind of case the name giving goes 
with an acquaintance with th a t  to which the name i s  given, in  many 
cases there i s  no acquaintance with that to which the name i s  given .
A name is  often  given to something which has been i d e n t i f i e d  d escrip ­
t iv e ly ,  and of ten  the d e sc r ip t i o n  i s  not rea lly  a d e f in ite  d escr ip tion .
For R u ssell, the  sorts  of name-giving where the re  i s  
lack of  any acquaintance with t h a t  to  which the name i s  given are  
not r e a l l y  name-giving. Furthermore,  anyone who uses a word as a 
name must be acquainted with the bearer of th a t  name.
A name, in  the narrow log ica l  sense of a word whose 
meaning i s  a p a r t i c u l a r ,  can only be applied to a 
particu lar with which the speaker i s  acquainted, . . .
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We are  not acquainted with Socrates, and the re fo re  
cannot name him. When we use the word 'S ocrates', we ore 
r e a l l y  us ing a d escr ip tio n .1
This follows from R u sse ll's  account of proper names. I f  
the  sense of a proper name i s  i t s  referent and a speaker knows the 
sense of a given name, i . e .  understands the name, then the speaker 
must know the r e f e r e n t  of the name. To know the referent o f a name 
i s ,  for R u ssell, to foe acquainted with i t .
R u sse ll's  claim that we must be acquainted with a p a r t i ­
c u l a r  before being able to use a word as i t s  name makes understandable
h is  further claim th a t  "the only words one does use as names in  the
2lo g ic a l sense are words l ike  ' t h i s '  or 'th a t'."  For, "One can use
' t h i s '  as a name to  stand fo r  a p a r t i c u l a r  with which one i s  acquainted
at the moment. We say 'This i s  w h ite '. I f  you agree t h a t  'This i s
w h i t e ' ,  meaning the ' t h i s '  t h a t  you can see , you ai'e using ' t h i s '  as 
3a proper name." Of t h i s  approach Hlntlkka remarks, "Here one f e e ls ,  
something has gone amiss. Not only i s  i t  strange to  c a l l  ' t h i s '  and 
' t h a t '  names. i t  seems p o s it iv e ly  perverse to a l leg e  t h a t  they are 
our only proper names properly so c a l l e d . " ^
R u s s e l l ' s  requirement t h a t  we must be acquainted with the 
bearer of a name in  order to  use a word as a name means t h a t ,  for him, 
we cannot use the word 'Socrates' as a name. "We are  not acquainted 
with Socrates, and therefore cannot name him. When we use the word 
'S ocrates', we are r ea lly  using a d escr ip tion . Our thought may be
^Op.c i t .  p. 201.
^Op.c i t .  p. 201.
^Ibid. p. 201.
lîiîîtiîska, " E xisten tia l Presupposi t ions  and E x isten tia l Commitments". The Journal of  Philosophy. Vol. 56, 1939. p. 126.
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K ■rendered by some such phrase as, 'The Master of P la to ,*
Geach emphat ically  denies t h i s  point  of R u s s e l l ' s  when he 
w r i t e s ,  "It i s  indeed e sse n tia l to  the ro le  of a name that the  name 
can be used in  the presence of  the  ob jec t  named as an acknowledgment 
of  i t s  presence. But equally e sse n tia l to the name's ro le  i s  i t s  use 
to t a l k  about the named objec t  in  absentia ," But Geach does agree
that- acquaintance i s  e s s e n t i a l  at some point: "There must in  the f i r s t
qinstance be someone acquainted with the object named."'" Once the re  has 
been t h i s  i n i t i a l  acquaintance then the name may be used to ta lk  
about the named object in  absent ia ,  and in  perpetuum. "Plato knew 
Socra tes ,  and A r i s t o t l e  knew P la to ,  and Theophrastus knew A r i s t o t l e ,  
and so on in  a p o s to l ic  succession  down to our own tim es; that i s  why 
we can leg itim a tely  use "Socrates" as a name the way we do."^
Although Geach denies the extreme th es is  put forward by 
Russe l l ,  he supports the  central notion th a t  acquaintance i s  e s s e n t i a l  
to a word's becoming a name,, or being properly used as a name. So, 
for Geach, since no one has seen Vulcan, the word '"Vulcan" i s  not 
r e a l l y  a proper name. I t  was not a proper name even when soma 
astronomers believed Vulcan e x is ted , and now th a t  i t  i s  f a i r l y  c e r t a i n  
t h a t  Vulcan does not e x is t  i t  i s  a l so  quite  certa in  t h a t  "Vulcan" i s  
not a proper name. The same can be said for a l l  those words which 
were (and are) supposed to be the names o f f i c t i o n a l ,  mythical or 
imaginary bei ngs.
^Russe ll ,  o p .c it ,  p, 201,





I f  log ic ians  l i k e  Russe l l  and Geach are  c o r r e c t  most of
what has been described above as name-giving i s  not r e a l l y  name-givii
For Geach, the  giv ing of  a name to something which does not e x i s t  i s
r ea lly  the giving of a quasi-name. He says:
Suppose we hear of a man who dreams of the same g ir l  
n ight a f t e r  night  , as happened i n  a s to ry  of H, G, 
Wells; for convenience of conversation, we may say he 
dreams of P e t ro n e l la  every night,  without e ith er  committ­
ing ourselves to  the view th a t  there i s  a real l i v e  g i r l  
he i s  dreaming o f , or meaning t h a t  the name "Petronella"  
i s  the name he g ives the g i r l  in  h is  dreams. For us,
"Petronella" i s  then functioning not as a name but as a
quasi-name.
and also
Names and quasi-names are  of course grammatically propernouns.2
I t  seems to me th a t  Geach i s  trying to  have his cake and e a t  i t .  He
wants to say th a t  r e a l  names designate only e x i s t in g  th in gs, but
s ince names l ike  "Pe t ro n e l la "  (he says: ' the  name "P etronella"') are 
bestowed on ch a rac te rs  in  dreams he w i l l  have quasi-names. I t  i s  a
d i s t i n c t i o n  without a d ifferen ce fo r  which he can give ,  on his  own
3word, no sa tis fa c to ry  account.  But above a l l ,  he cannot stand 
imaginary e n t i t i e s .  " I  allow no such e n t i t i e s  as imaginary g i r l s  in  
my universe of discourse,"^ Geach i s  not alone in  th is  p r o h i b i t i o n i s t  
attitu d e  to imaginary e n t i t ie s .
R u sse ll's  a t t i t u d e  to the bearers of names i s  quite  
unequivocal,  indeed ru th less , as we have already seen. ' '  For in  the  long
^Op.c it .  p. 161. 





run R u s s e l l ' s  lin e  on proper names leads to the v ir tu a l elim ination  
of  s in g u la r  terms and the almost exclu sive  use of d e f i n i t e  d escrip tions  
in  his  lo g ic . But the view need not be pressed t h a t  fa r .
Frege i s  in  general agreement with R u ssell. In a 
properly constructed formal language " it  must be impossible to form 
a proper name lacking a reference."^ Dummett explains th at, for  
Frege, a sentence containing a proper name without a referen t was a 
sentence without a tru th-valu e. And " it  i s  impossible to give any 
coherent account of the  functioning o f a language i n  which i t  i s
9possib le to  construct well-formed sentences which lack truth-value.""  
Natura l  language i s  im perfect, and we make do with i t .  There are 
proper names in natural language without reference, but we under­
stand what i s  said i n  s p i t e  of being unable to give t r u t h - value to  
the sentences in  which empty names occur.
Frege says, "A lo g ic a lly  perfect language should s a t is fy
the conditions; t h a t  every expression well  constructed as a proper
name out of signs a lready introduced s h a l l  in  fa c t des igna te  an
ob jec t ;  and t h a t  no new sign s h a l l  be introduced as a proper name
3without being secured a reference."  For example, Frege in s is t s  t h a t  
i n  arithm etic one does not create numbers by d e f i n i t i o n  and then give  
them names such as "zero", "one", e t c .  "Zero" i s  a proper name, but 
"Only when we have proved t h a t  there e x is ts  one object and one only 
with the required property are we in  the p o s i t io n  to give th is  objec t  
the  proper name 'zero'."^  We must secure a re fe rence  for the name,
^Dummett, o p . c i t .  p. 167 
^ Ib id .  p, 167 
^O p.cit. p. 145
^ Ib i d .  p. 145.
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Even though Frege held to the d e s ir a b ility  of every name's 
referring to an o b je c t ,  in  p ra ctice , Frege's doc t r ine  of sense and
reference enabled him to cope with the  s i t u a t i o n  where a name did 
not have a r e f e r e n t .  Frege's so lu t ion  fo r  the  problem of what i t  
amounts to to use a name l ik e  "Vulcan" i s  to say t h a t ,  as Dummett 
puts i t ,
Such an express ion has a sense because we have a 
c r ite r io n , perhaps quite sharp, a t  any rate a t  le a st  
as sharp as fo r  most names having a genuine reference, 
for an o b j e c t ’s being recognised as the referent of the 
name : but i t  lacks a reference, because as a matter of
fact there i s  nothing which would id en tify  any object  as 
the  referent of the name ; there i s  no ob jec t  which 
s a t i s f i e s  the condition determined by the sense fo r  
being i t s  referen t.
Dummett concludes t h a t  Frege "had no need to pos tu la te  any realm of
shadowy non-existent objects which yet had being, and could therefore
be ta lked about and were ta lked about whenever we used one of these
2empty proper names." In  practice then Frege did not go the way of 
Russell  and Geach and declare the names of Vulcan, P e t ro n e l l a ,  Pegasus 
and Pickwick not to be names a t  a l l .  Frege accepts  such names fo r  
what they are, and i n  as much as he does t h i s  h is  account i s  that 
much more i n t u i t i v e l y  accep tab le .
But, once again, i n  Dummett as in  Geach, Quins and others, 
we see th is  disparaging reference to  "the shadowy realm of non­
e x isten t objects."  But there i s  nothing shadowy about Pickwick, 
Pegasus or Cair Paravel. There are qu i te  clear  accounts of who, what 
and where they are. But of course, that is  not what Dummett and the 
others are ta lk ing about, yet there does seem to be some lack of 
c la r i ty . I t  i s  one th ing to guard against the  confusions which can
3Dummett, o p . c i t . ,  p. 160,
^Ibid. p. 161.
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a r ise  when a name i s  used and i t  i s  not c l e a r  whether what i s  named 
e x is t s  or not, i t  i s  another th ing  to  say tha t  we cannot,  in  some 
l o g ic a l  sense, name non-existent o b je c t s .  As Hlntikka says of t h i s  
view;
The c r i t e r i a  by means of which we recognise an express ion 
as being a proper name do not involve ascertain ing t h a t  
the re  i s  a unique person (o r  object.) to which i t  r e fer s . 
Otherwise i t  would bo a lo g ic a l and not merely a factu a l 
mistake to be deceived by a pseudonym. The p ecu lia r ity
of  'Bourbaki' w i l l  not lead us to  repudiate i t s  namehood.
Empty names are s t i l l  ca lled  names ; . .
Our ord inary  language includes amongst the things of which 
we we speak a myriad of  non-ex is ten t  ob jects , but we are able in  
ordinary language to d istin gu ish  between real and imaginary, ex is ten t  
and n on -existen t. Why should we not then be able to do the same in
logic?
This quest ion  i s  asked, not simply to throw down some sort  
of  lo g ic ia n 's  g a u n t l e t ,  but because there  i s  a problem, one so lu t io n  
to which demands t h a t  we be able  to do some such th ing in  our formal 
systems. The problem can be posed in  the form of a question . In
posing the quest ion Î  w i l l  use the le t te r s  'EP* fo r  " e x i s t e n t i a l
presupposition", and take i t  t h a t  names interpreted in  an EP way are 
names i n t e rp re te d  to be non-empty. The question i s :  I f  we are  given
a formal language which i s  to be in te rp re te d  in  an EP way with re spec t  
to  names, i s  i t  poss ib le  to consider  situ a tio n s in  which those named 
ind ividuals did not e x is t?
In  the chap ter  on free logic  I  hope to  show th a t  the bes t  
way of considering s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which named in d iv idua ls  do not e x i s t  
i s  to abandon an EP i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  names, because the EP i n t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n  of names makes for considerable d if f ic u lt y  in  the  consideration  
of  such s i t u a t i o n s .
^ " E x i s t e n t i a l  Presupposi t ions  and E x i s t e n t i a l  Commitments", p. 127<
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The sense of a name
We s h a l l  a lso  explore the notion th a t  words are entered
in to  the sy n tac t i c  category of proper names by t h e i r  being given as
proper names and th a t  what Dummett c a l l s  " the  c r i t e r i o n  fo r  an objects*
being recognised as the referent of the name" i s  given in  some basic
sense a t  the name-giving — sometimes by the circum stances, as with
a baptism; sometimes by an author  in  the form of a descrip tion;
sometimes by s tip u la tio n , or some other  means. But in  many cases
the re  i s  no c r i t e r i o n  which would s a t is fy  a demand for a d e f i n i t e
d e sc r ip t i o n  o ther  than saying t h a t  a i s  j u s t  the item to which the
name 'a.* was given. I t  does make sense simply to ask, when looking
f o r  the  person who i s  c a l led  "Who is  a,?” We s h a l l  explore the
im pl ica t ions  of assuming th a t  i f  we see the naming r e l a t i o n  as the
f i n a l  i r r e d u c ib le  c r i t e r i o n  for an o b j e c t ’s being recognised as the
rolhient of a name, then we can in terpret the notion of the sense of
a given name as the r e l a t i o n  e s tab l i sh ed  by t h a t  name's having been
given to something.
I t  i s  p ossib le  to  give a formal account of the naming
r e l a t i o n  and the sense of a proper name as out l ined  above. This i s
done in  d e ta il  in  Appendix I .  Use i s  made there of the work of 
1 2Church and Rennie. The formal system developed there  r e lie s  on the 
basic idea t h a t  there are four categories of item s, they are truth 
va lues ,  in d iv id u a l s ,  possib le  worlds, and syn tactic  item s. The 
logic  there i s  developed in  terms of  the relation sh ip s of a functional
^A. Church "A formulat ion of the  Simple Theory of Types",  The Journal 
of Symbolic Logic Vol. 5 , 1940, pp.56-68,
211. K. Rennie, Some uses of type theory in  the analyses of Lanquaoe. 
Aus t ra l ian  National U n iv e rs i ty ,  Canberra, 1974.
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typa which can e x is t  between these categories and ca tego r ie s  b u i l t  
upon them. Our main in te r e s t  i s  in  the s e t  of func t ions  from names 
to  in d iv id u a ls .
I f  a name i s  given to an in d iv id u a l, say ' a /  i s  the name
of a,, then the re la tio n  between the name and the ind iv id u a l  can be
represented se t - th e o r e t ic a lly  by I t  can a lso  be
represented by {^<the individual named by * â '> ]   ^E ither o f
these can be treated as the sense o f ‘a.** and i t  i s  qu ite c lear  that
the sense of is  d is t in c t  from the  sense of *b' provided th a t  *b* 
i s  a d i f f e r e n t  sy n tactic  item to
When a word i s  used as a name i t  i s  placed in  a re la tio n
to that which i t  names. I t  i s ,  of course, an i tem In the category
of  syn tactic  item s, but with in  that category i t  becomes a member of
the se t  of names. This i s  not to say th a t  the sense of a name i s
9" i t s  having been assigned whatever reference i t  has been assigned",
as Wiggins says .  I t  i s  the resu lt o f i t s  having been assigned a 
referen t, the  s e t t i n g  up of the des igna t ion  r e l a t i o n .  Once the word 
has been assigned i t s  referent i t  then has a sense. Indeed, Wiggins 
goes on to  in d ic a te  j u s t  t h i s  when he says, " I f  standing fo r  i t s  
referent i s  what a proper name's having a sense co n sists  in , then 
the re  i s  no room for discrim ination of sense arisin g  from the p a rti­
cular circumstances under which a proper name may have been learn t.
Such contingencies are overcome as they are overcome i n  the learning
3of the sense of any o ther  sort of expression."
^The convention here i s  t h a t  the  value of the  func t ion  i s  to the l e f t .
o"D. Wiggins, "Essen t ia l i sm ,  Continuity and Id en tity" . Synthèse,  23, 1974, p. 338. '
®J,bid. p. 338.
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But we are  here emphasising the "s tanding for" rather
than "that which" a name stands fo r . Wiggins emphasises the  l a t t e r  and
says " I f  we. a t tach  the name ji, to  bearer b.. and the name n. to bearerJ
b, . . , and i f  b. -  b. then,  whether we wish i t  o r  not, the sense of 
XI. w i l l  be the same as the  sense o f n. Yet, in  a footnote, Wiggins2. J
says that "the th ing designated i s  s t i l l  in  a d ifferen t category from
?the sense of i t s  name."" This i s  quite confusing. We have shown how 
we can preserve a p a r t l y  Fregean notion of sense which i s  d i f f e r e n t  
from reference, and yet not dependent on the how each person comes to 
learn which ob jec t  i s  the referent o f a given name. We do not have
to invent a new category of  senses for names.
But,  al though we have provided an account of the sense of 
a proper name, th is  might not be s u ff ic ie n t  fo r  our purposes because 
of  the nature of  the  questions which ra i sed  the problem in  the  f i r s t  
place. Frege's o r ig in a l problem was not why *a’ and *b' are 
d iffe re n t names, but why "g=t" conveys quite d ifferen t ,  information to 
" a r a " .
Even before  we deal vdth th a t  quest ion we need to ask 
whether or not we need to  understand anything more about 'a.' and ' b '  
than that they are names, t h a t  they belong to t h a t  syn tactic  category. 
In  8 sense, the answer i s  that we do not have to understand anything 
more about and 'b ' than th a t  they belong to the category of names, 
N evertheless, as we have defined i t ,  a symbol's being a name j u s t  i s
a symbol's being related  to that which i t  names.
Given that some members of the category of s y n tac t i c  items 
are going to  be used as names we id e n tify  a word's  being used as a
^Ibid, p. 338.
% bid. fn . 29, p. 357.
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name by i t s  lo g ic a l ro le  in  sentences. I f  a word's l o g ic a l  ro le  i s  
not c l e a r  then the re  w i l l  be ambiguity. In spoken Engl ish ,  "Twas 
brown" can be quite ambiguous. I f  a word's lo g ica l  role i s  c l e a r ,  and 
i t  I s  clear  t h a t  i t  i s  a name, then i t s  sense i s  c lea r .
I f ,  then, to understand a word's being a name i s  to under­
stand i t s  sense, what more must we understand concerning "^b" and 
I f  there  i s  anything then i t  w i l l  be about the r e l a t i o n  of 
i d e n t i t y .  I t  i s  worth noting at t h i s  point  th a t  the re  i s  not the 
same pressure on answering the question "What i s  i d e n t i t y ? "  t h a t  the re  
i s  on answering the quest ion "What i s  a proper name?" There are 
questions about whether i d e n t i t y  i s  a re la tion  or not, but these are 
i n  a d ifferen t category .  We are in terested  in  the question  of how a 
p e rson 's  understanding of "a=b" d if fe r s  from th eir  understanding of 
1» such a ivay t h a t  the  t ru th  of one i s  determined i n  a way 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  to the  s teps  taken in  the other.
That d i f f e r en c e  can be explained in  terms of the sense of 
*â* and the sense of ' b ' ,  Whereas we understand to bo l o g i c a l ly
true because what i s  named by must be i d e n t i c a l  to wha t  i s  named
by i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  what i s  named by 'a.* need not be i d e n t i c a l
to  what i s  named by ' b ' .
2 5
CHAPTER TWO 
FORMALIZING AND SINGULAR TERMS
The elim ination of s ingu la r  terms
Before proceeding f u r th e r  with the account of proper 
names in  terms of the naming func t ion  we must take account of the view 
t h a t  there  i s  no need fo r  any proper names in  formalized or id ea l  
languages. Quine claims th a t  i t  would be b etter to elim inate names 
and to reparse  simple s ingu la r  terms as general  terms, and so, there 
i s  no real need fo r  any account of lo g ic a lly  proper names,
Quine 's  arguments fo r  t h i s  course of action f a l l  under 
two main headings.  On the one hand he argues th a t  the re  are a l l  
kinds of problems which a r i s e  from the various uses of constant 
s in g u la r  terms or proper names which would not a r i s e  in  reparsed 
s ingu la r  terms. On the o ther  hand he argues t h a t  by recons t ruc t ing  
the category of names as subordinate  to tha t  of general  terms we lose 
nothing.  Though he does acknowledge that "there i s  a f ee l ing  th a t  with 
repars ing  the names as general  terms we f o r f e i t  p a r t  of t h e i r  meaning, 
v i s .  the purport  of uniqueness,"^ But i t  i s  only a f e e l in g .
We w i l l  take up Quine’s arguments about the problems which 
a r i s e  from the various uses of singular terms when we are d iscuss ing  
free  lo g ic s . At th is  point i t  i s  important to deal with h is  o the r  
s e t  of arguments. For  i f  proper names do not rea lly  need to be 
taken in to  account as such in  formalized languages, but proper names 
can be accounted fo r  by recons t ruc t ing  them, then there i s  no need fo r  
any account of proper names apart from an account of  general terms 
(and q u a n t i f i e r s ,  bound variables and. id en tity  in Quine's case ) ,
W^, V, 0 . Quine, Word and Obje c t , M.I.T, Press ,  M assachusetts, 1960,
p. 162.
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Quine suggests t h a t  we can replace  constan t s ingu la r  
terms e i t h e r  by naming pred ica te s  or by d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t i o n s .  He 
proposes th a t  in  e i t h e r  case we r e t a i n  only one kind of s ingu la r  
term, the bound v a r ia b le .  We turn f i r s t  to h is  proposal f o r  naming
N tmi ncf ored i  c a t e  s
He proposes that when we want to formalize "Socra tes  i s  
wise” we do not put i t  as ”Ws", where "2 " means "Socrates" and "W,. 
means " i s  w ise .” Instead, we should le t  " S . mean " . . . i s  Socrates",
and formalize to
Wxi
The proposal i s  t h a t  we take "Socrates i s  wise" to  mean t h a t  of a 
s e t  of ind iv idua ls  there  i s  a t  l e a s t  one which i s  both named "Socrates' 
and i s  wise.  C le a r ly ,  we can poin t out t h a t  in  t h i s  proposal,  the 
" a t  l e a s t  one" takes  away the uniqueness p resupposi t ion .
So Quine suggests  that the predicate  " . . . i s  Socrates" 
i s  a uniqueness p red ica te .  J u s t  as " . . . i s  a cousin o f . . ."  i s  
symmetrical and " . . . i s  a part o f . . ."  i s  t r a n s i t i v e ,  so " . . . i s  Socrates* 
OF " . . . i s  named 'S o c r a t e s ' "  i s  the property of one and only one 
in d iv id u a l .  As Strawson puts i t ,  "Instead of 'Socra tes  swims' wo 
have 'Something i s  uniquely Socra t ie  and swims' or 'Something which 
i s  uniquely S ocra t ie  swims*. Instead of 'S o c ra te s '  t out court we have 
'Something which i s  uniquely Socratie* . As far as t h i s  language i s  
concerned, names (and sub jec t - term s  in  general)  are  to be seen simply 
as abbrev ia t ions  for such cons t ruc t ions  as these"^
Now i f  a s e t  of such d i s t i n c t  p red ica tes  were to be
Fo Strawson, Sub j e c t  and Predicate in  Logic and Grammar, Methuen,
London, 1974, p. 12.
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introduced then we could claim th a t  a l l  Quine has done has been to  
re-introduce constan t  s in g u la r  terms in to  the formal language. Even 
though they have been in troduced i n  p red ica te  form the same s i n g u l a r i t y  
of re fe rence  would be e x p l i c i t  in  the prim itive bas is  of the n o ta t ion .
Quine him self says t h a t  "the d i s t i n c t i o n  between s ingu la r  
and general  terms i s  vaguely t h a t  a singular term names or  purpor ts  
to  name j u s t  one o b je c t ,  though as complex or  d iffu se  an objec t  as 
you please, while a general  term i s  true of each, sev era lly , of any 
number of objects."^ Also he says t h a t  "'Pegasus' counts as a 
s ingu la r  term though t rue  of nothing, and 'n a tu r a l  s a t e l l i t e  of the 
ear th* counts as a general  term though t rue  of j u s t  one ob jec t .  As 
one vaguely says, 'Pegasus '  i s  s ingu la r  in  th a t  i t  purports to r e f e r  
to j u s t  one ob jec t ,  and ' n a tu r a l  s a t e l l i t e  of the ear th* i s  general  
in  t h a t  i t s  s i n g u l a r i t y  of reference i s  not something purported in  
the  term."^
So, on h is  own account,  since naming p red ica te s  would 
purport  to r e f e r  to but one ob jec t  they would have to be counted as 
s ingu la r  terms. And j u s t  i n  case i t  i s  responded th a t  naming 
p red ica tes  were to  be in  the same sy n tac t ic  category as any o ther  
p red ica te ,  i t  can be pointed out t h a t  the kind of lo g ic a l  d i f f e rences  
t h a t  would d i f f e r e n t i a t e  naming p red ica tes  from o the r  p red ica tes  are 
p re c i se ly  the d i f f e r en c es  which would d iffe re n tia te  constant  singular  
terms from p red ica te s .
We have a lready taken note of the r e f e r e n t i a l  purport of 
naming p red ica te s .  A second poin t can be brought out by a cons ide ra t ion  




(a) (xJ(2 )(x  = && 1  = s . :) . X = %)
(b) (%)(z)(uniquely-Sx & uniquely-S%. 3  . x = %)
(a) i s  c l e a r l y  a lo g ic a l  t r u t h ,  and so must (b) be a lo g ica l  t r u t h  
i f  naming pred ica tes  are as Quine suggests. Now (b) i s  not a 
l o g ic a l  t r u t h  in  general fo r  pred icates. In  o ther  words, the 
following i s  not a lo g ic a l  t r u t h  of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  theory;
(c )  (xJ(y)(F&& FI . 3  . &= i )
All of t h i s  in d ic a te s  t h a t  one can e l imina te  constant 
singular terms in  favour of uniquely referring pred icates, but since 
the semantics fo r  both are the same in  p rin cip le , and the semantics 
fo r  uniquely r e f e r r i n g  pred ica tes  w ill  be d i f f e r e n t  to  the semantics 
fo r  general term pre d ic a te s ,  i t  looks as though Quine has simply 
replaced one sy n ta c t i c  category with another but l e f t  the semantics 
the  same. There j u s t  does not seem to be any point in  i t .  Also in  
terms of the sort of account of proper names that we have been 
developing there seems to be even le s s  poin t .  We have been developing 
the idea t h a t  the sense of a proper name i s  the r e l a t i o n  which the 
name has to that which i t  names. Quine's  moves with naming pred ica tes  
accord with th i s  account of tiie sense of proper names. So be seems 
to have changed nothing but the symbols, Quine himself ,  says, about • 
the  general term " is Socra tes” , t h a t  "such general terms might on 
t h a t  very account be denominated, more p articu larly , names",^
Reference by d e sc r ip t i o n
Although Quine has suggested the device of a naming 
p redicate  to e l im ina te  proper names, t h a t  device i s  not the only one 
suggested. The o ther  important suggest ion i s  to t r e a t  'S o c r a t e s ' ,
^Quine, op .c i t .  p. 182-
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fo r  example, as a general  term with no uniqueness c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  
and then "'Socrates' as a s ingu la r  term can be defined as i s
S ocrates)' on the bas is  of ‘S o c ra te s '  as a general  term."^ This move 
to d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  i s  foHov;ed by a R usse l l ian  programme of 
elim inating d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s  by d e f i n i t i o n .
So Quine can say th a t  “Singular terms have been reparsed
2where simple,  and dissolved where of the  form of d e s c r ip t i o n s . "
And after  showing how one can get r id  of d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  as 
such, Quine remarks in  a footnote  t h a t  "By retracing the  relevant 
reasoning of 3 37 in  add i t ion  to the above, the reader can see t h a t  
the manner of e l im ina t ing  d e sc r ip t io n s  here i s  rea lly  the same as
3R u s s e l l ' s  desp ite  d i f f e r en c es  of approach."
By following th i s  programme Quine i s  l e f t  with pred ica tes ,  
i n d e f i n i t e  s ingu la r  terms and q u a n t i f i e r s ,  i d e n t i t y  and the log ica l  
connectives,  such as negation and conjunct ion,  as the bas ic  c o n s t i ­
tuen ts  of h is  formal language. Neither constant s in g u la r  terms nor 
uniquely r e f e r r in g  p red ica tes  a re  amongst these  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  These 
c o n s t i t u e n t s  r e f l e c t  the two bas ic  notions on which he grounds h is  
no ta t ion  from a phi losophical  point  of view. They are divided 
reference and the i d e n t i t y  of o b jec ts . We tu rn  f i r s t  to  Quine 's  
notion of divided reference.
Divided reference
According to Quine one of the  main d ifferen ces between 
constant  s ingu la r  terms and general  terms i s  that constan t  s ingu la r
*Ibid .  p, 189, 
^Ifoid, p, 184, 
^Ibldo fn ,  p, 184,
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terms purport  to  refer  to but one ob jec t  whereas general terms do not. 
Constant s in g u la r  terras have s in g u la r  reference, but  general  terms 
do not purport to r e f e r  to  but one o b jec t  and so have divided 
reference, Quine says t h a t  the  express ion i s  a natural s a t e l l i t e  
o f  the earth", although i t  has in  f a c t  but one referen t, does not 
purport to refer  to but one o b ject. We could,  without  contradiction , 
have a whole se t  o f objects each of  which could be referred to  by 
the express ion " . . .  i s  a natural s a t e l l i t e  of the earth."
Although i t  does seem strange to say that a general term 
refers to any th ing, e sp ec ia lly  expressions l ike  " . . .  i s  red" or 
" . . .  i s  wise",  we can see something of what Quine i s  gettin g  a t  here, 
but i t  i s  problematic. N evertheless, our point here i s  t h a t  even 
i f  we grant  Quine the d i s t i n c t i o n  between s ingu la r  and divided 
reference we cannot agree t h a t  singular reference can be treated as 
l e s s  basic  than div ided reference.
Fox' Quine, not only general terms, but some o ther  terms 
a lso  have divided reference. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  there are some singular  
terras which Quine claims have div ided reference. This  emerges in  
the  course of Quine 's  moves to e l im ina te  constant s in g u la r  terras.
In his  programme c-f e l im ina t ing  names and d e fin ite
d esc r ip t io n s  Quine reta ins what he c a l l s  " i n d e f i n i t e  singular terms",
What t h i s  amounts to  i s  t h a t  he reta ins bound variables^, which do
not stand alone, but are bound by a q u an tifier . The q u an tifier ,
e i t h e r  ' 3 '  for 'At l e a s t  one '  or ’ V ' for 'Every ' ,  and var iab le
2toge the r  c o n s t i t u t e  an i n d e f i n i t e  singular tex'm. Fox' example, i f  
we take ' F . « . '  to  mean ' . . . i s  w i s e ' ,  then *(3 x)Fx'  means 'Something 
i s  wise*.  The * ( 3 x ) , . . x *  c o n s t i t u t e s  an i n d e f i n i t e  singular term
h b id . p. 178. 
®Ibid, p. 162-163.
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which i s  t r a n s la t e d  as 'Something .
Of these  s ingu la r  terms Quine says, " i n d e f i n i t e  singular
terms do not des igna te  objects'*,  apparently meaning th a t  they do
2not name any one o b je c t ,  although there w il l  be an ob jec t  with the
property predicated of the i n d e f i n i t e  singular term i f  the property
i s  t r u l y  predicated. I n d e f in i t e  singular terms are said  to be " b u i l t
3upon general terms," and do not purport to r e f e r  to j u s t  one ob jec t .  
In d efin ite  singular terms, l ik e  general  terms, have divided reference.
Divided reference, toge the r  with id en tity  are basic for  
Quine because he holds that once a person has mastered these notions 
he has mastered the scheme of enduring and recu rr ing  physical o b je c t s .  
And things true in  such a scheme of objects can best be expressed in  
a formal notation based upon divided reference and id e n tity . So, i f  
we can give good reasons for holding that one cannot master divided 
reference and i d e n t i t y  without grasping uniqueness of reference, then 
we could argue t h a t  the e l im ina t ion  of s ingu la r  terms severely  
• impoverishes a language which i s  supposed to be adequate fo r  the 
express ion of t r u t h s  about the ob jec t s  in  the scheme proposed.
So f i r s t  l e t  us consider what Quine has to say about t h i s  
scheme of enduring and recurring physical  o b je c t s .  The scheme i s  
d erivative  in  a strong sense. What are primary are the s t im ula t ions  
which a person rece iv es . These s t im ula t ions  resemble each other and 
d if fe r  from each other. A person learns to respond in  a general term 
fashion to  s t im u la t io n .  This i s  so because of a recognition of 
resemblances, A ch i ld  must, so to speak, sense more resemblance
^Ibidc p. 146, 
^ ïb id .  p. 113 
^ Ib ld .  p. 163.
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between some stim ulations than between o th e r s .  Otherwise a dozen
reinforcements of h i s  response 'Red ' ,  on occasions when red th ings  were
presented,  would no more encourage the same response to a t h i r t e e n t h
red thing than to a blue one; and a dozen reinforcements o f his
response 'Mama', on occasions dominated by the mother ' s  face at various
angles, would be j u s t  as inconsequential."^
In  the course o f time, building on the recogn i t ion  of
the  substan tia l sameness of stim ulations a ch i ld  has to "get on" to
divided reference, and hence to  have mastered the scheme of  physical
o b jects , Quine says t h a t ,  "To what ex ten t  the  ch i ld  may be said to
have grasped id e n tity  of phys ical  objects (and not ju s t  s im ila r ity
of s t imula t ion)  ahead of divided reference, one can sca rce ly  say
?without, becoming c l e a r e r  on c r it e r ia ." '
So, fo r  Quine, the re  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between the i d e n t i t y  
of ob jec ts  and the divided re fe rence  of general terms. With these 
two notions a person may name an o b je c t ,  and hence have mastery of 
•a s ingu la r  term,
Quine 's  use of the  'Mama' example shows how he sees a 
c h i l d ' s  development of the conceptual scheme. At some poin t there  
i s  a s h i f t  from a certa in  response to s im i la r  s t im ula t ions  to a 
certa in  response to the same ob jec t .  This s h if t  r e f l e c t s  a grasp of 
both what i t  i s  fo r  ob jec ts  to be the same and what i t  i s  for a term 
to  divide i t s  reference. So, instead of 'Mama' being a response 
to  s im i la r  s t im u la t io n s ,  and thus ,  i n  a sense,  a general  term, 'Mama' 
becomes the name of an o b je c t .  For the ch ild  the one word refers  
always to the same ob ject, and hence i s  a name. Other words which 




So, in  the context of several, utterances such as "Mama 
s ings" ,  "Papa s ings" ,  "Mama cooks", "Papa does not cook", the 
ch i ld  i s  showing t h a t  one and the same object i s  s im i la r  to  another 
ob jec t  in  c e r t a in  ways, and d i s s i m i l a r  in  c e r t a in  ways, as well  as
showing th a t  he now can use the physical  object  scheme.
Both for mastery of the physical  ob jec t  scheme and fo r  
the a b i l i t y  to be able to  name o b jects , Quine says t h a t  a person 
must have grasped the notion of the  i d e n t i t y  of physical  objects and 
the notion of a general  te rm 's  d iv id ing  i t s  reference.
One way of looking a t  the person 's  grasping of or g ettin g
on to the notion of the i d e n t i t y  of physical  objects i s  to see the
person t a c i t l y  assuming that the world i s  made up of d i s t i n c t  o b je c t s ,  
or t h a t  there  i s  a s e r i e s  o f d i s t i n c t  ob jec t s ,  or t h a t  the world 
about the person can be seen as a c o l l e c t i o n  of d i s t i n c t  o b je c t s .  This 
t a c i t  assumption gives sense to div ided refe rence  in  both the bound 
va r iab le  and general  term senses.  To say th i s  i s  not to say t h a t  
q u a n t i f i e r s  and general  terms derive a l l  t h e i r  meaning from the notion 
of  the  i d e n t i t y  of physical  o b je c t s ,  i t  i s  j u s t  to i n s i s t  t h a t  t h i s  
notion i s  e s s e n t i a l .
All  of what has been said so far has been focussed on 
divided reference. We now turn  to i d e n t i t y  and i t s  r e l a t i o n s h ip  to 
divided reference. In  the course of the  d iscuss ion  we sh a ll take up 
c r it ic ism  of Quine 's  point  of view.
I d e n t i t y  and div ided reference
Even w ith in  Quine 's  own conception of how one comes to 
grasp the conceptual scheme of physical  ob jec ts  we can point  out the 
b as ic  inadequacies of  h is  notion of i d e n t i t y  and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to 
div ided reference. In  f a c t  he says very l i t t l e  about i d e n t i t y ,  but
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he does speak about how one comes to grasp the notion of 'same x \
He suggests t h a t  t h i s  notion i s  grasped in  a fashion analogous to the 
way in  which one grasps divided reference.
By a process of b inary  os tens ion  one learns  'same-person*. 
This term goes with simultaneous or  c lose ly  consecutive p re sen ta t ions  
in  pairs. I t  proves to apply whenever both p resen ta t ions  are 
appropr ia te ,  "for example, to  'Mama* and whenever both are  appropr ia te  
to 'Daddy'."1
Although, as Quine says, his  example i s  u n r e a l i s t i c  and 
merely cited  to demonstrate some s o r t  of  analogy, we must take i t  
ser iou sly  in  some sense otherwise i t  i s  mere phantasy. But his 
example i s  not only u n r e a l i s t i c ,  i t  seems to have the  lo g ic a l order 
the  wrong way around. Quine 's  th es is  i s  t h a t  the temporal order, or 
a t  b a re s t  minimum the lo g ic a l  o rder ,  i s  t h a t  f i r s t  a person grasps 
the notion of  i d e n t i t y  and of a term's dividing i t s  reference. Then 
(second) one grasps the notion of 'same x ' ,  perhaps a t  the same time 
as one grasps the notion of i d e n t i t y  and of a te rm 's  d iv id ing  i t s  
reference, and then ( t h i r d )  one can name o b jec t s .
But in  the example given, one learns  "same-person" 
because i t  applies to c lo se ly  consecutive  presentations of  'Mama' or 
'Daddy*. Although i t  i s  not i n d e l i b l y  c l e a r ,  i t  looks very much as 
though the th i r d  and second step s, at le a s t , are round the wrong way. 
I t  even looks as though a person i s ,  i n  Quine 's  example, learning 
i d e n t i t y  and divided re ference  on the bas is  of having learnt to name 
Mama or Daddy, or to  recognise  these  persons as so named.
Also, Quine himself ,  in  h i s  sec t ion  on id e n tity , says 
t h a t  "statements of i d e n t i t y  t h a t  are true and not id le  c o n s i s t  of
^ Ib i d .  p,
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unl ike  singular terms t h a t  refer  to the  same t h i n g . Now i t  i s  not
much help fo r  Quine to say th a t  we base asse r t io n s  of i d e n t i t y  on the 
notion  of same physical  ob ject, because he has already said t h a t  we 
only master the notion of same physical object  when we master the
notion of id e n t ity . Perhaps one masters them together as one
"scrambles up an in te l le c tu a l chimney, supporting himself  against
9each side by pressure against the others.""
I f  we accept the chimney image the l e a s t  that can be said 
i s  that id en tity  and naming go together, th a t  i s ,  singular reference 
i s  e sse n tia l fo r  id e n t ity . And so, what i s  needed in  order to grasp 
the scheme of recu r r ing  and enduring physical  ob jec ts  i s  mastery of 
both s ingu la r  and div ided reference.
N evertheless, i t  can be responded that once the  schema of 
recu r r ing  and enduring physical  ob jec t s  has been mastered only 
i d e n t i t y  need by included i n  a language which i s  to be used to s t a t e  
t r u t h s  about these  o b je c t s .  An understanding of s ingu la r  references* 
being e s s e n t i a l  fo r  an understanding of i d e n t i t y  simply means t h a t  
the  use of i d e n t i t y  implies an understanding of s ingu la r  reference. 
Although t h i s  lack of s ingu la r  terms impoverishes the language, we 
can do without them. As Quine says ,  "having got up to here ,  we 




qW. V. 0 . Quine, "To Grice" i n  Words and Objections:  Essavs on the
work of  W. V. Quins. Eds. Donald Davidson and Jaakko Hlntikka .  
Reidel Dordrecht, 1969, p. 326.
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Singular Reference
But j u s t  what does t h i s  claim of Quine 's  amount to in  
terms of a formal language and i t s  semantics? I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  true 
t h a t  in  f i r s t  order p red ica te  ca lcu lus  one can do without a s e t  of
nind iv idua l  cons tan ts .  Church's  system, , i s  a c l a s s i c  case of 
j u s t  th is .  But, as has a lready been pointed out,  the lack of i n d i ­
vidual constan ts  i s  made up for i n  the semantics,  A carefu l d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  i s  drawn between bound and f ree  occurrences of ind ividual variab les, 
and then the value o f a variable occurring free in  a formula i s  given 
as a s ingle  item in  the domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  S ingular reference  
i s  preserved in  the semantics by t h i s  d is tin c t io n  between free and 
bound occurrences of in d iv idua l  v a r i a b le s .
What t h i s  claim must amount to i s  that there s h a l l  be no 
f r ee  occurrences of ind iv idua l  v a r iab les  in  the  formal no ta t ion  most 
to  be d e s i r ed .  This then ra ises the quest ion of what w i l l  be the 
semantics fo r  quan t i f i ed  formulae. Are the semantics to involve  
s in g u la r  re ference?  For standard se t-th e o r e tic  semantics the answer 
on prima fac ie  grounds would be 'y e s ' .  I f  we give the semantics for  
( 3  k )Fx  in  the usual  way then we have
( i )  Val(F) e ( P ( D J
( i i )  V a l(3x)F x  = 1 .5 .  Val(F) ^ 0.
But how do we decide whether or not VaKF) # 0? We decide i t  by
seeing whether or not there i s  some one member of Val(F) to  which we 
may make s in g u la r  reference. I f  i t  i s  impossible to make s in g u la r  
reference, V al(3x )F x  = 0,
This a lso  turns  out to be the s o r t  of argument which deve-
1lops i f  we resort to our formal type th e o r e t i c  metatheory. I t  tu rns
^Sse Appendix
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out there  a lso  t h a t  we are d r iven  back to  the semantics for qu an t i ­
f i c a t i o n .
Geach^ has developed a p a r a l l e l  argument with much the
same conclusion .  I t  i s  p a ra lle l i n  the sense t h a t  he does not develop
i t  in  the context of the semantics fo r  q u a n tifiers , but rather, in  the
context of  the sort o f na tu ra l  deduct ion dec is ion  procedure followed
2by Quine in  Methods of Loaic and elsewhere. In discussin g  the ru le
of  E x i s t e n t i a l  I n s t a n t i a t i o n  (SI) Geach says:
The premise " (3  x)Fx" g ives us what i s  supposed to 
be t r u e  in  some instance; we make b e lieve  t h a t  we can 
a c tu a l ly  c ite  an instance w, and then, i f  a conclusion  
follow s from t h i s  make-believe c i t a t i o n  of an instance, 
regardless o f which instance w may be, t h a t  
conclusion i s  deemed to follow from ” (3  x)Fx". Thus, 
since q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  theory can be formulated in  t h i s  
na tura1-deduct ion s t y l e ,  i t  necessarily  g ives us 
'poss ib le*  proper names, namely the dummy l e t t e r s  l ike  ^ 
’V* used in  natural deduction as i f  they were proper names.
This resort to 'poss ib le*  proper names i s  the resort to
s ingu la r  reference. Geach goes on to  say, "This deprives of a l l
ph i losoph ica l  s ig n i f ic an ce  Quine 's  neo-Russe111an trea tm ent of  proper
names as d isguised  d e sc r ip t i o n s . " ^
For both standard  semantics and in  na tu ra l -deduct ion
methods there  i s  the e x p lic it  assumption of the p o s s i b i l i t y  of
singular reference. I t  i s  almost impossible to see how one can avoid
r e s o r t in g  to singular re fe rence ,  or some s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  surrogate for
i t ,  such as su b stitu tin g  proper names. I f  Quine kicks  away his  ladder
of  singular reference then he w i l l  lose touch with the Quinean ground
of  being — the range o f bound v a r i a b le s .
^Op.c i t .  pp. 139-146.
V. Oo Quine, Methods of Logic, Holt ,  New York, 1950.
3O p .c i t .  p. 143,
^ Ib id .  p. 143.
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CHAPTER THREE 
NAMING ACROSS POSSIBLE WORLDS
We now tu rn  to modal p red ica te  logics  in  order to see 
whether the proposed theory of proper names i s  of any use in  c l a r i f y ­
ing a range of problems such as the problem of transmundane i d e n t i ­
f i c a t i o n  and the problems of the su b s t itu t iv ity  o f id e n t ic a ls . These 
problems w il l  be approached, not by the immediate consideration  of a 
range of modal predicate lo g ic s ,  but by the cons idera t ion  of some 
conjec tures  and then by the cons t ruc t ion  from the ground up, as i t  
were, of a range o f lo g ic s . We s h a l l  delay the in t ro d u c t io n  of 
modal opera tors  somewhat. Afte r  the  in t roduc t ion  of modal operators 
we s h a l l  consider the  uses of d e f i n i t e  de sc r ip t ions  in  modal p red i ­
ca te  log ic ,  e sp e c i a l l y  considering the re l a t i o n s h ip  between d e f i n i t e  
descrip tions and proper names.
Time and His tory
Writers of s c i e n c e - f i c t i o n  have o f ten  used the idea of 
someone's going from t h i s  universe  to some o ther  un iverse  which, 
although i t  i s  sim ilar to  t h i s  one, i s  d i f f e r e n t  in  some s ingu la r ly  
important way. In many cases the source of the d i f f e r en c e  i s  to be 
found in  some h i s t o r i c  event which has turned out d i f f e r e n t l y  to 
what has actu ally  happened. Perhaps Napoleon wins W aterloo,or H i t l e r  
i s  assass ina ted  in  1938, or Church i l l  d ies  in  1940, or  Hannibal 
conquers Rome, or  Socrates wins his  cou r t -case .
The idea t h a t  h i s to ry  could have been the same up to some 
p a r t i c u l a r  point  and then have diverged,  has obvious i n t u i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s  to e ith er  Kripke 's  notion of sets  of possib le  worlds or
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H in t ikka ' s  notion of model system s. Indeed, Hintikka i s  qu i te
e x p l i c i t  about t h i s  very th ing when he says:
What I  take to be the d i s t i n c t i v e  fea tu re  of a l l  use of 
p rep o s i t io n a l  a t t i t u d e s  i s  the fact t h a t  in  using them we 
are consider ing more than one p o s s i b i l i t y  concerning the 
w or ld .1
We can s e t  up a model system to r e f le c t  the d i f f e r en ce  
between the ac tua l  and some possib le  ( f i c t i o n a l )  world. The ac tua l  
world,  £ ,  can be ( p a r t i a l l y )  described by some se t of propos i t ions ,
Pg, such as would be found in  a history  te x t , A second se t of propo­
s it io n s ,  would describe a f ic t io n a l world, f,. There could be 
much in  common between the two s e t s ,  e sp e c ia l l y  i f  the f i c t i o n a l  
account asse r ted  t h a t  everything before  some p a r t i c u l a r  event was 
the  same as in  the ac tu a l  world. The p a r t i c u l a r  event, l e t  us say, 
i s  Hannibal 's  cross ing  of the Alps, and in  the f ic t io n a l world Some 
f a l l s  to Hannibal and Carthage dominates the Mediterranean sta te s  
fo r  c en tu r i e s .  Given such a s to ry  of a Car thagin ian Mediterranean, 
then there  would s t i l l  be many propos i t ions  in  which would be in  
but many which would e i t h e r  not be in  or whose negation 
would be in
In  the  context of  our Punic s to ry  we can ask about the 
r e l a t i o n s h ip  between the ind iv idua ls  in  £  and f , t r e a t i n g  t h i s  as an 
instance of the general  problem of the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  between ind iv idua ls  
from world to  world. We can ask, do and show us p o s s ib i l i t ie s ,  
as f a r  as what could have happened when Hannibal was in  I t a l y ,  one of 
which was f u l f i l l e d  and the o the r  not;  or do and show us two 
q u i te  d i s t i n c t  possib le  worlds which are remarkably s im i la r  in  some 
r e spec ts  but q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  in  o thers?  This question  i s  re levan t  
to conjec tu res  about what might have been the case,  both in  the
Hint ikka,  Semantics fo r  p rep o s i t io n a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  in  Philosophica l  
Logic . Eds. J.W. Davis e t  a l .  Reidel Dordrecht,  1969, p. 24.
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s i t u a t i o n  when we d o n ' t  know and are looking for the  l i k e l i e s t  
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and a lso  when we are d iscuss ing  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  contrary  
to f a c t .  From such conjec tures  questions  a lso  a r i s e  concerning the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of in d iv idua ls  across possib le  worlds.  The f i c t i o n a l  
and the phi losophical  are  c lo se ly  re l a t e d  here .
Pursuing our Punic story , consider the  following: Let
us suppose t h a t  Wells^ invents  a time-machine and "goes back" to 
Hannibal 's  invasion of I t a l y ,  Then by means of his  modern s k i l l s ,  
he helps Hannibal to overcome Rome and defeat  Sc ip io .  As a consequence 
o f t h i s  Carthage dominates the Mediterranean, and modern h i s to ry  i s  
r a d i c a l l y  d iffe r e n t , and Wells does not invent his  time machine. In  
o th e r  words, we f i r s t  assume th a t  i f  he invents his  machine then he 
helps  Hannibal,  then we discover  that i f  he helps Hannibal he does 
not Invent h is  machine. We can conclude t h a t  he did not invent 
h is  machine and go back and a lte r  h i s to r y  so t h a t  h is  own machine 
could not be invented.
Let us consider two of the  ways of escaping the  conclusion 
of  our time tra v e llin g  con jec tu res .  These ways of escaping w i l l  have 
to  involve an a l t e r a t i o n  in  the s to ry ,  or i t s  framework, o r  some 
presupposi t ion about "going back" in  time.
The f i r s t  way of escaping i s  to pos tu la te  a ltern ative  
poss ib le  worlds which are qu i te  d is jo in t .  Since the world in  which 
Wells makes his  machine does not have Wells helping Hannibal to win, 
then Wells cannot arrive , or  appear,  a t  some point in  i t s  past  
because he does not.  So we assume th a t  Wells* machine a c tu a l ly  takes 
him to some o ther  possib le  world, an a l t e r n a t iv e  one to t h i s  one.
In  H, G. Wells* story "The Time Machine” (1895) the tim e-tra v e ller  
i s  not Wells, nor i s  the story to ld  by the t im e-tra v e ller . I  have
j u s t  borrowed the  surname. Let us name him "0,  H, Wells",
41
oris in  which a Mr, Wells appears and helps a general ca l l ed  Hannibal. 
The fa ct t h a t  the h istory  of t h a t  world i s  the same as the history
of  t h i s  one up to  the point when Wells appears i s  but an amazing 
coincidence.
This escape route  is  used by various  w riters . The impor­
t a n t  fe a tu re  of  t h i s  kind of story i s  t h a t  the Hannibal of t h i s  
world and the  Hannibal of that world are not one and the  seme person. 
N e i ther  i s  the  Socra tes of t h i s  world nor the Socra tes  of  t h a t  world 
one and the same, nor anyone e l s e ,  except the tim e-tra v e ller . Even 
i f  the  d e sc r ip t io n s  w i th in  and are the same i n  every way, 
the  people,  p laces ,  things e t c . ,  are d i s t i n c t  with only the one 
exception, Wells.
So the na tu ra l  language name "Socra tes" ,  though i t  occurs
in  sentences express ing the propos i t ions  in  both and
su f fe r s  from the same kind of ambiguity as any n a tu ra l  language name
which names two persons.  I f  we form alize the express ion of  the
propos i t ions  in  p and wi th in  one formal system, then we w i l l  9 *
have to use d i s t i n c t  ind iv idua l  cons tants  fo r  the two Socra tes .  We 
can do as we would in  the  case of two Mr, Jones in  one world,  t h a t  i s ,  
use any two cons tan ts ,  or we could do something a l i t t l e  more 
i n t u i t i v e l y  acceptable ,  t h a t  i s ,  use the same l e t t e r  and subscr ip t  
but with a s u p e r sc r ip t  to in d ic a te  the world, "Socra tes"  in  
might be represented  by and "Socra tes"  in  by
Hughes and Cresswel l  make a recommendation somewhat 
s im i la r  to  t h i s  la t te r  a l t e r n a t i v e  when s e t t in g  out symbols fo r  a 
quan t i f ied  modal logic  with contingent i d e n t i t y .  S im i la r ly ,  we could 
take a denumerable l i s t  of ind iv idua l  cons tan ts ;  a^, bj ,^ b^,
%» . . . ,  and give to each the  supe r sc r ip t  jn when i t  named an 
ind iv idua l  in  the  world described by p ,
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The second way of escaping r e l i e s  upon the notion of 
"branching" worlds.  This idea i s  t h a t  there  i s  but one world up 
u n t i l  the moment before  Wells appeared.  Upon t h a t  i n s t a n t  there  
begins a branching in to  two possib le  worlds,  the  one which we c a l l  
" the  real world",  the o the r  " the  time t r a v e l l e r ' s  world." would 
be the d e sc r ip t i o n  of the world up to  and then along the ' r e a l '  
branch, the descrip tion  up to and then along the  'time 
t r a v e l l e r ' s '  branch.
The important feature of th is  kind of story i s  th at, 
unlike the f i r s t  where only Wells i s  common to both worlds, there 
are  many ind ividuals common to both.
Ind iv iduals, worlds and id en tity
At t h i s  point  we can generalize about the individual
constants  and the ind iv idua ls  they designate r e l a t i v e  to each 
I f  the re  are denumerably many possib le  worlds, each ( p a r t i a l l y )  
described by a s e t  of p ropos i t ions ,  ( n > l ) ,  then the names used 
in  express ing the p roposit ions  could designate ind iv idua ls  such t h a t  
e ith er:
I . )  There would be but one s e t  of in d iv idua ls  each
of whose members would be common to each possib le  
world, or
I I . )  There would be one d i s t i n c t  s e t  of  ind iv iduals each 
o f  whose members would be common to each possib le  
world, and one d i s t i n c t  so t  of in d iv idua ls  fo r  each 
and only one p ossib le  world, or
I I I . )  There would be s e t s  of ind iv idua ls  whose members 
would be common to the members of various  se ts  of 
poss ib le  worlds, ranging from u n i t  se ts  of possib le
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worlds to the whole s e t ,  or 
IV,)  There would be as many d i s t i n c t  and exclu sive  se ts  
o f  ind iv idua ls  as possib le  worlds with but one se t  
fo r  each p ossib le  world.
In  the f i r s t  th ree  cases we have the s itu a tio n  where 
ind ividuals are common to  several worlds. This i s  what was suggested 
above in  both ways of escaping the time travel paradox. For one 
there  was only one i n d iv idua l  common to both worlds,  in  the  other 
the re  were many. Case IV i s  j u s t  the s i t u a t i o n  suggested by Lewis 's  
Counterpart theory ,^
These cases ra ise  a problem about what can be expressed 
about common membership of various  worlds in  any formal language we 
might co n s t ru c t .  I f  we set. up a formal system con s i s t in g  of a model 
system, XL , of model s e t s ,  p ^ ( n > l ) ,  so that XL ”  { u^, u^, l y , . , . j ,
then although each }\  ^ can be taken as a ( p a r t i a l )  d escrip tion  of a 
poss ib le  world we must decide where the "trans-world"  id e n t it ie s  are 
to go, or  even whether we are to t o l e r a t e  the express ion of  such 
proposit ions  in  the formal language. I f  we were to decide not to 
t o l e r a t e  such t rans-world  i d e n t i t i e s ,  fo r  whatever reasons ,  and we 
were to supe rsc r ip t  ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  in  the manner suggested 
above, then i t  i s  f a i r l y  c l e a r  what would happen in  our formal system,
VJe would simply wr i te  the formation ru le s  so t h a t  only ind iv idua l  
constants  with the same superscript would occur in  the  one formula.
Then, those formulae with the ind iv idua l  constants  superscr ip ted  
with ji could go only in to
I f  we decide to  t o l e r a t e  the express ion of transworld 
i d e n t i t i e s  then s u i t a b le  provis ion  w i l l  have to be made in  the 
formation r u l e s ,  and s u i t a b le  condit ions  s e t  out for the membership 
of members of XL , I t  would be possib le  e i t h e r  to c rea te  a d i s t i n c t  
1D, Lewis, "Counterpar t  Theory and Quantified Modal Logic",  The Journal 
(ULjüUJaaoiÈZ, 65, 1968.
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transworld i d e n t i t y  se t as a member of XI and to r e s tr ic t  transworld 
i d e n t i t i e s  to  t h a t  d is t in c t  s e t  of formulae, or  to  allow transworld 
id e n t it ie s  to be members of some or  any of the in  XI . Because 
of c e r t a in  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which would a r i s e  with the former p o s s i b i l i t y  
i n  the  long run we here adopt the l a t t e r  p olicy .
I t  must be noted t h a t ,  in  genera l ,  the ind iv idua l  named 
by need be i n  no way sim ilar to the Individual named by ' a T \
The use of the same le t te r  and subsc r ip t  with d iffer in g  su p e r sc r ip t s
i s  no more than a typographical  concession to the use of  names in  
n a tu ra l  language. The in d iv idua l  constants  are the symbols as a 
whole and i s  as d ifferen t to ' as would * *  be to
Also, ill what follows,  we s h a l l  assume that / I  i s  a s e t  
o f  s e t s  of formulae of some formal system. I f  the  members of
were maximal con sisten t se ts  of formulae then each member could be 
ca lled  a complete novel^. and a possib le world i s  simply what Is  
described by the  p ropos i t ions  expressed by the  members of a complete 
novel,  except fo r  those members which are  trans-world  i d e n t i t i e s .
Q u a n t i f i c a t io n ,  transworld i d e n t i t y ^ a n d  no modal opera tors
We w i l l  now proceed to  the cons t ruc t ion  of four formal 
systems, without modal operators, to r e f le c t  each of the cases I  to
IV. I t  i s  important to be c l e a r  about the presupposit ions  in  terms 
o f  which these  systems w i l l  be b u i l t .  Our f i r s t  assumption i s  t h a t  
an ind iv idua l  constant  des igna tes  one and only one in d iv id u a l .  I t  
does not matter  in  which formulae an ind iv idua l  constant  occurs ,  or 
in  which in  an XL the formulae occur, a constan t  designa tes  only
1 .  ■ ■J .  Hint ikka,  " In d iv id u a l s ,  Poss ib le  Worlds and Epistemic Logic",  
Noiis, Vol. 1 No. 1, p. 41.
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one in d iv id u a l .  Our assumption th a t  whatever a constant designates  
I t  designates always means t h a t  we are assuming t h a t  cons tants  are 
what Kripke c a l l s  " r i g i d  designators."^
The second of our assumptions i s  t h a t  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n s ,  
such as (Ex) and (Ox), w i l l  have as t h e i r  domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  
the se t  of in d iv idua ls  i n  the world ( p a r t i a l l y )  described by the 
in  which the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  occurs. So, i f  describes world 
n, and (Ex)Fx i s  a member of u , then our reading of (Ex)Fx as "some- 
th ing  i s  F" presupposes t h a t  the something i s  of  world £.  To be 
qu i te  e x p l i c i t  we should read 
(Ex)Fx d
as "Something in  world n , I s  F," Sim ilarly we should take
( % ) %  Pn 
as ind ica t ing  t h a t  everything in  world _n i s  F,
With these  two presupposi t ions  in  mind we w i l l  cons t ruc t
the four systems = ( l < i < 4 ) .  These four systems are to r e f l e c t
the  cases I  to IV re sp e c t iv e ly .  We w i l l  begin by cons t ruc t ing  p^Q -
4to r e f l e c t  case IV, We begin with p Q = because i t  i s  in  many 
ways the s implest  case .  Once we have constructed a l l  four systems, 
p^Q “  ( 1 1 <  4 ) ,  we w i l l  then introduce modal opera tors  and construct
a s e t  of modal predicate lo g ic s .
Our procedure i s  unl ike  the usual procedure of taking some
formal system and attempting to  give i t  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  We are
presupposing c e r t a in  th ings  about ind iv idua l  constants  and q u a n t i f i e r s  
and const ruct ing  systems in  accordance with those p resupposi t ions .
The systems w i l l  d i f f e r  only with r e sp ec t  to one th ing ,  and t h a t  one
^S. A, Kripke, "Naming and Necess ity"  in  Semantics of  Natural Language, 
Eds, D, Davidson & G, Harmon, Reidel Dordrecht, 1972, pp. 269 f*f.
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th ing  concerns the r e l a t io n s h ip s  between domains of q u a n t i f i c a t io n  
as s e t  out in  cases I to IV,
As we proceed c e r t a in  quest ions  w i l l  a r i s e ,  and w i l l  be 
d e a l t  with .  By the  time we get to the point of in troducing  modal 
opera to rs  we s h a l l  have determined c e r t a in  important quest ions  of 
in terp reta tion , and t h i s  should a s s i s t  us with the modal systems. 
But above a l l ,  i t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  our presupposit ions  about i n d i ­
vidual constants  w i l l  lead to  reasonable  and re a d i ly  i n t e r p r e t a b l e  
systems of modal p red ica te  lo g ic .  Furthermore, in  these  systems 
certa in  problems concerning i d e n t i t y  and d e sc r ip t i o n  can be d ea lt  
with q u i te  e f f e c t iv e ly .
So we now proceed to system ju^ Q -  which i s  to r e f l e c t  
case IV, where the se t s  of i nd iv idua ls  in  the worlds are qui te  
d i s t i n c t  one from the other.
Formalizing.
JCE L5
Pr im i t ive  symbols: 
improper symbols: d  U ( )
prepositional v a r ia b le s :  r , , £»,
ind iv idua l  variab les: x^t l ip  Xg# %• « • »
 ^ . n - n n n , n n n3.nd2.VIdual cons tan ts .  “*l* 1  ^ * ^2* Bp• * * ® ®
m - a r y  p red ica te  variables: F^, G ,^ G ,^ ® ® » (^ > 1 )
predica te  constant :  =
Formation Rules:
1. A p repos i t iona l  v a r iab le  standing alone i s  a w ff,
2 . I f  i s  as m-ary pred ica te  v a r i a b le ,  and i f
m ind iv idua l  constants  (n e c es sa r i l y  d i s t i n c t )  then
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F @2 ». IS a w i i ,
3, I f  a, and b are  any in d iv idua l  constants  (not n eces sa r i ly  d i s t i n c t )  
then a. -  b i s  a wff.
4 . I f  A i s  a wff so i s  A.
So I f  4  and B are wffs and a l l  the  individual constants  occurr ing 
in  A and B outside of atomic pa r ts  which are id e n t it ie s  have 
the same superscript, then so i s  ( ^ 3  & ) .^
6. I f  A is  a wff and x i s  any individual variab le, then provided 
th a t  a l l  the ind iv idua l  constants in  A have the same superscript, 
then (Ux)(A ( x / / a ) )  i s  a w ff, where (A i x / / ^ ) )  i s  the r e s u l t  
of s u b s t i t u t i n g  x fo r  a at zero or more occuBsnces of a. in  A..
Ï . Termi na1 c l a u s e .
Formulae constructed according to ru le s  land 2 are  ca l l ed  "atomic 
wffs" ,  and formulae constructed  to  ru le  3. are c a l led  " i d e n t i t i e s ” .
The "atomic par ts"  of any formula are the smal les t  well  formed p a r t s .
The normal d e f i n i t i o n s  of  &, V, = and E are used. Also (A (X/Y )) i s  
the r e s u l t  of s u b s t i t u t i n g  X fo r  Y a t  every occurrence of Y in  A.
Model System:
A Model system il,  i s  such that
~ n  "" p  , h p f  c e o ,  , * e «  ^ (  n ^  1 )
and the members of XI are model s e t s ,  i . e .  se t s  of formulae. The 
condi tions  which determine the membership of any p in  a u^Q = 
model system are
(C. |.\^) I f  A conta ins  any ind iv id u a l  constant occurring outs ide
of an i d e n t i t y  and i  r  n, then A ^  p n'
(C.DD) I f  af and ^  are ind iv idua l  constan ts ,  ( i ^  l ) ( k > l ) ,  i n  any
1
I n  o ther  words: a l l  the constants  in  A and B have the same super­
s c r i p t s  o the r  than those occurring i n  i d e n t i t i e s  where d i f f e r e n t  super­
s c r i p t s  are allowed.
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' member of a member of i l  and i  # k then fo r  every i n  i l
a] ^ ^
(Comment: these  f i r s t  two ru le s  ensure t h a t  Iransworld n o n - id e n t i t i e s
occur in  model s e t s .  The second ru le  i s  ca l led  ' (C.DD)'  because i t  
i s  the dis jo in t ,  domain con d i t io n . )
( C . ^ )  Not both A e. p and e p .
(C , '^ "^ )  I f  e M then A e u .' n ' n
( C . d ) I f  (ADB) e p then e i t h e r  <^ A & p or B e p or both 
(0,  3 ) I f  '^(A 3 B) € then A e and ^  A e
(C.E ) I f  (Ex)A 6 u then (A(aVx))  e ii, for a t  l e a s t  one11 ^  r 21 — — • n
ind iv idua l  constant a_” ,
(C.Ü ) I f  (8x)A € p then i f  occurs in  any formula in  ju then
UUl/VxJ) €
( C . s e l f / O  b 3^ b é
(G.-)  I f  A e and (a" -  b!b e then (A (a? /b ? ) )
(Comment: the r u l e s ,  (C,-~^) to  ( C , - ) ,  are the standard ru le s  fo r
pred ica te  logic  with i d e n t i t y  where the ind iv idua ls  in  the  domain of 
q u a n t i f i c a t io n  fo r  are  designated by ind iv idua l  cons tants  with 
the su p e r sc r ip t  j i . )
(C. p =) I f  A €- and a l l  the atomic par t s  of  4  a r^e in  the form of
i d e n t i t i e s ,  then fo r  each ind iv idua l  constant  j u ,  which occurs
in  A with 1 ^  n, A e u . , and i f  a. occurs in  any formula
iu  then A e p^,
(C. ”  =) I f  .A G p^ ,^ and a l l  the atomic par t s  of A are in  the form
of i d e n t i t i e s  and a. = b c p^ ,^ then (A (a, ^  b ))  e
(Comment: I t  i s  possib le  to condense t h i s  se t  of ru le s  by, fo r
example, removing the  su p e r sc r ip t  r e s t r i c t i o n  in  (C. ~) and then 
dropping (C. = =) a l to g e th e r .  But i f  we do th i s  i t  w i l l  make i t
more d i f f i c u l t  to compare the systems p^Q -  (1 4  i  < 4 ) .  These l a s t
two ru les  ensure t h a t  any transworld non - iden t i ty  in  one model s e t
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in  a model system w i l l  occur in  a l l  the model s e t s  in  the  model system 
and t h a t  any id e n t i t i e s ,  or formulae constructed out of id e n t i t ie s ,  
w i l l  be c o n s i s t e n t  one with the o th e r . )
4All  these  rules are  members of the set  C . Any model 
system, XI , whose membership i s  determined by the members of  i s  
a =: ( XI ) .  In  general  we l e t  'S(X1 )* stand for " X I  i s  a
model system whose membership i s  determined by a s e t  of ru le s  fo r  
system S ', or  fo r  " n. i s  an S model system,"
A s e t  of formulae, X , i s  said to be s a t i s f ia b le  
( c o n s i s t e n t )  in  a system S i f  the  s e t  i s  included in  some in  some 
S model system. Wo l e t  'S Sat ( X ) '  stand for " X i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in  
So" So we have
S Sat ( X ) .=.  ( B n .  ) ( 3 j i ) ( S ( X I  ) & & X G p  ^)
I f  X i s  s a t i s f ia b le  i n  S then we say t h a t  each member of 
X i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S, or j u s t  ' s a t i s f i a b l e *  i f  the  context makes 
c l e a r  which S we in tend .
A formula i s  said to be l o g ic a l ly  t rue  in  S or s e l^ -  
sus ta in ing  in  S i f  the u n i t  set  o f  i t s  negation i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e  
in  S and the formula i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S. When the  context makes i t  
c l e a r  which system i s  under consideration we w i l l  simply say th a t  a 
formula i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  We l e t  *S Se l f - sus  (A)* stand for 'A i s  
s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in  S , ' So we have:
S S e l f - sus  (A) S Sat ( ( A I ) B n)(S(Xl) & u e f lm>:tx  ^ L «= J f Jj
& ^  Pg)
A formula w i l l  th e re fo re  be not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  S 
i f  e i t h e r  the  formula i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e  in S or i t s  negation i s  
s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S,
4In  p Q = the following se t  of formulae i s  s a t i s f i a b l e ;
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{ ( % ) ( %  G- Gb^) , a j  "  %  $ â j  “  &i }
This s e t  could be included in  a in  some A  . The s e t  could be 
read off as saying
io Socrates^' i s  wise
i i .  Something i s  f a s t  and B i l l ‘d i s  a philosopher
3 ?i l l .  S o c r a t e s ’ i s  not Socra tes"
i v .  Socrates^ i s  B i l l ^
V.
? 2 v i .  Socrates' i s  Socrates,
i l l  gives express ion to the assumption th a t  the domains fo r  p^ and
Pg are d is t in c t  (by (CDD)), But we do allow propos i t ions  such as v i .
The following se t  of formulae i s  c l e a r ly  not s a t i s f i a b l e
The f i r s t  and second formulae cannot be toge ther  in  any (by ru le  
(C. p ^ ) ) ;  and both id e n t i t ie s  are ruled out by (C.DD) v/ith (C. -^  ) .
This system and the o thers  we cons t ruc t  are s e t  out 
toge the r  in  f u l l  and contras ted  i n  Appendix I I .
We show th a t  a s e t  of formulae, X , i s  p^Q = s a t i s f i a b l e  
by construct ing  on X a model s e t  in  accordance with the ru le s  
in  C^. I f  X i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e  i t  w il l  prove impossible to  cons t ruc t  
on i t  a which accords with the ru le s  in  C^, To show th a t  a 
formula i s  se lf -su sta in in g  we show t h a t  the u n i t  s e t  of i t s  negation 
i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e ,  bu t we must a lso  show th a t  the formula i t s e l f  
can be a member of a The reason fo r  t h i s  la t t e r  s t i p u l a t i o n  i s
th a t  rule (C. p^ )^ w i l l  exclude some formulae toge ther  with t h e i r  
negation.
The system, “ , which has now been s e t  out i s
supposed to r e f l e c t  case IV as s e t  out above. Here we assume th a t  
each possible  world has a q u i te  d i s t i n c t  s e t  of  in d iv idua ls  in  i t ,
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d i s j o i n t  from the in d iv idua ls  in  a l l  the o ther worlds* But in  order 
to  give expression in  the  system to t h i s  assumption we have to 
abandon the idea t h a t  a l l  the in d iv idua l  constants  in  a des igna te  
ind iv idua ls  only in  the  world described by p . Nevertheless the 
r u le s  fo r  q u a n t i f i e r s  in d ic a te  t h a t  the domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  
any q u a n t i f i e r  in  a formula in any i s  the s e t  of those in d iv idua ls  
designated  by individual constan ts  with supe rsc r ip t  n, and only those 
indiv iduals*  So we can say t h a t  each in  p^ Q = i s  related to 
i t s  own domain of qu antif ication , and t h a t  domain of quantif ication  
i s  the s e t  of individuals in  the  world described by a l l  the  formulae 
in  a except fo r  the trans-world id e n t i t ie s  and th eir  negations.
In  order to ensure that the re  are d i s j o i n t  domains we 
have had to allow trans-world  id e n t i t ie s  and t h e i r  negations in to  
the s e t  of well-formed formulae,  The d i s j o i n t  domain ru le  (C.DD)
then completes the task* I f  we allowed no trans-world  i d e n t i t i e s
(or t h e i r  negations) in to  the s e t  of well formed formulae and 
enforced the same so r t  of formation ru l e  fo r  i d e n t i t y  as we did for 
pred ica tes  ( ru le  2 , )  then we could i n t e r p r e t  a l l  s e t s  of formulae 
with j u s t  one domain.
We are assuming th a t  each ind iv idua l  cons tan t  names one 
and only one in d iv id u a l ,  although each ind iv idua l  can be designated 
by more than one ind iv idua l  constant with the same superscript.
I f  each ind iv idua l  cons tan t  names one and only one ind iv idua l  in  
j u s t  one s e t  of in d iv id u a ls  then we need (C. p =) in  order  to  prevent 
the following model system from being consis tent*
A. ”  { » Wgj
[s.. a. âi = b.2 , = cf } c
(a. a. âj 5^ fef , # Cj ] s ^2
2 2 ?In  pj we have described a s i t u a t i o n  in  which *b^  *, and *c ^ ' ,
a l l  name the one in d iv id u a l ,  but in  pg we have described the s i t u a t i o n
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where t h i s  i s  not the case* Rule (C„ p =) prevents such a s i t u a t io n  
a r i s in g  by making sure t h a t  a l l  four  i d e n t i t i e s  are c o n s i s te n t  with 
each o ther .
3The system p Q - ,  to r e f l e c t  case I I I  above, i s  d i f f e r e n t  
to p^Q “ in the following way:
The condit ions  for membership of a p^Q = ( -H. ) w i l l  omit ru les  
(C, and (C.DD) and add
(C.“ ) I f  A e u and a = b « ii then (A ( a / / b ) )  »— I a — f n I j
The amended se t  of rules i s  O'
n “ *'■" f H — — — r n
,3
3By omitt ing (C, p^) and (C.DD) from C we allow fo r  the ind iv idua ls  
in  the world described by p^  ^ being in a world described by another 
s e t  p^^^« The q u a n t i f i e r s  in  both p^Q = and p^Q = have as t h e i r  
domains the s e t s  of in d iv idua ls  t h a t  occur in the relevant worlds.
For example, i f  (Ex)Fx e  p^ and (Ex)Fx e; pg, the i n t e r s e c t i o n  of
the domains of these  q u a n t i f i e r s  can be e i t h e r  empty or  non-empty fo r
3 4 3p. Q =, but they must be empty fo r  p Q =. In p Q the way to  show
th a t  the i n t e r s e c t i o n  of the s e t s  of in d iv idua ls  in  two worlds i s  not
empty i s  to have in  the model se t s  which describe those worlds t r a n s -
world i d e n t i t i e s  wdiich ind ica te  the Indiv idual  or in d iv idua ls  common to
both worlds. For example, i f
1 _  , 2  %  -  fei e Pi
then we know th a t  there  i s  a t  lea s t  one ind iv idua l  common to both 
world 1 and world 2, Rule (C. p - )  w i l l  ensure t h a t
%  ~ -1  ^ ^2 '
(C, p =) i s  to ensure t h a t  the overlapping of s e ts  of ind iv idua ls  i s  
expressed in  a l l  r e levan t  model s e t s .  I f ,  as well  as the  above 
i d e n t i t y ,  we have (Ex)Fx in  and (Ex)Fx in  pg then we know th a t
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the  domains of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  overlap.
4 3p Q -  i s  a sub-system of  p'Q - ,  The formulae are the
same fo r  both systems. I t  can a lso  be shown th a t  the formulae
4 3s a t i s f i a b l e  in  p Q = are s a t i s f i a b l e  in  p Q =,
Furthermore,  we can cons t ruc t  p a r t i c u l a r  model systems
in  p‘‘Q “  which r e f l e c t  case IV, and a l l  the other cases a lso . To
r e f l e c t  case IV we f i r s t  cons t ruc t  a set  v of n o n - id e n t i t i e s  as
follows;
^ “  {k  ^  z "  I K ^ m }
V i s  the se t  of a l l  transworld i d e n t i t i e s  negated. We then cons t ruc t
3a p Q “  ( IT ) but we include v in  pj in A ,
One way to r e f le c t  case I i s  f i r s t  to cons t ruc t  a set
as follows;
V = ^ 1 _ 2 .2  -  =3 3 _ g4-1  ~ % * ■^’1 *‘”1 * -1 ■*
bf 8 4  = 4  ' 4  = X * * ® *
4  = 4 « 4  = 4 ' 4  = , , a «
1 „ 2 2 _  3 3 _ 4% 8 % &2 8 0 e o
, 1 p^2 8 0 a ,
1 _ 2% - 2 » , . .
1 _ 2
%  " % » ,  ,  .a
a* -  ai+1- n  ■■ ®n ’ • '  '  • “ n “  “ 0
}
The formulae in V in d ic a te  t h a t  the  ind iv idua ls  in  world 1 are in 
every world,  and t h a t  i f  any in d iv idua l  i s  in  any v/orld i t  w i l l  be 
in  world 1. For example, what i s  c a l led   ^ world 1 w i l l  be ca l l ed
p 3i n  2, and *a^ ' in  3, and so on. All ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  w i l l
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oappear in  v . We then cons t ruc t  a p Q = ( A. ) but we include v
in  In  jCl ,
One way to r e f l e c t  case I I  i s  f i r s t  to cons t ruc t  a s e t
as follows:
3and then cons t ruc t  a p Q = ( A  ) with V included in  i 
We now construct formal systems which w i l l  ensure that case I and
case I I  hold*
To ensure th a t  case I holds ,  th a t  i s  where there i s  but 
one domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  a l l  worlds we cons t ruc t  system 
-* This sytem has the same pr im it ive  symbols as p^Q -*
The formation ru le s  w i l l  need to be a l t e red  so t h a t  2 i s  replaced by
n f ï
2% I f  i s  an m-ary pred ica te  v a r iab le ,  and i f  a...^
are in  ind iv id u a l  constants  (not necessa r i ly  d i s t i n c t )  then
pmG ëg
i s  a wff.
and 6 i s  replaced by 6 \
6% I f  A i s  a wff and x i s  any indiv idua l  v a r ia b le  then (Ux)
(A (x /a  ))  i s  a w ff, where (A (x// a ) )  i s  the r e s u l t  of
s u b s t i t u t i n g  x for a a t  zero or more occurrences of a. in  A.
3 1So the wffs of  p Q = are a subset of the formulae of p Q +.
A new se t  of condi t ions ,  C^, fo r  membership of any p^ 
in  any p^Q = ( A  ) w i l l  omit from the ru le s  (C* p ^ ) ,  (C.DD), 
(C.E^) and (C.U^), (or omit from the ru le s  (C.E^^ and (C.U^^). 
and include the ru le s
(C*E) I f  (Ex)A e p then i f  b occurs in  any formula of any p^  ^
then ( A ( ^ x ) )  e p^.
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The ru les  in  C \  toge ther  with the  a l t e red  formation 
r u l e s ,  ensure t h a t  any individual constant  can occur in  any kind of 
formula in  any So i t  i s  the one set of ind iv idua ls  whose
members can be designated by in d iv idua l  constants  in any We
could have s im pl i f ied  p^Q~ by taking as ind iv idua l  cons tants  fo r  
the system those with one su p e r sc r ip t ,  say 1. But t h i s  would have 
made the r e l a t i o n s h ip  between the  s e t  of wffs of p = and the se ts  
of wffs of the o ther  th ree  systems f a r  more complex,
.j A .
2The system p Q = would ensure t h a t  case I I  holds,  and 
would have a l l  the p r im it ive  symbols of p^Q ~ but with the add i t ion  
of ind iv idua l  constants  by the a l t e r a t i o n ,  fo r  ind iv idua l  constants  
only,  of ( n > l )  to ( n^  O), The constants  with the supe rsc r ip t  0 would 
be taken as des igna t ing  ind iv idua ls  in  the se t  of in d iv idua ls  common
to  a l l  worlds .  The formation ru le s  would be the same as fo r
2 4A new s e t  of cond i t ions ,  C , w i l l  omit from C the ru le s  and
(C.DD), and add the ru le s ;
(C,DD®) I f  a? and b|  ^ are ind iv idua l  cons tan ts ,  ( i > 0 ) ( k > 0 ) ,  i n
any member of a member of  A  and i  #  k then fo r  every
f i ^ i n n  a! # hf c fi„.
(C,E^) I f  (Ex)A 6 u then (A(a^/x)) or (A(b^Vx))  ^ for at
l e a s t  one ind iv idua l  constant a,® or one ind iv idua l  
nconstan t  b ,
(C,U^) I f  (Dx)A e p^  ^ then i f  occurs in  the formulae of 
any p^  ^ then (A(b^/x)) e p^ .^
Rule (C,DD) i s  replaced with (C,DD^) because the proviso in  the former 
t h a t  ( j >  l ) ( i >  1) does not prevent i d e n t i t i e s  of the form
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being in  any I f  such i d e n t i t i e s  were to be allowed then by
t r a n s i t i v i t y  o f  i d e n t i t y  we might get ,  from ^  and a.j = b^ ,
4  = 4 -
The E x i s t e n t i a l  and Universal  i n s t a n t i a t i o n  ru le s  have been expanded 
so t h a t  i n s t a n t i a t i o n s  can be made in  any to  constants  with a 
s u p e r sc r ip t  which i s  e ith er  £  or  0. Clear ly  the individual constan ts  
with the 0 su p e r sc r ip t  name the ind iv idua ls  i n  the s e t  of individuals  
common to a l l  the worlds. I f  i t  i s  true t h a t  and name the 
one ind iv idua l  in the  se t  common to a l l  worlds then th is  must be so 
i n  every world,  according to our assumptions. The ru le  (C. p ~) 
wi 11 ensure t h a t  i f  and *b^* name the one ind iv idua l  then 
-  b^ ' w i l l  appear in  every p^  ^ in  which e i t h e r  or 'b ^ '
occurs.
In  cons t ruc t ing  these  four systems to r e f l e c t  the four 
cases of des igna t ion  and domains of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  there  are two 
important groups of  ru les .  The f i r s t  group of ru le s  (C. p^),  (C.DD), 
(C.DD^) and (C. p =) ensure t h a t  the sets  of ind iv idua ls  in  each 
world are In accordance with cases I  to  IV, and th a t  the  r e f e re n t  of 
any ind iv idua l  constant  i s  uniform in  a given model system. The 
ru le  (Co p =) ,  which i s  in  every system, ensures t h a t  constancy of 
re fe rence ,  so t h a t  i f  'a.  ^ ' and ' r e f e r  to  one ind iv id u a l  in  one 
world then ^  ' w i l l  appear in  every in  which any re ference
a t  a l l  i s  made to  e i t h e r  ^  or  W . The o ther  ru le s  w i th in  t h i s  
group are used to ensure t h a t  various se ts  of in d iv idua ls  are kept 
d i s t i n c t  where t h i s  i s  requ i red ,  and the only re fe rence  made to 
ind iv idua ls  in  o ther  worlds with d i s t i n c t  s e ts  of ind iv idua ls  i s  in  
trans-world  i d e n t i t y  formulae. The ru le s  (C, p^ )^ and (C.DD) occur 
in  p^Q = and ensure t h a t  the  only occurrence of formulae in  a p^ ^
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conta ining su p e r sc r ip t s  other than n are occurrences of trans-world  
i d e n t i t y  formulae, and a l l  transworld  i d e n t i t i e s  are f a l s e .  A 
s im i la r  s i t u a t i o n  occurs in  p Q = but with allowance for  a se t  of 
in d iv idua ls  common to a l l  worlds.
The second group of ru le s  which i s  important i s  the group 
of e x i s t e n t i a l  and un ive rsa l  i n s t a n t i a t i o n  r u l e s .  These ru le s  
i n d ic a te  from system to system j u s t  what the domains of  q u a n t i f i c a ­
t i o n  a re .  I t  i s  c l e a r  from these  ru le s  that the domain of a quantif ier  
in  a i s  the s e t  of ind iv idua ls  in  the world of which i s  
the ( p a r t i a l )  d e s c r ip t i o n .  We could say th a t  quantif iers are world 
r e l a t iv e  in  every p^Q = ( l < i < 4 ) .
1 3I t  should a lso  be noted th a t ,  i n  p Q = and p Q =, i d e n t i t y  
and pred ica t ion  are t r e a ted  somewhat d if fe re n t ly ,  even though we have 
ca l l ed  '=* a 'p re d ica te  c o n s t a n t ' .  We have already pointed out th a t  
in  a l l  these systems naming i s  constant  across a l l  possib le  worlds,
but p red ica t ion  (of o th e r  kinds) i s  not.  For example, i f  ’
i i  1 idesignates the same in d iv idua l  as 'af *, then = ay ' ; and *£ ' can be
s u b s t i t u t ed  fo r  * in  a l l  formulae, but the p rope r t i e s  of can
change from world to  world in  a qu i te  a r b i t r a r y  fash ion .  So we
can have F^^ e and Fa;  ^ e but -^^ Fa,  ^ ^ p-y.
Although the d i f f e r en c e  in  the treatments  of i d e n t i t y
1 3and predication i s  quite c l e a r  in  p Q -  and p 0 =, the re  i s  a
2 4d i f f e ren ce  a lso  in  p Q = and p Q =, even i f  t h a t  d i f f e r en ce  i s  
simply th a t  trans-world  i d e n t i t i e s  are given a separate s tatus.
These d i f fe rences  o v e ra l l  in d ic a te  t h a t  our ind iv idua l  constants  are 
being t r e a te d  as r ig id  designa to rs  as we presupposed they should be.
I t  i s  poss ib le  to formalize t h i s  r i g i d  des igna t ion  
r e l a t i o n  in  the type th e o r e t i c  system of Appendix I .  When t h i s  i s
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done, as i t  i s  in  the  Appendix, i t  i s  clear that the r e l a t i o n  *x 
r ig id ly  designates  i s  the same r e l a t i o n  as *x names In  the
systems “  (14  i  < 4) we have assumed the p r in c ip le  of r ig id  
designa t ion  and have applied i t  in  a kind of pre-niodal lo g ic .
We can t r e a t  membership of a as though the formulae 
which are members were t ru e  in  world in. I t  i s  in  t h a t  l i g h t  t h a t  
we can tu rn  now to  some of the  consequences of  our d e f in it io n  of 
s e l f - s u s t a in a b i l i ty ,  . I f  a formula i s  s e l f - s u s t a in in g  i t  does 
not follow th a t  i t  i s  true in  a l l  possib le  worlds under cases I I  and 
IV.
4 2For example, in  systems £ Q = and p Q the formula 
(U%)Fx D Fa^
i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  I t s  negation i s  not sa t i s f ia b le  in  any ^ . I t
i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  only in  The poin t i s  th a t  t h i s  formula and i t s
negation are  both prevented, by (C. p%), from being a member of any
where n 1, because t h i s  formula contains a, «^ The negation of
t h i s  formula cannot be a member o f  One way of express ing t h i s
f a c t  i s  to say th a t  in  any maximal c o n s i s te n t  with the ru les  in
c \  ((Ux)Fx3 Fa.^) w i l l  be a member, even though t h i s  formula i s  not
s a t i s f i a b l e  in  any o ther
In  genera l ,  with the except ion of t rans-world  id e n t i t i e s ,  
4 ?in  p Q := and p ’Q -  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  formulae containing ind iv idua l
cons tants  with s u p e r sc r ip t s  equal to  or g re a te r  than 1 are  not t ru e
in  a l l  poss ib le  worlds but are true only in one world. I f ,  as i s  
2the case in  p Q =, a s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  formula conta ins  ind iv idua l  
constants  with the su p e r sc r ip t  0, then such a formula w i l l  be t ru e  
in  a l l  possible  worlds.  All  s e l f - s u s t a in in g  formulae conta ining no 
ind iv idua l  constants  w i l l  be t rue  in  a l l  possible  worlds.
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1 3In  the o ther  systems, p Q = and p Q =, a l l  s e l f -
sus ta in ing  formulae are  true in  a l l  possible worlds.  The world-
2r e l a t i v e  s e l f - s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  of formulae which occurs in  p"Q = and 
]i^Q “ does not occur in  the  o th e r  systems.
I d e n t i t y  and e s s e n t i a l  p ro p e r t i e s
When we discussed the time t r a v e l  s tory  two ways of 
avoiding an unwanted conclusion were suggested. In the f i r s t  i t  was 
assumed th a t  the time t r a v e l l e r  had a c tu a l ly  gone from one world, q, 
to  another,  f^ , and t h a t  he was the only member common to  both.  This
3assumption could be expressed in  a model system of p Q " ,  o r  in  a 
2model system of p Q = provided t h a t  there  was e i t h e r  only one 
ind iv idua l  constant with 0 as su p e r sc r ip t  or only one ind iv idua l  
designa ted by a l l  cons tan ts  of supe rsc r ip t  0. Nei ther  p^Q = nor 
” could be used.
In the second way i t  was assumed t h a t  the worlds
"branched".  Again t h i s  could be expressed in  a model system of
2 3 ?e i t h e r  p Q = o r  p Q =. In  a way, p'Q = i s  more i n t u i t i v e l y
acceptable  as a means of express ing t h i s  way of avoiding the unwanted 
conclus ion because the system i s  const ructed with a domain of i n d i ­
v iduals  common to a l l  poss ib le  worlds.  Nevertheless  we could use
3 1p Q =. But su rp r i s in g ly  enough, we could a lso  use p Q "  fo r  the
d e sc r ip t i o n  of t h i s  "branching" system of worlds.  I f  we do use p^Q =
then we are assuming t h a t  everyone in  the ac tua l  world, £,  i s  a lso  in
the time t r a v e l l e r ' s  d e s t i n a t i o n  world, _f, and t h a t  no one e l s e  i s  in
the world f . ( I t  serves our purposes fo r  the moment to  confine our
a t t e n t io n  to persons,  but the same can be said of  o b je c t s ,  places ,
e t c . )
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I f  we use p^Q = then our assumptions are  those s e t  out 
i n  case I .  Applying the assumptions of case I  to the "branching" 
world notion means t h a t  one and the same se t  of persons i s  supposed 
to be common both to  the trunk and one branch and a lso  to the  trunk 
and the o ther  branch. This i s  easy enough to grasp as f a r  as the 
t runk goes. This i s  the  common h i s t o r y .  But what does t h i s  amount 
to  from the branching on?
Under the  assumptions of case I we could say th a t  the 
individuals who l iv e  before  and through the branching w i l l  belong to 
the set designated by the cons tan ts  superscr ip ted  by 1. But what of 
those who belong wholly to one of  the branches? Let us suppose 
t h a t ,  in  our Punic story, in  the branch f, Hannibal has a son a f t e r  
the f a l l  of Rome whom he c a l l s  "Napoleon". Are we to i d e n t i f y  
Napoleon in  £_ with the Emperor Napoleon in g? There are  severa l  
responses which could be made to the question .
One response would be simply to say t h a t  na tu ra l  language 
names l ike  "Napoleon" are of ten  ambiguous. In  formal iz ing we must, 
because of our assumptions about the  nature of names in  an id ea l  
language, compensate fo r  these  ambiguit ies by formalizing the same 
ordinary language name with more than one individual constan t  when 
the ordinary language name i s  ambiguous. This i s  somewhat l ike  
t r e a t i n g  the word "Napoleon" as a means fo r  the  expression of more 
than one name, or  o f  only a pa r t  of  a f u l l  name. This makes the 
name "John Smith" something l ik e  the term "bank". Ordinary language 
makes do with as few words as poss ib le .
But even i f  we accept the  notion th a t  names in  ord inary  
language can be ambiguous, t h i s  does not r e a l l y  give the appropr ia te  
response to the ques t ion .  The question demands an answer to  the 
problem of how the  ind iv idua ls  (persons) in  f^ can be the same
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ind iv idua ls  (persons) as those In £ .  Does i t  make sense to say t h a t
whereas Napoleon was born in  the  r e a l  world in  Cors ica  in  1769, in
the  world of our s to ry  he was born in  Rome in  217 B.C.? What are  we
to  make of  the  difference in  pedigree? And although we might go on
to  r e t a i l  a s to ry  of what happened in  ^  so t h a t  Napoleon becomes
Emperor of a l l  Europe and much of  Africa and d ies  in  h is  f i f ty -second
year ,  there  i s  not much to convince one th a t  the two are  r e a l l y  the
one person, apar t  from our s tory  in  which we simply give the iiams
"Napoleon" to the son of  Hannibal, I t  i s  not t h a t  the re  i s  any
co n t rad ic t io n ,  i f  t h i s  i s  done in p^Q =. We can have two d e sc r ip t i v e
s e t s ,  and pg, and include in  the formula "Bn^ & to be
read as "Napoleon was born in  the year  1769 and lo s t  the B a t t l e  of
6 6Waterloo", and inc lude  in  Ug the formula & S£ to  be read
as "Napoleon was not born in  the year  1769 but was the son of Hannibal," 
Although the formulae are con t rad ic to ry  i f  in  the one in  the
system when they are not in  the same there  i s  no inconsis tency .
Another response which can be made to  the question of 
whether we should i d e n t i f y  Napoleon in  _f with Napoleon in  £  i s  t h a t  
we should do so i f ,  and only i f ,  the re  are some sp e c ia l ly  designa ted 
p rope r t ie s  common to both .  For example, i t  might be necessary fo r  
such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  th a t  both be male homo sapiens .  This response 
i s  pa r t  of a basic theory t h a t  any ind iv idua l  has some e s s e n t i a l  
p ro p e r t i e s  which i d e n t i f y  him (or i t ) ,  and which he (or i t )  w i l l  have 
in  every world in  which he (o r  i t )  appears.  Only the possession of 
such e s s e n t i a l  p rope r t i e s  would l icence  the giv ing of a proper name 
to  an ind iv idua l  in  a second poss ib le  world when th a t  name has 
a lready been given to someone in  another possib le  world.
I f  we consider  again our t i m e - t r a v e l1er we could descr ibe  
the  s i t u a t i o n  in  the following terms; A man wakes up and finds
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himself  in  an a l to g e th e r  s trange world, apparent ly  the Roman world 
of  220 B.C. He d iscovers  perhaps t h a t  h is  face i s  d i f f e r e n t  to what 
he remembers i t  to be. Yet he has what c e r t a in l y  seem to be coherent 
memories of the 21st  Century and a lso  of en ter ing  s time machine. I t  
would certa in ly  not be absurd for t h i s  man to reckon himself  to be 
Wells and to be a t im e-trave ller . The dec is ive  f a c t o r  fo r  him 
would be whether he counted what appeared to be memories to be 
memories indeed. The point here i s  not that t h i s  man's b e l i e f s  about 
what seem to be memories w i l l  show th a t  ho i s  Wells, or i s  not Wells, 
but. j u s t  t h a t  what appear to be memories could c o n s t i t u t e  a 
formidably persuasive  in f luence  whether or not he comes to be lieve  
t h a t  he was Wells.  He can hardly  be l ieve  t h a t  he does remember 
the  21st  century without be l iev ing  t h a t  he i s  a t i r n e - t r a v e l l e r .  This 
follows from the t r u t h  th a t  one can remember being x only i f  one i s  x .^
Far  more problematic i s  the Napoleon case .  There i s  no 
question of memory t h e re .  We have two people, born in  d i f f e r e n t  
ci rcumstances,  placed d i f f e r e n t l y  in  h i s to ry ,  dying in  d i f f e r e n t  
circumstances.  The notion t h a t  the re  might be p ro p e r t i e s ,  possessed 
by both and by no one e l s e ,  which i d e n t i f y  both as the bearer  of  
the one name, and hence, by our theory and our assumptions, the one 
person, i s  r a th e r  a s trange  notion.
But,  in  order to explore t h i s  quest ion of the i d e n t i t y  
of  ind iv idua ls  from world to world we begin by in troducing modal 
opera tors  and extending the log ics  se t  out above. At f i r s t  we w i l l  
be concerned with the in t roduc t ion  of a l e t h i c  m oda l i t i e s .  These 
modal i t ies  w i l l  not be int roduced j u s t  in  order to cons ider  t h i s  
problem of cross-world i d e n t i t y ,  but a lso  various o th e r  problems.
In  d iscuss ing  cross-world i d e n t i t y  and associa ted  problems we w i l l  
d iscuss  the problem of  e s s e n t i a l i sm .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we w i l l  d iscuss
Cf.  A. Flew, "Locke and the Problem of Personal Id e n t i t y "  in  Locke 
and Buckley, eds,  C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, Macmillan, London 
e sp e c ia l l y  pp. 159-164.
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whether each ind iv idua l  has some property  in  a l l  poss ib le  worlds, a 
property which i d e n t i f i e s  t h a t  ind iv idua l  from world to world*
Modal Systems
Let us begin by considering what hap()ons when we add the 
p r im it ive  symbol MZi ’ to the improper symbols of each -  ( l ^ n < 4 ) .  
And l e t  us read * d ^ ‘ as *ïn every poss ib le  world: and '0 A' as
*In a t  l e a s t  one poss ib le  world: ‘ We c a l l  the extended systems
-  (1< n4 4 ) ,  and assume for the moment t h a t  i f  A i s  a formula 
so are Q A and 0 A *
We need to  add a formation ru le  in  each case ,  but there  
i s  no need to  a l t e r  the membership of * But there  w i l l  have to 
be extens ions  to  the consis tency ru le s  in  each case. Before s e t t i n g  
out new ru le s  and s e t s  of  r u le s  fo r  each m”q = ( K n < 4 )  we w i l l  
d iscuss  what follows from the suggested readings of the modal 
ope ra to rs ,  and some of the  problems which arise*  We assume fo r  the 
moment t h a t  each (1< i  <4)  i s  included in  the r e spec t ive  extended 
s e t  of  condi t ions .
I t  ought to  follow from the suggested reading of ' a  A * 
t h a t  i f  _A i s  a tautology then □ A w i l l  be s e l f - s u s t a in in g ,  since A 
w i l l  be the case in  every possib le  world. Sim i la r ly ,  i f  B i s  a theorem 
of  p red ica te  ca lcu lus  in  which the re  are no individual constants, 
then dB  w i l l  be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  And i f  we were to cons t ruc t  
maximal model s e t s ,  then we would expect every tau to logy  and every 
theorem of p red ica te  calculus  in  which there  are no ind iv idua l  
constants  to be members of each maximal model se t .  In these cases 
i t  follows from the reading of ’ a  A ’ that □ A w i l l  be t rue  in  every 
poss ib le  world, and so a a  A, and a  a o  A^, etc* Also in  these  cases,
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i f  O a  A i s  se lf -su sta in in g  then a  A i s  in  a t  l e a s t  one world,  and 
the re fo re  □ A i s  s e lf -su sta in in g .
Prima fa c ie ,  fo r  t a u to lo g ie s  and theorems of  predica te  
ca lcu lus  without individual cons tan ts ,  the modality indicated fo r  
each M^*Q = (14  1 < 4 )  i s  S5. The question i s ,  what, happens to  
formulae i n  which the re  are constants? For they are  a l l  indexed by
t h e i r  su p e r sc r ip t s  as belonging, in some sense,  to  one world,  except
3 5in  the case of id e n t i t i e s .  An i d e n t i t y  such as *.a ~ b * can hardly  
be said  to belong to  one and only one world.
In  d iscuss ing  what happens to formulae conta ining 
ind iv idua l  constants  we w i l l  tu rn  our a t t e n t io n  f i r s t  to i d e n t i t i e s .
We w i l l  d iscuss  formulae in  which no q u a n t i f i e r s  appear and in  which 
a l l  the atomic pa r t s  of the  formulae are  i d e n t i t i e s .  We w i l l  d iscuss  
formulae in  which q u a n t i f i e r s  appear l a t e r .
Turning f i r s t  to i d e n t i t i e s  we no tice  t h a t ,  s ince  in  = 
the one s e t  of ind iv idua ls  i s  common to  a l l  poss ib le  worlds,  i f  
M. “  â. i s  t rue  i n  any one world then i t  w i l l  be t ru e  in a l l  worlds.
So i f  ^  e fo r  some ji, then because of ru le  (C. fx =) we 
would expect (a, = & ) to be s a t i s f ia b le  in  every S im ilar ly
i f  a^ ^ a^ 6 u fo r  some n then ive would expect a^) to be
s a t i s f i a b l e  in  every
In  formal terras t h i s  would mean that i n  u Q “  ,
(1) n} -  bp E O (a '^ -  )
and (2) = b^)
and, by d e f i n i t i o n ,
(2*) a* = b  ^ = 0 (a *  = b^)
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would a l l  be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  Also the formulae 
(3) â  “  â, = D (â  “  a) 
would be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  In  one sense t h i s  means t h a t  modal opera tors  
are  vacuous when t h e i r  scopes are atomic id e n t i t i e s ,  but in  another  
sense i t  i s  t r i v i a l l y  t rue  t h a t  a l l  i d e n t i t i e s  are t ru e  in  a l l  
possib le  worlds.
3In M Q = where i t  i s  possib le  to have a se t  of in d iv idua ls  
common to a l l  possib le  worlds i t  i s  a lso  understandable t h a t  (1 ) ,
(2 ) ,  and (3) should be se l f -su s ta in in g .  In M^Q ~ and M^ Q = (1) w i l l
be se lf -su sta in in g  simply because both sides of the equivalence w i l l
f J. ialways be f a l s e  when i  ^ j , and i f  i -  j then i f  a. = by i s  t ru e  then
-  b*^ w i l l  be in  every because of ru le  (C, p - ) ,  In  M Q =
o i 1and irQ = (2) w i l l  be s e l f - s u s t a in in g  because i f  i  # j  then ^  ^ ^
w i l l  be in  every and both s ides  of the equivalence t r u e .  I f
i  = j then i f  i s  f a l s e  i t  w i l l  be f a l s e  in  every because
p 4of ru le  (C, p = ) .  In  M'Q = and M Q = (3) i s  c l e a r ly  s e l f - s u s ta in in g ,  
So (1 ) ,  (2) and (3) are  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  a l l  systems, and the self" 
s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  of these  formulae in  a l l  systems simply r e - in f c rc e s  
the  notion t h a t  ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  are r ig id  des igna to rs  in  these  
systems.
Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the modal opera to r  * Q * as ' I n  
a l l  possible  w or lds ’ does r a i s e  some problems a t  t h i s  point. These 
problems have an important bearing on what we sh a l l  say l a t e r  about 
quanti fy ing  in to  modal con tex ts ,  so we must d iscuss  them. Consider 
reading
(4 )  D (a* = b b
2
as
(5) In  a l l  possib le  worlds * names what a lso
'b^  ’ names,
The problem i s  t h a t  (5) can be taken as saying th a t  ’ i s  a name
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ii n  each possib le  world of something and 'b * i s  a name each 
possib le  world of the same th in g .  Both names occur in  a l l  possible
worlds as the names of  some one th ing .  This account o f  what (4)
1 3  1means i s  not problematic in  M Q ™ and M Q = where ' Ir  ’ can be used
in  p. when i  j  to descr ibe  something,
e p. i s  not ruled out by any member of e i t h e r  C^ '
3 io r  C' ' , So, i f  an in d iv idua l  constant, _a , occurs in  a ( n?- i )
1 3  i  .ill a M Q -  or a M Q -  model system we could assume that ' i s  used
as a name iji the world ( p a r t i a l l y )  described by
0 ABut when we tu rn  to M“Q -  and M Q = to consider t h i s
account,  there  are problems. What does i t  mean to say th a t  ’ and
’ occur in  ( ( i  j ) ( i  # n)( j  n ) ( i  > 1 ) (j > D )  as names of 
something? i s  the ( p a r t i a l )  d e sc r ip t io n  of a world iji which
there  i s  nothing named by e i t h e r  * or What ’ names i s
i 2in  world i , and what ’by ’ names i s  in  world j . (4) i s  f a l s e  in  M Q -
and ” ( i  j  ) ju s tbecause  what one name designa tes  cannot be
what the o the r  d es igna te s .
The problem can be solved by one of two moves. The
f i r s t  i s  to r e j e c t  the  reading of (4) as (5 ) .  The second i s  to
accept th a t  i f  an ind iv idua l  constant occurs in  a p  ^ then,  jji
the world ( p a r t i a l l y )  described by p^  ^ t h a t  ind iv idua l  constant i s
accepted as a name.
I f  we d o n ' t  accept the reading of (4) given in (5) ,
and a lso  r e j e c t  the second a l t e r n a t i v e  j u s t  suggested,  then t h i s
places  model s e t s  in  a s trange p o s i t io n .  Ind iv idua l  constants  are
being used in them to ( p a r t i a l l y )  descr ibe  worlds without any
guarantee t h a t  those cons tan ts  are taken to  be names in  the worlds
descr ibed . And problematic as the  s t a tu s  of transworld i d e n t i t i e s
i s  in  any p^ ,^ the in d iv idua l  cons tan ts  occurring in  them have to
be accepted as names. Even the w o r l d , ( p a r t i a l l y )  described we 
can conceive of someone saying, as they might in  ours ,  "Pickwick i s  
not i d e n t i c a l  with anyone in our world."
We w i l l  accept the second a l t e r n a t i v e  above. J u s t  as 
"Pickwick" i s  accepted as a name in  our world so we w i l l  assume th a t  
' ( i  f- n) i s  acceptable  in  the  world described by as a name.
VThis assumption a lso  means t h a t  (Ek) ( x ~ ^  ) in
(6) (ExJ(x= af) e 
means not only
Something i s  ( in  world n) 
but t h a t  Something i s  c a l l ed  ' ( in  world n).
So i t  i s  no wonder t h a t  (Ex) (x “  a,^) i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in (n ^ i )
in  “ and M*^Q = but i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e  in  = ,or in  = when 
( i > l ) ,  e s p e c ia l l y  since we have a l ready ind ica ted  th a t  the domain 
of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  always the se t  of ind iv idua ls  occurring in  the 
world described by the  And i f  we remember t h a t  a does not
have to be a complete novel then we can have the s i t u a t i o n  where
some names are  not mentioned. Only those mentioned are c l e a r l y  to 
be taken as accepted ijn the world descr ibed .
Q uan t i f i c a t io n  and Modality
Once we in troduce ,  as we have in  (6 ) ,  formulae in  which 
the re  i s  a combination of modal opera to rs ,  quantif iers and ind iv idua l  
cons tan ts  a s e r i e s  of problems a r i s e s .  I t  i s  not very problematic 
to  have closed formulae as the  scopes of modal o p e ra to rs ,^  but there 
are  three  o ther  forms of formulae which give r i s e  to problems.
I f  a  £  i s  a formula then A/is  the scope of  O , and i f  D A i s  the 
scope 0 Î  a q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  then ^  i s  the  scope of □ .
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So far we have ind ica ted  th a t  the q u a n t i f i e r s  in  the 
systems = (14  1 4 4 )  have as t h e i r  domains those ind iv idua ls  
t h a t  occur in  the world fo r  which the  in which the q u a n t i f i e r  
occurs provides a d e s c r ip t i o n .  We have given an intended sense fo r  
the  modal operators. We now consider  what i s  to be made of a 
formula which co n s i s t s  of an open formula as the scope of an opera to r ,
OX’ of a formula in which there  i s  a variable bound in  the scope of
the  modal opera tor  by a q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  not in the scope of the  modal 
opera to r .
Let us consider f i r s t  formulae of the form 0 g A ) 
where 0 I s  e i t h e r  □ or <> , Q i s  e i t h e r  (Ux) or (Ex), and A(^^) 
i s  the scope of Q and conta ins  a t  le a s t  one idnivid iial  constant 
with the s u p e r sc r ip t  i  ( i > 0 ) .  For the moment i t  w i l l  s impl i fy  the 
d iscuss ion  i f  we i n s i s t  th a t  ) does not conta in a trans-wor ld
i d e n t i t y .
I f  0,  in  0 Q A (a^) ,  i s  ^  then the re  should be no re a l
problem. We then give the general  reading:
For a t  l e a s t  one poss ib le  world: ^  ( a ^ ) .
4 3 ?Because, of the formation ru le s  fo r  M Q M Q -  and =, e sp e c ia l l y
6, a l l  the in d iv idua l  constants  in  ^  w i l l  be a.^. In system M^Q
unless  we a l t e r  .(C, p^ )^ both Q, A (a. ,^) and 2  A ( a ^ ) .w i l l  be
s a t i s f i a b l e  but only in and only i f  2  A (^j^) i s  not i t s e l f
con t rad ic to ry .  We could a l t e r  (C. p^) to
(C. J I f  A con ta ins  any ind iv idua l  constant ^  occurring outs ide  
the scope of  a modal ope ra to r  and outs ide  of an i d e n t i t y  
and i  ^  n, then
I f  (Co p^) i s  replaced by (C. ) fo r  = then 0 0 A j a ^ )  would
be s a t i s f i e d  in  any p provided 2  A ) was s a t i s f i a b l e  in  p^.
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2 4The s i tu a t io n  i s  s im i la r  in system M""Q “  to t h a t  in M Q - ,
2 ibut with one important d i f f e r en c e .  In M Q =, i f  (a, ) has the super-
i  is c r i p t  0  then 0 0 A (a ) and Ç A (a ) both f a l l  ou ts ide  the scope
of  (C. H )(and (C, u^ ))* So i f  0 A (a^) i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in a u' n *^ 11 “““ “ ' ' n
v/e could assume t h a t  0 2  A would be s a t i s f i a b l e  in any
Otherwise, fo r  i >  1, the s i t u a t i o n  i s  the same as fo r  M^ Q - ,
3The s i t u a t i o n  in  -  i s  the same fo r  a l l  formulae of
the  forms 0 Q A (a*) and 0 A (a^) as i t  i s  in  -  for those of the
forms <) 0 A (a^) and Q A (a^ ) .  The ru le  (C. u ) i s  not a member of
3 iC , so 2  A ) i s  not rendered not s a t i s f i a b l e  in ju s t  because
i # 1).
In system although i t  i s  unlike the other th ree  in
t h a t  there  can be a mixture of supe rsc r ip t s  in  the  scope of a
3q u a n t i f i c a t i o n ,  the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  as in  M Q - ,
So, we would expect,  on these  cons idera t ions  alone,  t h a t  
each system would have the same consis tency  ru le ,  namely 
(C. 0  '*") I f  0 A ^ ^ then there  i s  in  f l  a t  l e a s t  one
model s e t ,  such as p , such t h a t  A e and i s  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  to in (1 .
One th ing should be noted about ru le  (C. <) *) at t h i s  poin t .  I t  
concerns the phrase " a l t e r n a t i v e  to " .  The phrase i s  pa r t  of the 
techn ica l  phrase "alternative to  u in  i l  " which i s  defined in  the 
r u l e .  There i s  nothing in  ru le  (C, which prevents being 
an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  i t s e l f  in  i l  , The r e l a t i o n  between a set  and i t s  
a l t e r n a t i v e ,  s e t  up by ru le  (C, O ' " ) ,  i s  ca l led  by Hintikka " the  
a l t e rn a t iv e n e s s  r e l a t i o n " ,  and can be r e f l e x iv e ,^  Since we are using 
Hintikka s ty le  semantics we f a l l  in  with his  terminology. At the 
same time, though the a l t e rn a t iv e n e s s  r e l a t i o n  can be r e f l e x iv e ,  i t
Hint ikka,  Knowledge and B e l i e f .  Corne l l ,  I th aca ,  1962, p. 42,
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w i l l  be convenient fo r  the sake of the  so r t s  of proofs used in
these  systems to assume th a t  genera l ly  i s  not when i s
an a l t e r n a t i v e  to in  -0. ,
We now consider what the s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be i f  0 in 0 2  A
4 2i s  □ o We have already suggested t h a t  (C, in  C and C be
a l t e r e d  to  (C. . I f  t h i s  suggestion i s  followed then D 2  A
4 2( i  > 1) i s  not rendered not s a t i s f i a b l e  in  in  M 0 = and M Q =,
simply because i ^  lu Never theless ,  since 2  A  ^ i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e
4 ? .In M Q "  and M 'Q = when i 1 and i n we can hardly agree t h a t :
In  a l l  poss ib le  worlds: 2  A i s  s a t i s f i a b l e
in  -  and M^ Q - ,  So, we w i l l  have the s i t u a t io n  where, in  =
2 iand M Q a l l  formulae of the form ^  2  A (A ) ( i > l ) «  are  not
s a t i s f i a b l e .  I t  i s  t h i s  case which requ ires  the ad d i t io n a l  clause 
in  the d e f i n i t i o n  of s e l f - s u s t a in in g  formulae that a formula i s  s e l f - ­
sus ta in ing  i f  the  u n i t  s e t  of i t s  negation i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e  and 
the  formula i s  s a t i s f ia b le .  Without t h i s  l a s t  c lause in  the  d e f i n i t i o n ,  
s ince every formula of the  form o 2  A ) i s  not s a t i s f i a b l e ,  i t  
would follow th a t  ^  a  2  A ) was s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  From t h i s  i t  
would follow th a t  0 ^ ( U x ) ( F a ^ D  Fa^) was s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  and 
hence th a t  0  (Ex)(Fa^ & -^Fa^ ) ,  and t h i s  l a s t  formula reads as:
In £ît l e a s t  one possib le  world: i s  both F and not F.
And i t  wi11 j u s t  not do to  have such a proposit ion  as a log ica l  t r u t h .
So, in  = and m\ )  -  formulae of the  form P 0, A (2^ )
( i > l )  are going to  be neither s a t i s f i a b l e  nor s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
i  3On the other hand in the systems M Q ~ and M Q = i t  w i l l  
be possib le  for formulae of the  form oQ A (a^) to  be both s a t i s f i a b l eA mSêm «res «svs
2and s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  Also, in  M Q = i t  w i l l  be possib le  fo r  formulae 
of the form n  2  A to be both s a t is f ia b le  and s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,^
^Examples are given in  the Appendix,
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In the system M^Q “ we have the ad d i t io n a l  fea tu re  t h a t  
in  A(aj^) there  could be ind iv idua l  constants  o ther  than those with 
the su persc r ip t  i . But t h i s  does not bring about any r e a l  point  of 
i n t e r e s t ,  unless  we consider q u a n t i f i c a t i o n s  conta ining in  t h e i r  
scopes trans-world id e n t i t i e s .  We now take up th a t  cons ide ra t ion .  
I t  i s  only in  W^Q = where there can be q u a n t i f i c a t io n s  with t r a n s ­
world id e n t i t ie s  in  t h e i r  scopes. In  the o ther  systems these are 
ruled out by the formation ru les.
We need to  consider formulae with both modal opera to rs .  
Let us take the examples
(a) 0 (G x ) (x  =
and
(b) ^  (Ex) (x -  ^  ^  ^  -  b ^ ) .
(a )  can be read as:
1 1 0(a*) In  a t  le a s t  one poss ib le  world something i s  a. and a i s  b“ ,
(b) can be read as:
1 1 2(b*) In every possib le  world something i s  ^  and ^  i s  b .
I f  we take (a*) to mean th a t
(Ex)(x = & 8^ = b^) e u for some n,
then i t  follows th a t
b^ "  2^ ^  2^ "  b“ for some bî"
We have a lready seen t h a t  in  M^'Q -  every i d e n t i t y  i s  equ ivalen t  to i t s  
n e c e s s i t a t i o u .  So i t  w i l l  follow th a t  (a) i s  equ iva len t  to (b ) .
V/e now tu rn  to a cons ide ra t ion  of the second se t  of 
formulae in which modal opera to rs  and q u a n t i f i e r s  occur. These are 
formulae of the  form Q 0 A where the re  are no individual constan ts  in
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4 ?A« I t  can be argued th a t  in  M"Q -  and in  M "Q -  we should not permit 
the cons t ruc t ion  of  formulae of the  form 2  Ê A (x /a  )  ^ where O l  
and X i s  bound in  2s and the formulae contain no ind iv id u a l  constants. 
The argument aga ins t  permit t ing the cons t ruc t ion  of such 
formulae i s  t h a t  the most reasonable  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of such formulae 
means t h a t  the modal opera to r  i s  e i t h e r  unnecessary or makes the 
formulae c o n t ra d ic t  the underlying assumptions about the domains of 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  For example 
(Ux) a  Fx g
would be taken as in d ic a t in g  th a t  each ind iv id u a l ,  x, in the world 
described by was such t h a t  in  every possib le  world x was F.
Not only i s  everything in  the world described by to be F , but 
everything in  the world descr ibed by pj i s  to be F in  every o ther 
possib le  world. From t h i s  we should be able to in fer  t h a t  every­
th ing  in  the world described by i s  common to  a l l  the o ther
possib le  worlds.  This runs counter to the presupposit ions  of both 
4 ?= and =. I f  on the o the r  hand we take the example
c Ml ,
t h i s  would be taken as in d ica t in g  t h a t  each in d iv id u a l ,  x, in  the 
world described by p^ was such t h a t  in  a t  l e a s t  one poss ib le  world 
X was F.  Obviously t h a t  one world would have to  be the one described 
by for  the reasons given above. So the 0 i s  unnecessary, or 
vacuous.
I f  we do permit the cons t ruc t ion  of formulas such as 
(Ox)D Fx and (Ox)0  Fx, then those of the f i r s t  kind w i l l  be n e i th e r
s a t i s f i a b l e  nor s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  they w i l l  j u s t  not ever be members
4 2of any model s e t  i n  M Q -  or  M Q - ,  Those of the second kind w i l l  1 
a t  l e a s t  candidates  fo r  s a t i s f i a b i l i t y  or s e l f - s u s t a i n a b i l i t y ,  but
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the 0 w il l  be vacuous.
Against  t h i s  argument i t  must be pointed out t h a t  there
pare  exceptional cases in  M"Q =, For example, i f  we have an e x i s t e n ­
t i a l  q u a n t i f i e r ,  then there  are not the  same problems. The formula 
(Ex) O Fx (a
2in  system M Q = would make good sense when taken as in d ic a t in g  t h a t
a t  l e a s t  one of the in d iv idua ls  in  the world (p a r t ia l ly )  described
by p p  namely one of those designated by an individual constant with
a 0 s u p e r sc r ip t ,  say i s  in  a l l  possib le  worlds F.
This r e jo in d e r  does not remove the bar to  formulae of the
type under discuss ion  in  =,  We can ru le  out formulae of t h i s  
4type in M Q = by revising the formation rule 6, to
6M: I f  A i s  a wff and x i s  any ind iv idua l  variable, then
provided t h a t  a l l  the ind iv idua l  constan ts  in  A have
the same su p e r sc r ip t  and provided t h a t  no modal opera to rs
occur in  A, then (Ux)(A(x/a)) i s  a wff,  when (A(x//a)) i s  
the r e s u l t  of s u b s t i t u t i n g  x fo r  a. a t  zero or more 
occurrences of in  A»
We also  need the ru le :
7,  I f  A i s  a wff then so i s  Cl A*
2Because of the exceptions  in  M Q = i t  i s  b e s t  simply to 
add 7 to the formation r u l e s ,  and l e t  the other problems work them­
selves  out in  the ways in d ica ted .  The readings we have suggested fo r
the various  combinations of q u a n t i f i c a t io n s  and modal opera tors  do not
3 1ra i s e  problems in  M Q -■ and M‘Q =,
F in a l ly  we consider the th i rd  set  of formulae where
Î. Îformulae are of the  form 0 0 A (a ) and a occurs a t  l e a s t  once in  A«
4I f  we accept 6 M ins tead  of 6 in  the formation ru le s  fo r  M Q = then 
there  i s  no problem in  M^Q -  because there  are  no formulae of the form
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under d iscuss ion .
2The s i t u a t i o n  in  M Q =, which w i l l  be of i n t e r e s t ,  i s  
where the form under d iscuss ion  i s  
(Ex) p A (a^)c 
In p a r t i c u l a r  the two formulae 
(Y) (Ex) □ (x = a“ )
and
(8) (Ex) <> (x ~ £^)
are of in te r e s t .
I f  (7) i s  read as
(7*) There i s  something which, in a l l  possible  worlds,  i s
2then t h i s  seems to be t r i v i a l l y  true in M Q =. A paralle l reading 
of  (8) would a lso  seem to  be t r i v i a l l y  true.
Given th a t  (7) i s  the member of some then we can
read (7) in
( 7 " )  (Ex) a  (x  = a*) e
.as ind ica t ing  t h a t  there  i s  something in  world 1 which i s ,  in  a l l
possib le  worlds, named Sim ilar ly  we can read
(8") (Ex) <) (x = e
as ind ica t ing  t h a t  there i s  something in  world 1 which i s ,  in  at
l e a s t  one possib le  world,  named Reading (7” ) and (8") in  t h i s
way i s  simply to apply the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of (6) above. Of course
ot h i s  does not a l t e r  the point that in  M*"Q -  (7) and (8) are t r i v i a l l y
pt r u e ,  and they are s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in  M "Q 
We now consider the  s t a t u s  of
( 7 ' )  <B5£)a(x  = a b
and
(O ')  ( E x ) 0 ( x = a b
i n  the other th ree  systems. I t  should be c l e a r  t h a t  both of these
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w i l l  be s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in  M^ Q In  = (7*) i s  not s e l f -
sus ta in in g .  As the member of a model set (7*) i n d ic a te s  t h a t  something
in  the world described, namely ^  , i s  in  every possib le  world. That,
3 3in  M Q =, i s  not a log ica l  t r u t h .  Also in  M Q -  ( 8 ' )  i s  not s e l f -
s u s ta in ing .  As the member of a model s e t  (8 ')  i n d ic a te s  t h a t  some-
1thing in  the world desc r ibed ,  namely , i s  in  a t  l e a s t  one possible  
world .
Neither ( 7 ' )  nor ( 8 ’) are  formulae of =- because of
2the new formation ru le  6 M. But they are both formulae of M Q ” 
when (i.)k 1), and both are l o g i c a l ly  f a l s e .  Their  negations are 
se lf -su sta in in g , as one might well  expect.
1 3But we need to  consider the formulae of M Q -  and hV'Q ~
of the form
(Ux) 0 A (a^)
3Let  us consider the s i t u a t i o n  in  M Q -  f i r s t .  Once again l e t  us 
r e s o r t  to p a r t i c u l a r  cases:
(9) (Ux) a  (x -  £^) e f.1^
and
(10) (Ux) 0 ( x -  2^) ^
I f  we read the formulae without taking cognisance of the model s e t  of 
which each i s  a member then we ge t respectively
(9*) Everything i s  such th a t  in  a l l  possible  worlds i t  i s
and
(10*) Everything i s  such th a t  in  a t  l e a s t  one possib le  world
it. i s
The immediate problem i s  t h a t  i t ’ s not c le a r  what the  domain of 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i s .  But i f  we consider the formulae with re spec t  to 
some one then the q u a n t i f i e r  can be made r e l a t i v e  to the world 
( p a r t i a l l y )  described by So we can read (9) and (10) as
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(9") Everything in  world 1 i s  such th a t  in  a l l  possib le  
worlds I t  i s  a^.
and
d o" ) Everything in  world l i s  such that in  at l e a s t  one 
possib le  world i t  i s  
In o the r  words, world 1 conta ins  only one ind iv idua l  , and (9) 
ind icates  tha t  t h a t  one individual i s  ca l l ed  ’ in  a l l  possible  
worlds while (10) in d ic a te s  t h a t  t h a t  one ind iv idua l  i s  ca l led  
in  a t  lea st  one poss ib le  world.
The s i t u a t i o n  in  M^Q=is simpler because we have the same
domain of q u a n t i f i c a t io n  for  a l l  worlds.  So (9) in d ic a te s  th a t  t h a t
domain i s  j u s t  one i tem, and so a lso does (10).
We now set out the ru le s  fo r  the membership of model
se t s  as f a r  as the ru le s  a f f e c t  modal opera to rs .
(C, <) *) I f  <> A ci XI then there  i s  in X). a t  l e a s t  one
model s e t ,  such as , such th a t  A c  and i s  an 
S Ü e r a a t S v e ^  k
(C. □ ) I f  QA 6 £.0. then A e
(C. DO*)  I f  a  A G p^e:T1 and i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  in
-0 then OA c u , f m
(C. an , . , )  I f  n  A <s e XI and i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  in  
XI then Cl A e p^ .^
We have a lready noted one th ing about the ru le  (C, a  That concerned
the phrase " i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  t o " .  There i s  a second point  to which 
we now give a t t e n t i o n .
The second point  i s  more complex and concerns the system 
M^ Q " ,  Take the se t
^Supra p, 69.
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[ (Ex) □ Fx , ^  O (Ex)Fx \
To t e s t  t h i s  se t  fo r  s a t i s f i a b i l i t y  we w i l l  see i f  i t  can be included 
in  some By the d e f i n i t i o n  of ^  and (C,™ '^•), the second
formula gives the assumption:
1. 0 - (G ) [ )%









G by (C.E^^), and then
G by (C,  a  )
6 by (C. 0  * ) ,  where
i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p^  ^ in  Û , We could count p^  ^ as p^ ,^ but then
we would get
5.  (Ux) —' Fx € p^ by the d e f i n i t i o n  of E and
(C. "  ^ "^  ) ,  and so we get
6. e
which i s  co n t rad ic to ry ,  because of 3.  So we are forced to consider
the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p^  ^ i n  .0 i s  not p^ i t s e l f
but some o the r  a r b i t r a r y  s e t .  This gives
5 *. (Ux) Fx €
n
in
and also 6 ’ F a ' e p from 2 by (C. Q a  *) and (C. P )T f m
Unless we change the ru le  of un iversa l  i n s t a n t i a t i o n ,
(C.U ) ,  to allow (Ux)^Fx in  u ,  to be I n s t a n t i a t e d  to Fa",  we w i l l  n ^  r m -"1
get no con t rad ic t ion  between 6* and the i n s t a n t i a t i o n  of 5 \  There
i s  a lso  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of leaving (C.U^) as i t  i s ,  but of  adding a
ru le  to  enable 5 ‘ and 6* to be shown to  be c o n t ra d ic to ry .  In  order
to  keep the non-modal ru le s  the same as before ,  we in troduce  the ru le :
(C. D P  i )  I f  □ A e u, G -Tl and u,, i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to prn I in i n
in  .0. o r  p^ i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p^ ^ in  A  . then i f
A conta ins  occurrences o f  the ind iv idua l  constants  a""’3.1
a" then fo r  some ind iv idua l  cons tants  b^ k
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—i, ^ F|iî* *"'* •S'j %  ^ P-1 1 "K •'k
From t h i s  rule , in  our example above, we get
•y J n __ , m7 . &i -  fei Hm’
and by the s u b s t i t u t i i d t y  of i d e n t i c a l s ,  we get 
8 ’. Fb!" .  u
and by (C.U^) we get
- F i t ?  c P,”1 rm
and so there  i s  a c o n t r a d ic t io n .  So the se t  we began with i s
rendered n o t -sa t is f ia b le  by the addition of ru le  (C, a  a  i ) .
3Before adding (C, o  ci i ) to the ru le s  fo r  M Q = we must
ask whether i t  i s  appropr ia te ,  in  the l i g h t  of our presupposit ions
and case I I I ,  t h a t  the se t
( (Ex) a  Fx , -  a  (Ex)Fx 
be i n c o n s i s t e n t .  I t  does seem so. The f i r s t  formula i s  read as 
"Something from world n, i s ,  in a l l  worlds,  F"
The second i s  read as
" I t  i s  not the case that- in a l l  worlds something i s  F . ”
On these  readings ,  i f  the  f i r s t  i s  t rue  then the second should be 
f a l s e .
The question  may then be asked, why not i n s e r t  in the
qru le s  for M Q = a ru le  analogous to  (C. □ □ i )  but for the opera tor
^  . In t h i s  case ,  such an in s e r t i o n  would render c e r t a in  formulae
s e l f - s u s t a in in g  when our readings in d ica te  t h a t  they should not be so.  
We re tu rn  to t h i s  in  a moment, but before doing so we s e t  out the 
proposed se ts  of condit ions  fo r  the systems = ( 1 4  i  4 4 )  and some 
f a c t s  about formulae which are s e l f - s u s t a in in g .
The set fo r  M^ Q = co n s i s t s  of toge the r  with the f i r s t  four
ru les  above.
The se t  fo r  M^ Q -  co n s i s t s  of less  (C, p^) ,  and then added are
79
the f i r s t  four ru le s  above and ru le  (C. ) .
3 3 3The s e t  C» fo r  M Q =, so f a r ,  co n s i s t s  of C toge the r  with the f ive
ru le s  above.
The s e t  C» fo r  -  c o n s i s t s  of le ss  (C. p^) and then added
are the f i r s t  four ru le s  above and ru le  (C. p .
Given these  ru le s  only we can tu rn  a t t e n t i o n  to formulae
l ik e  the Barcan formula and i t s  converse .  There are o the r  formulae
which show the commutation of q u a n t i f i e r s  and modal ope ra to rs .  We
1 3w i l l  see which of these  i s  se lf -su sta in in g  in  M Q = and M Q =.
The Barcan Formula and others
The Barcan formula and i t s  converse are s e l f - s u s t a in in g  
in  M^Q = : ( (U x)oFx  s  o  (Ux)Fx), This accords well with our readings .  
Everything in  every world i s  F i f f  in every world every­
thing i s  F.
We have to remember t h a t  in  t h i s  case i t  i s  the one se t  of ind iv idua ls  
which i s  in  every world.  Although (Ex)oFx D o(Ex)Fx i s  s e l f -  
sus ta in ing  in  M^ Q =, the converse i s  not.  This a l so  accords with our 
readings .
I f  a t  l e a s t  one th ing i s  such th a t  in  every world i t  i s  F,
then in  every world a t  l e a s t  one th ing i s  F,
i s  c l e a r ly  se lf -su s ta in in g ,  but not
I f  in  every world at l e a s t  one th ing i s  F, then a t  l e a s t
one thing i s  such th a t  in  every world i t  i s  F,
The counter example to the  l a t t e r  i s  where a t  l e a s t  one th ing i s  F in
each world,  but i t  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  thing in  each world,  so no one th ing
i s  F across a l l  worlds,
3Also, in  = the Barcan formula i s  not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  
nor i s  i t s  converse.  This accords with our readings  so long as we
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remember th a t  the s e t  of Ind iv idua ls  in  each world can be a d i f f e r e n t  
s e t .  The Barcan formula then reads as:
I f  everything  in  every world i s  F then everything  from 
world i s  F in every world.
The formula i t s e l f  i s  f a l s i f i e d  by the s i t u a t io n  where world m 
inc ludes  not only a l l  the in d iv idua ls  from n (which are F) but o the r  
ind iv idua ls  which are not F,  The converse i s  f a l s i f i e d  by the s i t u a ­
t io n  where not everything from n i s  in every o the r  world.
3Also in  M Q -  the formula 
(Ex) a  Fx D C](Ex)Fx 
i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  but i t s  converse i s  not. This a lso  accords well  
with our readings .  The formula reads as:
I f  something from world ^  i s  F in a l l  worlds then in  a l l  
worlds something i s  F.
37he converse reads as:
I f  in  a l l  worlds something i s  F then something from 
world ^  i s  F in  a l l  worlds.
A counterexample to  the converse i s  given by the re  being no i n t e r ­
sec t ion  of domains of  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  In each world something i s  F,  
but i t  i s  not the same th ing which i s  F from world to  world.
We now take up the d iscuss ion  from the previous sec t ion
3about a ru le  fo r  <> analogous to  (C. a  a  i )  fo r  U Q Let us 
f i r s t  s e t  out such a r u l e .
(C, 0  0  i )  I f  0  A A  then there  i s  in  A  a t  l e a s t  one
model s e t ,  such as such t h a t  A e and i f  ^
nconta ins  occurrences of the  ind iv idua l  constan ts  ^  . . . »
1
then fo r  some in d iv idua l  constants  , b
n \ _  I «Î n _ .m
% l ” “Xj I’m' “Jk &k ^
The add i t ion  of t h i s  ru l e  to  C,, w i l l  not a f f e c t  the deduction whichM
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shows the Barcan formula to be not se lf -su sta in in g . This can be 
checked in  Appendix I I ,  But (C, i )  w i l l  render the  converse of
the Barcan formula se lf -su s ta in in g .  The ru le  (C, ^  ^  1) w i l l  not 
render the formula
OCEaJFx 3  (ExJ a  Fx 
se lf -su s ta in in g .
Since we are  t ry in g  to cons t ruct  these systems to  accord
with our presupposit ions  and preferred readings we have one good
reason for r e j e c t i n g  the in t roduc t ion  of (C, <) <> 1) in to  the se t
q 3of  ru le s  fo r  M"Q =, The "mechanics" of system M Q = are  such t h a t
ru le  (Cc Os)  i )  should not be in troduced.
None the l e s s ,  i t  would be bes t  i f  we could give some 
o the r  so r t  of reason as to  why (C, O Q i )  i s  d e s i r ab le  and (C, 0  <) i )  
i s  not,  that i s ,  a reason which does not re ly  simply on the produc­
t i o n  of proofs ,  some of which have welcome r e s u l t s  because ( C , () 0  i )  
i s  not used and o thers  of which have unwelcome r e s u l t s  when (C, 0  0  i )  
i s  used. Since one formula which (C, 0  <> i )  renders  s e l f - s u s t a in in g  
i s  the  converse of the Barcan formula we tu rn  to  i t .
The converse of the Barcan formula reads as:
I f  everything in  every world i s  F then everything  
from world _n i s  F in  every world.
The negation of t h i s  i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  when not everything from world _n
i s  in  every world, l e t  alone being F in  every world.  When we 
3formal ize ,  in  M Q =, the p ropos i t ion  t h a t
I t  i s  not the case t h a t  everything in  world i s  F in  
every world
we get
^  (Ux) □ Fx 
By d e f i n i t i o n  t h i s  gives us
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(Ex) 0  Fx , 
which reads as
Something in  world n_ i s ,  i n  a t  l e a s t  one poss ib le  world, 
not F.
And t h i s  reading i s  ambiguous. I t  could mean t h a t  something from 
world n i s  in  a t  l e a s t  one possib le  world o ther  than n and the re  i t  
i s  not F. But i t  could a lso  mean t h a t  something in world £  i s  in  
at l e a s t  one possib le  world namely r i t s e l f  — and the re  i s  not F.
And i t  could a lso mean t h a t  something in  world jn i s  j u s t  not in  any 
o the r  world.
Our counterexample f i t s  with the l a s t  two in t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
of t h i s  ambiguous reading, but not with the f i r s t .  I t  i s  the f i r s t  
reading which would j u s t i f y  the in t roduc t ion  of (C, <> <> i ) ,  but not 
the l a s t  two. Since our counterexample also f i t s  with the case ,  
case I I I ,  which M^ Q = i s  supposed to  r e f l e c t  we r e j e c t  ru le  (C, 0  O  i )
The Preferred  Systems,
We have pointed out t h a t  model systems can be constructed
3in  pi Q = to r e f l e c t  each of the cases I  to IV, So, in  the pro-
3modal p redicate  logics  we cons t ruc ted ,  we could say t h a t  j.t Q -  i s  
the most general  system. The ad d i t ion  of modal opera tors  does not
change t h i s  in  any basic  way. So we w i l l  discuss most problems in
3 1terms of M Q =, The system M Q ~ i s  a lso  of i n t e r e s t  simply because
the one se t  of ind iv idua ls  occurs in  a l l  possible  worlds
1 3So, in  what follows we s h a l l  t r e a t  M Q = and M Q = as the 
p referred  systems, the  l a t t e r  as the most prefe rab le
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The i n d i s c e r n i b i l i t y  of i d e n t i c a l s
Let us now consider the  p r in c ip le  of the  i n d i s c e r n i b i l i t y  
o f  id e n t i c a l s  r e l a t i v e  to the two preferred  systems. There are two 
formulae of i n t e r e s t .  They are
( i )  (Ux)(U%)/(x = %) & Fx , D FyJ  and
( i i )  (Ux)(U%)^&= % .3 a ( x  =
( i )  i s  the well  known law of s u b s t l t u t i v i t y  of i d e n t i t y  fo r  bound
v a r i a b l e s .  The o ther  i s  simply saying t h a t  i d e n t i t y  i s  true  fo r  a l l
poss ib le  worlds.  Both ( i )  and ( i i )  are s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in  “ and
Formula ( i i )  accords with what we have already said about 
i d e n t i t y  and r ig id  des igna t ion .  We have given i d e n t i t y  a p ecu l ia r  
s t a t u s  in our systems, a s t a tu s  denied any o ther  p red ica te .  This i s  
e sp e c ia l ly  c l e a r  in the allowing of i d e n t i t i e s  in to  s e t s  even when 
the ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  in  the  i d e n t i t i e s  do not designa te  any 
ind iv idua l  in the  world described by th a t  model s e t .  I t  i s  the re fo re  
important to note t h a t  al though ( i i )  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  the following 
formula i s  not:
( i i i ) (Ux) ( U%)(Fxy D □ Fxy)
A countermodel fo r  ( H i )  provides fo r  F t r u l y  r e l a t i n g  two th ings  in  
one world, but not in another .  This i s  to be con tras ted  with i d e n t i ty ,  
where i f  -  b ’ i s  true in  one world i t  w i l l  be so in a l l  others.
Quine maintains t h a t  i f  we accept ( i i )  then we are 
committed to " A r i s to t e l i a n  e ssen t ia l i sm "  which holds th a t  " some a t
3l e a s t  of the t r a i t s  t h a t  determine an. ob jec t  do so n e c e s s a r i l y , ”
And i t  must be admitted t h a t  in  a l l  our log ica l  systems we have
^See Appendix I I  
2See Appendix I I
oW,V, Quine, From a l o g i ca l  po in t  of view p, 156,
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we have assumed t h a t  there  i s  a f ixed ,  determinate i l l a t i o n  between 
ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  and the ob jec t s  they des igna te .  But being 
named by a c e r t a i n  name can hard ly  be held to be a t r a i t  which 
determines an ob jec t .  I f  i t  i s ,  then Quine’s suggestion t h a t  we use 
naming pred ica tes  to eliminate s ingu la r  terms makes Quine a supporter 
of A r i s to t e l i a n  e s se n t ia l ! sm .  I f  i t  i s  not,  then i t  i s  hard to see 
j u s t  how ( i i )  can count in favour of  what Quine says i t  counts in 
favour.  Anyway, we w i l l  r e tu rn  to  the question of essen t ia l i sn i  in 
a l a t e r  s ec t ion ,
Rifdd des igna tors  and d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t ions
In h is  paper,  " E x i s t e n t i a l  and Uniqueness Presupposi­
t i o n s " , ^  Hintikka se ts  about c o n s t ru c t in g .a  quan t i f ied  modal logic 
in  which s ingu la r  terms r e f e r  uniquely,  - By "s ingular  terms" Hintikka 
means both proper names and d e f i n i t e  descriptions, such as ’ the 
morning star* or ’ the next P res iden t  of the United S t a t e s ’ , Not only
does he want both kinds of s in g u la r  terms to r e f e r  uniquely,  but
he a lso  adopts the policy  of formal izing both names and d e f i n i t e  
d e sc r ip t io n s  with in d iv idua l  constan ts  (which he c a l l s  ’f r ee  v a r i a b l e s ’ ) 
In  the course of the  paper he makes severa l  points  
which i t  i s  usefu l  to d i scuss .  Bearing in  mind his  pol icy of 
symbolizing a l l  s ingu la r  terms with individual constants we f i r s t  
tu rn  to  what he says about the formula
(iv)  a i Q = e )  3 (Ex) n (x = a)
Hintikka maintains t h a t  ( iv)  i s  f a l s e ,  e s p e c ia l l y  when
in te rp re te d  in  accordance with the notion of possib le  worlds when
Hintikka,  " E x i s t e n t i a l  and Uniqueness Presupposi t ions"  in  
Phi losophica l  Problems in  Looic, ed,  K. Lambert, rUedel Dordrecht, 
1970, pp. 20-55.
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<C> iî " i s  t rue  in  a poss ib le  world i f f  £  were t rue  in  a t  l e a s t  one 
a l t e r n a t i v e  possib le  w o r l d . He says t h a t ,  i n  ( i v ) ,  the  antecedent 
i s  c l e a r l y  t r u e ,  but the  consequent can be f a l s e .  He argues as 
follows:
Reading « 'The j i e x t j r e s i d e n t  of the United S t a t e s ’ , 
the  antecedent of j/(iv27 says th a t  necessa r i ly  the next 
p res iden t  i s  the next p re s iden t ,  which i s  obviously t ru e .  
The consequent says that there  i s  someone w)io necessarily  
i s  the next p re s id en t ,  i . e .  whose e lec t io n  i s  in ev ita b le .  
On any reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of nece ss i ty ,  t h i s  i s  f a l s e . 2
Two poin ts  must be made. F i r s t ,  Hintikka has very
quickly dropped h is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of * 0  j>’ as ’in  a t  le a s t  one
possible  world £* and has lapsed in to  ’necessari ly* and "reasonalbe
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( s )  of  n e c e s s i t y . ” Secondly, Hintikka diagnoses why
( iv )  can be fa l s e  by saying
Whatever goes wrong with ( iv )^7  i s  due to the f a c t  t h a t  
under d i f f e r e n t  courses of events we^consider possib le  
*£* r e f e r s  to d i f f e r e n t  individuals,*^
But here he i s  wrong unless  we take i t  t h a t  ’a /  must
stand fo r  a d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t i o n .
3In  our system M Q -  ( iv )  i s  not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  but t h a t  
i s  simply because although i d e n t i t i e s  are t rue  in  a l l  possible  worlds 
i t  does not follow t h a t  some one ind iv idua l  i s  in  a l l  possib le  worlds.  
In  “  we read ( iv )  as
I f  a = a i s  t rue  in  a l l  worlds then there  i s  some thing 
from 11 which i s  a. in  a l l  worlds.
The re fe rence  of *_a’ does not change, ’_a* does not e x i s t  in  a l l  worlds,
3That i s  why the consequent can be f a l s e  in  M'Q =,
^Ib id .  p. 27.
^'Ibid. p. 25.
^ Ib id .  p. 29.
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But, in  system - ,  where the se t  of  in d iv idua ls  i s
the  same in  a i l  worlds,  then (Iv) i s  s e l f - sus ta in ing*  And ( iv )  i s
se lf -su sta in in g  j u s t  because not only i s  ' a ' taken to be a r ig id
des igna to r ,  but £  i s  in  every world* We can, in M^ Q =, only take
( iv )  to  be fa ls e  i f  we take *£* to be a d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n  which
does pick out a d i f f e r e n t  in d iv idua l  from world to world. Then
the re  i s  not some one ind iv id u a l  from one world which i s  the x
( i . e .  a,) in  a l l  worlds.
At any rate , a f t e r  d iscuss ing  ( iv ) he concludes t h a t  the
basic  semantical idea of 'poss ib le  worlds '  shows that 
almost any ordinary language statement in  which a s i n ­
gu la r  term occurs with in  a modal context i s  in  p r inc ip le  
p o t e n t i a l l y  ambiguous. Such a statement can sometimes 
be understood in  ( a t  l e a s t )  two d ifferen t ways. I t  can
be taken to  be about the d ifferent ind iv idua ls  which the
term picks out in  the d i f f e r e n t  possib le  worlds t h a t  
the  modal opera tor  i n v i t e s  us to consider.  However,
. o f ten  i t  can a lso  be understood as being about the 
unique ind iv idua l  to  which the term in  f a c t  refers ( i . e .  
r e f e r s  in  the ac tua l  w or ld ) . !
He f u r th e r  argues t h a t  we should t r y  to prevent s ingu la r
2terms from e x h ib i t in g  " t h i s  kind of  r e f e r e n t i a l  m u l t i p l i c i t y " ,
and he s e t s  about cons truct ing  a log ic  which w i l l  ensure t h a t  not
only do proper names have uniqueness of r e fe rence ,  but so also do 
d e sc r ip t i o n s .
Hintikka*s conclusion can only be granted when the 
s ingu la r  terms r e f e r r e d  to are d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t i o n s .  In  t h a t  case ,  
what he says about ambiguity i s  c e r t a i n l y  true. But,  i f  i t  i s  the 
case t h a t  ambiguity a r i s e s  in  the ease of s ingu la r  terms which are 
d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  then i t  would seem bes t  to t r y  to resolve  the 
problem by a cons ide ra t ion  of the  logic  of d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s  in  
modal con tex ts .  As i t  i s  Hintikka attempts  to  solve the  problem by
^Ib id .  p. 28, 
^ Ib id ,  p. 29
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cons t ruc t ing  an e l ab o ra te  modal logic  without any cons ide ra t ion  of 
the theory of d e s c r i p t i o n s ,
This f a i l u r e  to  separa te  proper names from d e f i n i t e  
d e sc r ip t io n s  can a lso  be seen in  Hintikka*s app l ic a t io n  of ( iv )  to 
Quine's example:^
(v) a  (the number of p lane ts  = the number of p lane t s )  D
(Ex) □ (the number of planets “ x)
The s ingu la r  terms in  (v) are d e f in ite  descriptions, and i t  i s  no 
wonder t h a t  one h e s i t a t e s  to say that (v) i s  l o g i c a l ly  true. But 
i f  we d o n ' t  treat d e f i n i t e  descriptions as r ig i d  des igna to rs ,  and 
the re  seems no reason to agree with Hintikka tha t  a l l  s ingu la r  terms 
should have unique re fe rence ,  then we can sus ta in  ( iv )  but deny (v) 
the s ta tu s  of l o g ic a l  truth. The b a s i s  of our systems has been that  
there  i s  an i n v a r i a n t  r e l a t i o n  between names and the in d iv idua ls  
named across a l l  poss ib le  worlds.  There seems to be every reason to
deny such an in v a r i a n t  r e l a t i o n  across  a l l  possib le  worlds between
"the  number of p lanets"  and a p a r t i c u l a r  na tu ra l  number. Our i n t u i ­
t io n s  about (v ) ,  when ' <> * i s  read as ' i n  a l l  poss ib le  w or lds ' ,  I s  
th a t  the number of  p lane t s  could change from world to  world.
We now consider the questions  which arise when formulae 
contain both d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s  and modal ope ra to rs .  Expressions 
such as " the  number of p lan e t s" ,  " the  morning s t a r " ,  " the  evening 
s t a r "  and " the  t i m e - t r a v e l l e r "  are examples of such d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip ­
t i o n s ,  S%ch express ions  are meant to pick out one in d iv id u a l .
D ef in i te  d e sc r ip t io n s  can be introduced in to  a formal
^Ib id , p. 26.
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system e i t h e r  by means of a p r im i t ive  opera tor  or by means of 
d e f i n i t i o n s .  In  what follows we s h a l l  follow the o u t l in e  of the 
d iscuss ion  to  be found in  Hughes and Cresswel l ,^  but we should be 
able to give fi rmer answers to  the quest ions  they r a i s e  than the 
answers they give .
We do not adopt the  usual symbolism fo r  d e f i n i t e
d esc r ip t io n s  because i t  becomes quite cumbersome as the theory i s
developed. Rather,  we add to the improper symbols the  following:
I  r j  ,
I, i s  a symbol l ike  U and E and i s  used to bu i ld  a q u a n t i f i c a t io n  
opera to r  : ( I x ) . This  opera to r  i s  a binary q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  with a 
scope of the form ( x ) , (x ) /  where y) (x) i s  the r e s u l t  of
s u b s t i t u t in g  x fo r  a t  le a s t  one occurrence of an ind iv idua l  constant  
in  the  formula , There i s  a sense in  which
can be read as
' t h e  y£> \
The formula
(%) I (x)7
i s  read as
' t h e  4  ^ i s  
and the formula
( I x )/Mx , X =  ^
i s  read as
' th e  morning s t a r  i s  Venus' , 
provided 'M' stands for the  property of being a morning s t a r  and 'a. '  
s tands  fo r  the name 'Venus' ,
^Op.cit. pp, 202-209.
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I f  we expand the systems M^Q = ( K i < 4 )  by the add i t ion  
of the symbols l i s t e d  above we w i l l  need to  add su i t a b le  formation 
r u l e s ,  and su i t a b le  consis tency ru le s  for model systems. F i r s t  
we cons t ruc t  formation ru le s :
(we use (A (x^'/a.)) for the  r e s u l t  of s u b s t i t u t in g  x for a t  l e a s t  one 
occurrence of a in A.)
(6 ,1 ' )  I f  A i s  a wff and B i s  a wff and x i s  any ind iv idua l
va r iab le  and a and b, are any ind iv idua l  cons tan ts ,  not 
necessa r i ly  d i s t i n c t ,  then
(B /x ^ /b j j /  i s  a wff, 
provided th a t  a l l  the ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  in  (Mx /b))  
and (B(xVb)) have the same supe rsc r ip t  unless  they occur 
in  atomic par t s  of the  form of an i d e n t i t y .
(6,IM) I f  A i s  a wff conta ining no modal operators and B i s  a wff
conta ining no modal opera tors  and x i s  any ind iv idua l  
va r iab le  and b and b are  any ind iv idua l  cons tan ts  not 
ne ce s sa r i ly  d i s t i n c t ,  then
i s  a wff,
provided t h a t  a l l  the ind iv idua l  constants  in  (A(x^/^)) 
and (B(x^/b)) have the same su p e r sc r ip t ,
(6 .1)  i s  the same as (61*) but without the  proviso.
We expand the formation r u le s  of  -  by adding (61),  and those of 
M^ Q = and M^ Q -  by adding (61*), and those of Ivi'^ Q = by adding (6,IM). 
We then have formulae for the  systems M^ QI ( l < i < 4 ) .  We sh a l l  use
A(x) and B(x) in  j u s t  the same sense of ^ ( x ) ,  and Ma,^) fo r  a
formula,  A, conta ining a t  l e a s t  one occurrence of  an Ind iv idua l  
cons tan t  with the su p e r sc r ip t  i : .
In  any formula of the  form ( I x ) / a .  bJ  the f i r s t  four 
symbols, ( Ix ) ,  are ca l l ed  ' the  d e sc r ip t i o n  o p e r a t o r ' ,  and
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i s  the scope of ( I x ) .
The condi t ions  fo r  membership of model s e t s  are drawn 
from the following;
( C . I “™) I f  B /  e  and (A(_aVx)) e' then (B(a”/ x ) )  q: p
(C.I— ) I f  (I%)/%, b7 « u and (A(j^x)) &- u then (B(a /x))  6- «*»W»rT« CWSMrrs * a  «  J |  |  «*«** I IT  «=»> •»>»* ««TSI /
(C.II) I f  ( Ix ) / i \ . bJ  e and (M a/x))  cr and (A(b/x>) e  p^
then a -  b e
(C.I  s e l f +) Not (1\0Z"a(x ) ,  (Ix)yTA(x), p^, provided
th a t  A(x) i s  the same as M%) except fo r  having 
K wherever A(%) has x  occurring,
( C . I  =) I f  (I jO/AfyJU ( I x j 7 7 B ( x 9 ,  X = x77 e and
A(x) , C(x)_7 6- p^  ^ and A(x) i s  the same as
A(%) except fo r  having x wherever A(v) has x  occurr ing ,  
then
, <Ix)Z~B(x), C(x)^7 ^ Pn'
(C.I = ) I f  (Il)ZlA(%), (Ix) / b ( x ) ,  X “  yJJ e p^  ^ and
( I x ) / ”A(x ) ,  C(x ) 7  e M and A(x) i s  the same as 
A(x) except fo r  having x wherever A(x) has % occur r ­
ing ,  then
( I x ) /  b ( x ) ,  C ( x )  7  e  iu„ prov ided t h a t  a l l  theCu»V<e« ♦»>» Ika» * «-n* «*0 PtKf J  Î1
ind iv idua l  constan ts  in A, B and C have the same
s u p e r sc r ip t s  i  where i > l .
(C.I ) I f  ( I x ) /  A, B 7 e u then (A(aVx)) a u for a t  l e a s t
one ind iv idua l  constan t  a*^ ,
(CoD I f  ( I x ) / ”a .  B_7 G p^ then (A(a/x)) e* p^  ^ f o r  a t  l e a s t  
one ind iv idua l  constan t  a,.
(C . ' - ' I )  I f  ( I x)7Ta(x) ,  B j r  c  pjj then
(Un)(A(x) & B . D . (Ey)((A(x)(v/x))  = x # y ) )  p ,«Tca «IW w«\n «Ma —v a  "Ata |  JT
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We also  add the  usual d e f i n i t i o n  of (E * x) A :
(E® x) A ~ df (Ev)(Ux)(A = x = y) where v does not occur in  A. 
We then have the ru le :
(C.ÏE) I f  (E‘ x) A G U then ( Ix l/^A,  k j  e  n .«VSS ^  ^  «Lvm «a»  » *»,» «sf f
We denote the se ts  C‘" by IC^  (1 4 i < 4 ) .
The s e t s :
I  = (C .I - ) ,  (C .II ) ,  (C.I s e l f  ^9, (C.IE)]
I^ = [ (C .I  ^ ) ,  (C.IpO, (C .II) ,  (C.I s e l f  ^9, (C.IE)^
IC  ^ = C^  U I u [(C.I = ) ,  (C .-^I)^
IC^ C^ U I^  U ( (C.I S) ,  (C o - I )^
IC  ^ = c2 u I., u [(C .I  f ) ,  ( C . - D ÏM
i c /  = C^ u I U [ (C .I  = ) ,  ( C . - I ) i
I f  we add i t  IG^ the ru le  (C . I ) ,  o r  add to IC^, IC^ or  i c /  the  ru le  
(Golj^) then the expanded d e sc r ip t i o n  systems w i l l  be designa ted as 
M^QI^ ( 1 < 1 4 4 )  r e sp e c t iv e ly .
From the formation r u le s  we can see t h a t  in  Î>/qï there  
w i l l  be no modal opera tors  in  the scope of any d e sc r ip t i o n  opera tor ,  
and a l l  the ind iv idua l  cons tants  in  the scope of a d e sc r ip t io n  opera to r
w i l l  have the same s u p e r sc r ip t .  These fea tu res  of M^ QX render the
system u n in te r e s t in g  from our point  of view.
3 3Once again our i n t e r e s t  i s  centred on M'QI and M^QI. When
we have
(v i )  ]Stx)_7 t
without modal opera tors  or transworld  i d e n t i t i e s  in  the  scope of ( I x ) , 
then t h i s  simply in d i c a t e s  t h a t  there  i s ,  in  the world described by 
j u s t  one ind iv idua l  with the property s e t  out in  A(x) and i tI  * * w «TS»fK0*a
^Cf. Hughes and Cresswel l ,  op ,c i t .
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a lso  has the property  s e t  out in  B (x). But the re  i s  no guarantee at  
a l l  t h a t  the in d iv idua l  which i s  the  A in  the world described by ju 
i s  a lso  the  A in  any o the r  world,  or t h a t  in  any o the r  world the re  i s  
any A, or  t h a t  i f  there  i s  any A the re  are not a thousand £*s .  Even 
when we have
( v i i )  D ( |x jZ"A(x),  B(x) J  «5
with the same provisos concerning the scope of ( ^ )  as fo r  ( v i ) ,  a l l
t h a t  ( v i i )  can guarantee i s  t h a t  in a l l  possib le  worlds the A i s  B,
but not t h a t  the same ind iv idua l  in each world i s  the A which i s  B,
For example, in  both the r e a l  world and the f i c t i o n a l  world of 
Hannibal ' s  v ic to ry  the winner of  the b a t t l e  entered  Rome in triumph, 
but the winner in  one world was Scip io ,  in  the o the r  i t  was Hannibal.
Hughes and Cresswel l  f ind th a t  when they introduce d e f i n i t e  
d e sc r ip t ions  the re  are c e r t a in  d i f f i c u l t i e s  with the logic  they 
c o n s t ru c t .  They po in t  out t h a t  there are c e r t a in  options  open to 
one when cons t ruc t ing  such a lo g ic .  E i the r  we can see ( I x ) /^A(x) . 
•o ,(x)_y as designa t ing  one ob jec t  in  one world (of which something 
w i l l  be p red ica ted ) ,  or  we can see ( Ix ) / °A (x ) .  . « . ( x ) ^ /  8S des ignating 
one ob jec t  which i s  A in  a l l  worlds .  In t h e i r  lo g ic ,  the former 
option makes
( v i i i )  (E’ x)A D ( W / I ,  and
( ix )  a ( E '  x)A 3  (Ex) a  A to be v a l id .
The l a t t e r  option renders ( v i i i )  and ( ix )  in v a l id ,  but
ix) (E® x) □ A 3  A y  v a l i d .  They favour the
l a t t e r  option.
Talcing each of ( v i i i ) ,  ( ix )  and (x) in  tu rn ,  and assuming 
them to be members of some , we would read them re sp ec t iv e ly  as:
( v i i i * )  I f  exac t ly  one th ing in  world i s  A^ then the A 
i s  A in  t h a t  world.
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(ix*) I f  in  every world exac t ly  one th ing i s  A then a t
l e a s t  one th ing from world jri i s ,  in  every world,
(x*) I f  exac t ly  one th ing  from world n i s  A in  every 
world then in world n the  ^  i s  A.
On the bas is  of these  readings  we would want ( v i i i )  to be va l id  but 
not ( ix )  and (x) .  In our systems ( v i i i )  i s  s e l f - s u s t a in in g  simply by 
v i r t u e  of ru le  (C .IE).  A counter-example to ( ix )  i s  where, in three  
worlds .n, jn' and ji” , we have three  ind iv idua ls  b and c such t h a t :
'"A c]
M„1= h k . .  At), -  Ac ]
M„»= -  â l i ,  Ac ]
In every world e xac t ly  one ind iv idua l  i s  A, but there  i s  no one i n d i ­
v idual which i s  A in a l l  worlds,  A counterexample to (x) i s
Pn “ ( M ,  6k,  ‘^ 6 ^  Î 
( M . 6k, — 6&j 
Pn"= [Aa, - 6 k ,  Ac. ï
Here there  i s  j u s t  one in d iv idua l  from ^  which i s  ^  in  a l l  worlds,
t h a t  ind iv idua l  i s  a. But there  i s  no one and only A (the  A) in  n.
So the antecedent of (x) i s  t rue  but the  consequent i s  not.  Not only
i s  (x) not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  but n e i th e r  i s
(x i )  (E:x) 0  A (E:x) A
The same counterexample f a l s i f i e s  (x i )  as f a l s i f i e d  (x ) ,
Quine 's  problematic (v)^ in  the nota t ion  of d e f i n i t e  
de sc r ip t io n s  becomes:
( x i i )  ( I s , ) /  Nx. X = 2 ,7 7
( % )  X = X.7
where *Nx* stands fo r  something l ik e  *x i s  a number a r r ived  a t  by
^See page 87 above
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counting the planets .'^  Since the antecedent of ( x i i )  i s  s e l f -  
sus ta in ing  by v i r t u e  of ru le  (C.I  s e l f  #) and the modal r u l e s ,  we 
need only look to  see what the s t a tu s  of the consequent i s .  A 
counterexample to t h i s  can be contracted  by setting  out a s e r i e s  of 
worlds in which the re  are  d i f f e r i n g  numbers of p lane t s .
I f  the p red ica te ,  N, does not concern numbers, fo r  
example, i f  'Nx' were to  stand fo r  'x i s  a l e t t e r  written by 
S o c ra te s ' ,  then the consequent of ( x i i )  could be rendered f a l s e  
simply by there  being no such l e t t e r  in  any . This so r t  of 
counterexample i s  not av a i lab le  in  M'^QI * (1 i <4) because of ru le s  
(C .I )  and C . I ^ ) .  Nevertheless ( x i i )  i s  not s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in those 
systems e i t h e r .  Counterexamples of the former kind are a v a i l ab le ,  
t h a t  i s  where d i f feren t ,  ind iv idua ls  from world to world have the 
property  of being a l e t t e r  w r i t t e n  by Socra tes.
The one major d i f f e r en ce  between the trea tment here and 
Hughes and C re ssw e l l ' s  trea tment of the d e sc r ip t ion  opera to r  as 
p r im i t ive  i s  t h a t  we have not extended the Universal  i n s t a n t i a t i o n  
ru le s  to include:
(C.UI) I f  (Ux) A (x) Ç p then ( I x ) / 1 ^  (x ) ,  A ( x ) ^  e uI ^  Au» y  «mb » = »  vutt « w f J Q
The extens ion of the  axiom VI in  Hughes and Cresswell  to
((Ux)A^3 B) whenever B d i f f e r s  from A only in having any 
term in  place of a free occurrence of x in A (provided 
t h a t  no va r iab le  f ree  in  the term i s  bound in  B) 
i s ,  in  our system, the same as adopting (C.UI). There i s  a d i f f i c u l t y  
in  adopting (C.UI).  Even i f  * / '  i s  a monadic p red ica te ,  the ru le  
must be seen as applying to a l l  monadic p red ica te s .  So, unless
precise  fo rm al i sa t ion  would require  the use of s e t  theory e .g .  'Nx* 
stands fo r  'x  = C^^^tz  I s  a p lanet  J * ' :
^O p .c i t ,  p. 203.
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(üx) A (x) i s  never s a t i s f i a b l e ,  (C.UI) means t i iat  in every world 
the re  i s  j u s t  one £> . One way of avoiding t h i s  unpleasant  
conclusion i s  to drop ru le  (C.I*^) in our systems, a move which i s  
analogous to Hughes and Cresswell*s s tipu la tion  t h a t  the value of 
' t h e  * should be the one in d iv idua l  which i s  the yb , or  e l s e  some 
arbitrary i n d i v i d u a l .^ This can only be seen as highly counter­
i n t u i t i v e ,  ju s t  as allowing "The (j> i s  not <j> ” to be s a t i s f i a b l e  
can only be seen as highly c o u n te r in tu i t i v e .  We can only say th a t  i t
seems prefe rab le  to  have ru le  (Col-^),  and so i t  seems preferable to
use systems of the s ty le  of fù^QI r a t h e r  than (14  1 < 4 ) .
Defin i te  d e sc r ip t io n s  can also  be introduced by
?d e f i n i t i o n .  In Hughes and Cresswell" the  treatment i s  confined to 
monadic p red ica te s .  The d e f i n i t i o n s  would be
(A) ( W Z ^  X, Ÿ' (Ejx) p  x&  (U%)( ^  X 3  /  %)
and
(B) ( Ix ) /*^  X ,  X = a 7  = df d  a & (Ux)( S  x D ix ~ a ) ) .^  t « « a  —1 «» «57*»
Two th ings  emerge from Hughes and Cresswell*s d i scuss ion .  The f i r s t
has to do with the formulae which are log ica l  t r u t h s  when d e f i n i t e
d e sc r ip t io n s  are int roduced by d e f i n i t i o n  r a th e r  than by taking the
d e sc r ip t i o n  opera to r  as p r im i t ive .  The second has to do with the
ambiguities of the nota t ion  which Hughes and Cresswell  use.  They use
tlio t r a d i t i o n a l  Russe l l ian  notation where 'the i s  * i s
formalised as * /"  (7x) ^  x ' .  Our nota t ion  simply avoids a l l  such
3ambiguity. There are o ther  ways of avoiding the ambiguity a l so ,
^Op.citc p« 203 f f .
^O p .c i t ,  p. 207.
3 See A. F. Smellyan, "Modality and Descr ip t ion” , The Journal of 
Süm&olic Log ie .  Vol. 13, 1948, pp. 31-37.
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ch ie f ly  by means of scope i n d i c a t o r s . Because our no ta t ion  avoids 
the ambiguity we w i l l  concentra te  on the d i f fe rences  which r e s u l t  
from the d i f f e r in g  approach.
i 1In  the systems M”QI” ( l < i ^  4) both (A) and (B) are  sel f -  
su s ta in in g ,  And j u s t  as, in the d e f i n i t i o n a l  system se t  out in 
Hughes and Cresswell,
( x i i i )  (Ix ) /j^  X, X = a_7:3 (3 x, & = a _ /
i l li s  not v a l id ,  i t  i s  not s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in M QI or M QI (14 i 4 4 ) ,  
But more importantly, ( x i i )  i s  not se lf -su sta in in g  in 
t h i s  d efin it io n a l version of the theory of d e sc r ip t i o n s .
I t  can be seen from th i s  e x p l i c i t  treatment of d e f i n i t e  
de sc r ip t io n s  as d e f in ite  d e sc r ip t i o n s  that we can deal with the 
opposite  problems found by Quine in  the form of (v ) .
Eüuü^Llkj%jite_deseTiptions
F i n a l l y ,  before leaving the subjec t  of d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip ­
t io n s  wo need to  consider  what i s  involved, in  more d e t a i l ,  in  
r e f ra in in g  from including  (C.UI) in our preferred systems which deal 
with d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s  (not by d e f i n i t i o n ) .
Vie have allowed * ( I x ) / / ^  ( x ) , «« . , (x)_7* to be non-designating 
as well as des igna t ing ,  and both those p o s s ib i l i t i e s  are  open within 
the  one possible world, t h a t  i s  when no modal operators occur in  
' (Ix)/TW (x) * When we look at M^ 'QI in  the l i g h t  of these
f ea tu res  of formulae conta ining d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  we see many 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  between M^ QI and Thomason's system Q3.^ The major 
d i f f e rence  between M^ QI and Q3 i s  th a t  Q3 i s  a f ree  lo g ic .  Non-designating
H. Thomason, "Modal Logic and Metaphysics” in  The Logical  Wav of
Doinq Things, Yale Univers i ty  Press, London, 1969, pp. 119-146, esp, 
pp. 138-145,
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d efin ite  d e sc r ip t io n s  are given as a value some objec t  i s  a domain 
of non-existent objects .  Non-designating f r e e -v a r i a b le s  (cons tan ts )  
are  s im i la r ly  t r e a te d  (and allowed fo r ) ,
Thomason says that he wishes to "take the s o r t  of 
reference  in  which a name ( 'S o c r a t e s ' )  i s  assigned one th ing 
(Socrates)  which i s_ the  same in  many possible  worlds as primary
Ior  paradigmat ic .” This i s ,  of course,  one of the presupposi t ions  
according to which we are  cons t ruc t ing  our systems. These i n d iv id u a l s -  
in-every-poss ib le-wor ld  Thomason claims ore substances .
Where he d i f f e r s  from us i s  t h a t  in  making the logic  f ree  
he only allows tiie e x i s t in g  ob jec t s  to be common to  every possible  
world, but allows fo r  each world a domain ( s e t )  of individuals to be 
the values of non-designating f ree  va r iab le s  (cons tan ts )  and 
d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t i o n s .
9 ■This  makes Q3 very much l ike  Ml)I where the se t  of in d iv idua ls  
common to a l l  worlds could be ca l l ed  substances .  I f  we make our 
logics  in to  f ree  log ics  then we add add i t iona l  f l e x i b i l i t y  to our 
systems, and we cons ider  the  question  of fr ee  logics  in  a l a t e r  
chap te r .  But we r e tu rn  to the question of substance l a t e r  in  t h i s  
chap ter .
At t h i s  point  we should simply note that d e f i n i t e  
d e sc r ip t i o n s ,  l ike  proper names, purport to re fer . So i t  seems only 
reasonable th a t  i f  we a s s e r t  t h a t  ( in  world n) the £  i s  such and 
such then we are a sse r t in g  something about the jZ . Up to t h i s  
poin t  we have been a t  pains to show th a t  d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s  are 
d i f f e r e n t  to names. Indeed, i t  might be said t h a t  a d e f i n i t e  
d e sc r ip t io n  c a r r i e s  i t s  sense e x p l i c i t l y  while a name does not. A 
d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n  should not only be understood to be a s ingu la r
^Ibid. p. 137,
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term, but a lso ,  t h a t  to which i t  r e f e r s  should be e x p l i c i t l y  
descr ibed .  With a name we might only understand that i t  does refer  
uniquely but not have se t  out e x p l i c i t l y  by d e sc r ip t i o n  anywhere t h a t  
to  which i t  refers .
I t  i s  the d esc r ip t iv en ess  of d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  which 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  distinguishes them from names. But both names and 
d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  are assumed to have, in any one world,  uniqueness 
of reference.
Hintifcka's  case fo r  the  need fo r  the highly  complex modal 
logic  which he develops in  " E x i s t e n t i a l  and Uniqueness Presupposi t ions"  
i s  most c e r t a in l y  based on the confused conf la t ion  of proper names 
and d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s .  None the l e s s ,  there  i s  another important 
theme which runs through H in t ikka ' s  d iscuss ion  of s ingu la r  terms and 
cross-world i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  That theme i s  th a t  whatever ind iv idua l  
constants  are symbolising in  a no ta t ion  the constants  themselves
jshould be seen as having the same r e f e r e n t  from world to world.
2In  another paper,  "Semantics fo r  p rep o s i t io n a l  a t t i t u d e s " ,  
Hintikka gives his  answer to  the question he poses, "With what r ig h t  
do we speak of in d iv idua ls  in  d i f f e r e n t  possible  worlds as being 
id e n t i c al?"  But before giving his  answer he i n s i s t s  t h a t  he i s  
d iscuss ing  poss ib le  worlds in  as much as they a s s i s t  in  i l lum ina t ing  
p repos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e s  such as b e l i e f  and knowledge. His i n t e r e s t  
i s  pr im ari ly  in  epis temic  modal i t ies  such as are expressed by "a
^Ib id .  p. 29.
2J ,  Hintikka,  "Semantics f o r  P rep o s i t io n a l  A t t i tudes"  in  P h i losophical  
Logic . Eds, J ,  W. Davis,  D. J .  Hockney, W. R. Wilson, Reidel Dordrecht, 
1969, pp. 21-45,
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be l ieves  t h a t  (and symbolized by At the same time, the
suggest ions he makes about cross  world i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  are even tua l ly  
applied to a le t l i ic  moda l i t ie s  in  " E x i s t e n t i a l  and Uniqueness 
P resupposi t ions" ,
Because of Hintikka*s primary i n t e r e s t  in epistemic 
modality we w i l l  f i r s t  give an example of how the problem of cross 
world i d e n t i t y  arises  in epis temic  con tex ts .  For example, suppose 
t h a t  a. be l ieves  t h a t  Adam was the f i r s t  male homo sapiens and also  
that Adam was s ix  f e e t  t a l l ,  brown skinned, and l ived for severa l  
hundred year s .  Now, i t  would be compatible with _a’s b e l i e f s  about 
Adam th a t  Adam was blue-eyed and l ived for 756 years ,  but i t  would 
a lso  be compatible with a ' s  b e l ie f s  that Adam was brown-eyed and 
l ived fo r  656 years. So Hintikka suggests th a t  besides  the world in  
which a, i s  supposed a c tu a l ly  to l iv e  and have b e l i e f s ,  we a lso  suppose 
t h a t  there  are  " a l t e r n a t e "  possible worlds in  which two things ob ta in .  
F i r s t ,  what a. be l ieves  i s  a c tu a l ly  true, and second, what i s  
compatible with _a*s b e l i e f s  (or what we maintain i s  compatible with 
^*s b e l i e f s )  i s  a lso  t ru e .
So we have th ree  model-sets,  to f i t  our example, which 
can be p^, p^ ,^ and p j , In p^  ^ are the s tatements :
a b e l ieves  that Adam was the f i r s t  male homo sapiens, was 
s ix  f e e t  t a l l ,  brown skinned, and l ived fo r  severa l  
hundred years .
I t  i s  compatible with what a be l ieves  t h a t  Adam was 
blue-eyed and l ived 756 years .
I t  i s  compatible with what a, be l ieves  t h a t  Adam was 
brown-eyed and l ived 656 years .
In p^, an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p , are the s tatements :
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Adam was the f i r s t  male homo sapiens ,  was s ix  f e e t  t a l l ,
brown skinned, and l ived fo r  severa l  hundred years ,
Adam was blue-eyed and l ived for 756 years.
In p . ,  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to p , are the statements :J 0 .
Adam was the f i r s t  male homo sapiens ,  was s ix  f e e t  t a l l ,
brown-skinned, and l ived for several hundred years .
Adam was brown-eyed and l ived fo r  656 years.
The important question  th a t  arises  i s ,  by what r ig h t  do
we assume t h a t  the blue-eyed 756 year  old man in one world i s  the
same person as the  brown-eyed 656 year  old man in  another  world?
To press tiie question f u r t h e r ,  we might ask,  i s  i t  not possib le  t h a t
we have two separa te  ind iv idua ls  given the same name?
Hintikka says t h a t  in  the case of prep o s i t io n a l  a t t i t u d e s
possib le  worlds are
. . .n o rm a l ly  possib le  s t a t e s  of a f f a i r s  or courses of 
events  compatible with the a t t i t u d e  in  some spec if ied  
person. Now normally these  a t t i t u d e s  may be a t t i t u d e s  
towards d e f i n i t e  persons as d e f i n i t e  physical  o b jec t s .
But how i s  i t  t h a t  we may be sure, s ig h t  unseen, t h a t  the 
a t t i t u d e s  are d i rec ted  toward the r i g h t  persons or  
o b jec t s?  Only i f  in  a l l  tlie possib le  worlds compatible 
with the a t t i t u d e  in question  we can pick out the
r e c ip i e n t  of t h i s  a t t i t u d e ,  i . e .  the Ind iv idua l  a t  i t s
receiv ing  end.
So, i f  _a*s b e l i e f  i s  towards (o r  about) Adam then we must
ensure th a t  Adam in  the world p a r t i a l l y  described by i s  the same
ind iv idua l  as the Adam in  the worlds described by p^  ^ and p j , 
Hintikka then pos tu la te s  "a se t  of functions  F each member _f of 
which picks out a t  most one in d iv idua l  f (  p) from the domain of
ind iv idua ls  . . . .  Furthermore,  we must o f ten  requ i re  t h a t ,  given f^ ,
f .2  e i f  f^( p) -  f^ ( p) then ^ ^ ( X  ) “  ^  ) fo r  a l l  a l t e r ­
na t ives  X to p .  In  o ther  words, an ind iv idua l  cannot ' s p l i t *
^ Ib id . p. 34.
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1when we move from a world to i t s  a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  The functions  in  F
are  called  " ind iv idua t ing  functions."
Hintikka then claims that the  question of when an
ind iv idua l  in  one world i s  the same ind iv idua l  as one in  another i s
not as important as whether the re  i s  a func tion in  F which picks out
both in d iv id u a ls .  So a = b, when a i s  in  world n and b in  world m,
i f f  there i s  a function  in F such t h a t  t h a t  func t ion ,  say gives
f/ j])  ^ and f(m) -  b. There i s  a sense in whicli, Hintikka says,
these  functions  can be seen as the names of the ind iv id u a ls  which
appear (or e x i s t )  i n  a v a r i e ty  of possib le  worlds — "the members
of  F might in  f a c t  be thought of as names or ind iv idua l  constants
2of a c e r t a in  kind."
Having proposed a l l  t h i s ,  Hintikka then q u a l i f i e s  i t  a l l
by pointing out that in  some modal i t ies  we might want ind iv idua ls  to
s p l i t  and merge. Furthermore he poin ts  out th a t  the members of F
are not themselves individuals manifest ing themselves in  various
possib le  worlds.  The members of  F can be seen as embodying the
t o t a l i t y  of ways of  recognis ing "one and the same ind iv idua l  under
3d i f f e r e n t  circumstances and under d i f f e r e n t  courses of even ts ,"
In as much as the members of F determine whether two 
in d iv idua ls  in  d i f f e r e n t  worlds are one and the same or not, there  i s  
some point in  seeing the members of F as names or individual constants  
Then, by d e f in it io n ,  or a t  l e a s t  by presupposit ion ,  these names are 
r i g i d  d e s igna to rs .  What a member of F picks out from world to  world 






This use of members of F as r ig id  des igna tors  i s  a t  one
with Rennie 's  account of r ig i d  d e s igna to rs ,^  In H in t ikka ' s  account
of F i t  i s  se t  down tl^  t  F i s  a s e t  of functions  from worlds to
in d iv id u a ls .  In  Rennie, where D. i s  the set  of a l l  in d iv idua ls  and
i s  the se t  of a l l  worlds,  the se t  I X i s  the se t  of a l l  func tions
from worlds to in d iv id u a l s .  Of D.^, Rennie says
we might expect to form a domain of in tens iona l  
in d iv id u a ls ,  or  ino iv iduol  concepts. That i s ,  an 
ind iv idua l  concept i s  an indexed sequence of i n d i v i ­
duals t h i s  usage of the  term i s  very s im i la r  to 
t h a t  of Carnap,
Hintikka also  r e f e r s  to Carnap and says of the  in d iv idua t ing  
fu n c t io n s ,
They are ex ce l len t  approximations in  our theory to 
the  ‘ind iv idua l  concepts '  v;hich many philosophers 
have p o s tu l a t e d .3
There i s  then a footnote  re ference  to  Carnap^ which i s  the same as
Rennie 's  footnote to the sec t ion  quoted above. Rennie de f ines  a
r ig i d  des igna to r ,  in  the sense of Kripke,  as a function  from worlds
„6
to  in d iv id u a ls .  He then says t h a t  ”a r ig i d  des igna to r  i s  a
des igna to r  th a t  takes  on the same substance in  each world. '
In s p i t e  of the  g rea t  s im i l a r i t y  between Rennie 's  and 
H in t lkka ' s  accounts of r i g i d  des igna to rs  there  i s  one v i t a l  underlying
^Op.cito,  p. 91 f f ,
^Ifoid, p, 91,
^O p .c i t .  p, 39,
^R, Carnap, Meaning and N ecess i ty . Univers i ty  of Chicago P ress ,  
Chicago, 1947,
qOp,c i t .  po 92.
^Ibid, p, 93,
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d i f f e r e n c e .  In Rennie's account of r i g i d  des ignation the d e f i n i t i o n  
of a r ig id  des igna to r  makes use,  in  the definiendura, of  ordinary 
i d e n t i t y .  What Rennie 's  d e f i n i t i o n  says, s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  i s  t h a t  a 
r i g i d  des igna to r  i s  a func tion such th a t  there  i s  an ind iv idua l  which 
in  a l l  worlds is, the ind iv idua l  picked out by the func t ion .  So i f  a 
function  does not pick out the same Indiv idual  in a l l  worlds i t  i s  
not a r ig i d  des igna to r .  The notion of 'same in d iv id u a l '  i s  p r im i t ive .  
By c o n t r a s t ,  in  H in t lkka ' s  account of in d iv idua t ing  func t ions  i t  i s  
the function which determines i d e n t i t y .  The ind iv idua t ing  function  
i s  primitive. This  very c o n t r a s t  i s  discussed by Rennie, where 
Rennie says of Hintikka t h a t
he says t h a t  merely to assume t h a t  the same 
ind iv id u a ls  can crop up in  d ifferent worlds i s  j u s t  to 
wish the problem / o f  cross-world i d e n t i f i c a t i o n /  away,
not to solve i t .  Ills so lu t ion  to the problem i s  to
pos tu la te  the ex istence  of what we might c a l l  a canonical  
s e t  of  ind iv idua l  concepts ,^
Despite t h i s  one important d i f f e rence  between H in t lkka ' s  
account and Rennie 's  account of r i g i d  des igna to rs ,  there  are 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  such th a t  the re  i s  one important problem fo r  both 
accounts.  The problem i s  t h a t  both a s s e r t  th a t  names are func t ions .  
This j u s t  does not seem appropr ia te .
We have a lready argued th a t  names are items in a syntactic  
category,  and are  symbols. This i s  not to say that names are 
typographic e n t i t i e s ,  j u s t  as numbers are not typographic e n t i t i e s .  
Names, as symbols, s tand in a r e l a t i o n  to what i s  named, and although
we have argued t h a t  the id ea l  naming r e l a t i o n  i s  a func t ion ,  names
themselves are not func t ions .  In  a way, our argument i s  t h a t  the 
members of F are the senses of names'.
Hintikka i s  aware of t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  and says
^Ib id . pp. 112 f f .
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The functions  th a t  belong to F may of course be con­
s idered spec ia l  cases of the ' in d iv id u a l  concepts '  
pos tu la ted  by some philosophers of logic  or as spec ia l  
cases  of F reg e ' s  ' s e n s e s '  (Sinne) . No i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  
poss ib le  between the two c la s s e s ,  however, fo r  we saw 
e a r l i e r  th a t  not every a r b i t r a r y  s in gu la r . te rm  (say b) 
which picks out an ind iv idua l  from each / s e t  of in d iv idua ls  
in  a w or ld /  we are considering  goes toge the r  with an f, ^ £t 
al though every such term i s  c e r t a in l y  meaningful and 
hence has a Fregian 'sense* and perhaps even gives us an 
' i n d iv id u a l  concept* . As I  have put i t  elsewhere, 
members o f  F do not only involve a 'way of being g iven '   ^
as F reg e ' s  senses do, but a lso  a way of beincr in d iv id u a ted .
Here, i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  Hintikka has e i t h e r  dropped the idea th a t  
names are members of F,  or h is  o r ig i n a l  suggestion placed g rea t  
emphasis on the q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  such functions  were names of a j
c e r t a i n  kind, Î
I t  seems to me th a t  i t  would not take much change in  i
H in t lkka ' s  point  of view fo r  t h a t  poin t  of view to become the view j
It h a t  the members of F are the senses of names. This i s  not to say i
t h a t  any changes would be unimportant,  they would be important,  but ;
the  view i s  c lose  to the view being advocated he re in .  We have |
a lready argued th a t  Hintikka should d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between names and 
d e f i n i t e  d e s c r i p t i o n s , We have a lso  argued t h a t  the sense of a 
name involves botli a way of  being given and the in d iv idua t ion  of t h a t  
to  which the name i s  (was) given.  The most formidable problem, |
though, i s  whether we take the i d e n t i t y  of ind iv idua ls  to be p r im it ive  
o r  the id en tity  of ind iv idua t ing  functions  to be p r im i t iv e .  I f  the 
l a t t e r  course i s  followed i t  should be pointed out t h a t  i t  i s  usual  
to  show functions  to be i d e n t i c a l  by r e s o r t  to the i d e n t i t y  of 
in d iv id u a l s ,  r a th e r  than vice versa .
As f a r  as Rennie 's  account of a r i g i d  des igna to r  i s  
concerned there  i s  no c l e a r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of what he says about a 
name's being a func t ion .  Indeed, he suggests t h a t  the way to  formalize
^O p.c it .  p. 39.
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a name l ike  'Nixon' i s  to use a func t iona l  express ion: —
t h a t  i s  the function which picks out the one in d iv id u a l ,  Nixon, in  
a l l  worlds.^ There seems to  be some confusion here between use and 
mention.
Presumably ' X ' designates a func t ion ,  and ' n . ' 
designates the in d iv idua l  who, in each world w ., i s  c a l led  ‘Nixon 
' X ' i s  not i t s e l f  a func t ion ,  but i s  the fo rm al iza t ion  of or 
the  symbolic equ iva len t  of 'Nixon' ,  I f  ‘ X w^ n^. ' des ignates  a 
function of constant value, then i f  ' X w^n^' i s  the symbolic 
equ iva len t  of 'Nixon'  we would expect 'Nixon' to designate a function 
of constant value ( t h a t  value being Nixon), But 'Nixon' designates  
Nixon, not the function whose constan t value i s  Nixon.
I t  might be suggested th a t  * X w^n^' des igna tes  a 
r e l a t io n s h ip ,  r e t between worlds.  That r e l a t i o n s h ip  i s  the 
r e l a t i o n s h ip  which pe r ta in s  between a s e r ie s  of ind iv idua ls  in  worlds. 
But i f  t h a t  were the case then * X w^n^' would seem to be inapp rop r ia te ,
fo r  i t s  s e t  t h e o r e t i c  expansion would be
[  , 4 n  ^, *^3  ^ * « <,, ^ , w^^ , , »
( n > l )
which i s  qu i te  d i f f e r e n t  to the so r t  of th e o re t i c  expansion which 
one would give to a r e l a t i o n s h ip  between ind iv idua ls  in  various 
possib le  worlds, in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  for the Nixon case we would get 
e i t h e r
"i>]
or
[ £  n ^  ^^ i '  ^2  '  ^ i ' ^^ 3 ^  , . » • ^ 
depending on how one wanted to descr ibe  the r e l a t i o n s h ip .  In the
^Op.citc p. 94,
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former d e sc r ip t io n  of the  r e l a t i o n  we take i t  t h a t  Nixon i s  one and 
the  same parson ( ind iv idua l )  in  a l l  worlds, so the r e l a t i o n  i s  simply 
t h a t  of i d e n t i t y .  But the re  i s  here a presupposi t ion of r i g i d  
des igna t ion .  The name 'Nixon* simply names t h a t  person who i s  one 
and the same person in  a l l  worlds, so t h a t  i t  i s  t ru e  t h a t  (n. = n . ) .  ,
But th a t  can hardly be Rennie 's  view, and anyway ' X Wj n^. ' i s  not 
ide iitityo
In  the la t te r  d e sc r ip t i o n  we are rea lly  adopting a 
contingent i d e n t i t y  account of cross-world i d e n t i f i c a t i o n / '  Such 
an account would re ly  on p ropos i t ions  of the form of Nixon in world 
1 i s  Nixon in world 2. Once again,  t h i s  i s  not the r e l a t i o n  
designated by ' Xvjj^n.' ,
The confusion in  Rennie 's  account of r i g i d  designa t ion  
i s  somewhat compounded by the f a c t  t h a t  he has but one domain of  
in d iv id u a ls ,  D., the members of  which he designates  by symbols such 
as *n. ' which can not r e a l l y  be taken to be anything o the r  than 
ind iv idua l  cons tan ts .  So the symbol ' n ^ '  i s  going to  designa te  one 
and the same ind iv idua l  — across a l l  possible  worlds.  In  Appendix 
I we have t r i e d  to avoid the confusion which a r i s e s  here in  Rennie 's  
monograph by in t roducing a type fo r  symbols, or a quo ta t ion  opera to r .
Presupposi t ions  and Formal ization
In t h i s  chap te r  we began with c e r t a in  presupposit ions  
and constructed formal systems to give express ion to  those presuppo­
s i t i o n s  , Our assumptions were f i r s t ,  t h a t  constant s ingu la r  terms 
were r ig i d  des igna to rs ;  second, t h a t  the domain of  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  
q u a n t i f i e r s  outs ide  the scope of modal-operators would be world
^Cfo Hughes & C ressw ell,  o p .c i t ,  pp. 189 ff .
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re la t iv e ;  and t h i r d ,  t h a t  the modal operators were to be in te rp re te d  
as ,  in a sense, q u a n t i f i e r s  whose domain was to  be possib le  worlds.
In  the l i g h t  of these  assumptions c e r t a in  th ings  became 
c l e a r  about the model-set  mode1-system formal iza t ion  we used. Our 
f i r s t  assumption indicated t h a t  i d e n t i t y  had to be given spec ia l  
s t a t u s ,  and t h a t  trans-wor ld  i d e n t i t i e s  and n o n - id e n t i t i e s  would have 
to  be able to appear in  any ( p a r t i a l )  description of any world.
Unless i d e n t i t y  i s  given t h i s  spec ia l  s ta tu s  then we cannot, be sure 
th a t  our formal systems give accura te  expression  to our assumptions 
about the s e t s  of in d iv idua ls  i n  worlds (Cases I to IV).
The second assumption forced us to  be c l e a r  about the 
domains of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  The r e la t i o n s h ip s  between the se ts  of 
in d iv idua ls  in  the worlds ( p a r t i a l l y )  described by model s e ts  in 
model systems had to be sp e l t  out c lea r ly .  Once t h i s  was done, the 
formal systems were constructed  to  match the various p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
s e t  out in  cases I to IV.
The t h i r d  assumption in d ic a te s  a way of  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
the  notion of lo g ica l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  given the o the r  assumptions.  But 
i t  i s  not c l e a r  t h a t  the modality i s  of log ica l  n e ce s s i ty ,  whatever 
t h a t  may be. Using the des i red  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of modal opera to rs  we 
have been able to i n t e r p r e t  quan t i f i ed  modal contexts, both in  the 
cases where the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  not in  the scope of any modal 
opera tor  but binds some occurrence of a var iab le  which i s  in the scope 
of a modal operator, and in  the cases where the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  
i t s e l f  in  the scope of a modal ope ra to r .
The most important fe a tu re  of a l l  t h i s  formaliz ing has 
been t h a t  the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of ind iv idua l  constants  as r ig id  
des igna tors  has not been changed when the constan ts  occur in  modal 
con tex ts .  Even so, the re  are some questions  which need f u r th e r
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d iscuss ion .  These quest ions  have already been ra ised  or mentioned. 
The f i r s t  major quest ion fo r  fu r th e r  d iscuss ion  i s  th a t  
of e ssen t ia l ! sm .  Do ind iv idua ls  have c e r t a in  e s s e n t i a l  p rope r t ie s  
which, from world to world,  ensure the  sameness of the ind iv idua l?  
This w i l l  be discussed in  the next chapter .  The second quest ion 
concerns those in d iv idua ls  said not to e x i s t .  In some of our modal 
systems we have allowed fo r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  an ind iv idua l  might 
e x i s t  in  one world but not in another .  We have s a i d , e x p l i c i t l y  
t h a t  names might be given to  non-ex is ten t  persons,  places and th ings. 
To what then do such names r e fe r?  This w il l  be discussed in  the 
f i f t h  chapter. F i n a l l y ,  there  are a set  of c lose ly  r e l a t e d  quest ions  
to do with knowledge, acquaintance,  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  into  epis temic 
con tex ts ,  and the d i f fe rence  in  cogni t ive  value between someone's 
knowing th a t  = â  sud knowing th a t  a = b. These quest ions  are d i s ­
cussed in the f i n a l  chapter .
CHAPTER FOUR 
ESSENTIALISH
Common Proper t ie s
We introduced modal opera to rs  and constructed the logics  
“ (1 '^1 < 4 )  in order  to  explore the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  there  might 
be some e s s e n t i a l  f e a tu res  which i d e n t i f y  a given ind iv idua l  and which 
he ( i t )  has in every world in which he ( i t )  appears.  At t h i s  point  
we must the re fo re  d iscuss  what i s  bound up in the notion of an 
i n d iv id u a l ' s  having e s s e n t i a l  p ro p e r t i e s .
Marcus d i s t in g u i sh es  between two kinds of essen t ia l i sm  
which are to be ca l led  individuating and A r i s to t e l i a n ,  "For 
A r i s to t e l i a n  essen tia lism , an e s s e n t i a l  property i s  a property an
object  must have. I t  answers to the question  "What i s  i t ? "  in  a
st rong sense; i f  i t  ceased to  have th a t  property i t  would cease to
e x i s t .  I t  i s  a property  such t h a t ,  i f  anything has i t  a t  a l l ,  i t  has
i t  necessa r i ly ,"^
But a lso  "among the a t t r i b u t e s  an ob jec t  must have are  not 
only those which i t  shares with ob jec t s  of i t s  kind (A r i s to t e l i a n  
e s s e n t i a l i sm ) ,  but those which are d e f i n i t i v e  of the  spec ia l
ch a rac te r  of the ind iv idua l  and d i s t in g u i sh  i t  from some ob jec ts  of
pthe same kind."  ' These in d iv id u a l ly  d e f in it iv e  prope r t i e s  are 
in d iv id u a l ly  e s s e n t i a l .
Marcus claims th a t  we appeal to the former e s se n t ia l i sm





when "we say of Moby Dick t h a t  although he l ives  in  the sea he i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  a mammal," but would presumably appeal to  the  l a t t e r  
when we say of Moby Dick t h a t  to f ind him i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  we 
find a g rea t  white whale. Marcus uses as examples of ind iv idua t ing  
essentia lism  "Unlike the rest  of use,  Winston i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a c y c l i s t ,  
not a mathematician," and "He's e s s e n t i a l l y  a philosopher,  not a 
p o l i t i c i a n . "
Essen t ia l i sm ,  under t h i s  view, i s  usefu l  for so r t ing  the 
p rope r t ie s  of o b je c t s .  There are those p roper t ie s  which t e l l  us of 
what kind an ob jec t  i s ,  crudely put,  whether something i s  animal, 
mineral  or vegetable .  There are those p roper t ie s  which show us 
j u s t  who or vjhat something i s .
Now i t  seems to me t h a t  Marcus i s  co r rec t  in  claiming 
th a t  e ssen t ia l i sm ,  in  some r a th e r  vague sense,  i s  a way of so r t ing  
p ro p e r t i e s .  For a l l  the examples given, some one property  i s  pointed 
to  in  sp i te  of some o the r  proper ty or p ro p e r t i e s .  The adverb 
" e s s e n t i a l l y "  might the re fo re  be seen as a pa r t  of an express ion 
r a th e r  than as a bas ic  express ion .  Consider:  "although x i s  ^  
e s s e n t i a l l y  x i s
In the case t h a t  we s e t  out above, where we had a man 
waking up in  the Roman Empire of 200 B.C. and reckoning himself  to  be 
a time t r a v e l l e r ,  he wonId probably say t h a t  al though he had a 
d i f f e r e n t  body and l ived in  a d i f f e r e n t  era he was e s s e n t i a l l y  the 
same person (or i t  was not absurd to  claim th a t  he was e s s e n t i a l l y  
the same person).
In  genera l ,  a g rea t  deal  depends on why we want to s o r t  
the  p rope r t ie s  of an i n d iv id u a l .  We may want to c l a s s i f y  s ea -c re a tu re s .
I l l
or to i d e n t i fy  one p a r t i c u l a r  whale by some simple means. We may want 
to show how a wise man could be so c a r e le s s  of public  opinion, or 
we may want to give an explanation  of  what appears to  be a man's 
memories.
So we s ing le  out those p rope r t ie s  which we count as 
important fo r  some reason. We began with modal opera to rs  in  order to 
explore  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the re  might be some e s s e n t i a l  fea tu res  
which id en tify  a given in d iv id u a l .  But, in the l ig h t  of what has 
j u s t  been pointed ou t ,  i t  might be b e t t e r  to phrase our top ic  as " the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  there might be some fea tu res  e s s e n t i a l  fo r  the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a given in d iv id u a l , "  Having rephrased the quest ion 
in  t h i s  way we must note th a t  we have, in a sense, narrowed the 
quest ion down to  a more or  le s s  epis temologica l  question .
C er ta in  important p ro p e r t i e s  are u sua l ly  used as a means 
of  Iden t i fy ing  an ind iv idua l  in  the  ac tua l  world, so perhaps those
p roper t ie s  can be counted as the e s s e n t i a l  p rope r t ie s  by means of
which the ind iv idua l  i s  to be i d e n t i f i e d  in o ther  poss ib le  worlds.
But t h i s  w i l l  not do, as Kripke has pointed out.  Important and 
e s s e n t i a l  p rope r t ie s  should not be confused,
Kripke w r i te s ,
To me A r i s t o t l e ' s  most important p ro p e r t i e s  co n s i s t  
in h is  ph i losophical  work, and H i t l e r ' s  in his  murderous
p o l i t i c a l  ro le ;  both , , ,  might have lacked these properties
a l to g e th e r .  Surely the re  was no log ica l  f a t e  hanging over 
e i t h e r  A r i s to t l e  or H i t l e r  which made i t  in any sense 
inev i tab le-  t h a t  they should have possessed the proper t ie s  
we regard as important to them; they could have had 
ca ree rs  completely d i f f e r e n t  from t h e i r  ac tua l  ones.  
Important p rope r t i e s  of an ob jec t  need not be e s s e n t i a l ,  
unless  ' importance'  i s  used as a synonym fo r  essence; 
and an ob jec t  could have had p roper t ie s  very d i f f e r e n t  
from i t s  most s t r i k in g  ac tu a l  properties, or from the  
p rope r t ie s  we use to i d e n t i f y  i t , ^
Op, c i t ,  p. 289,
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I t  i s  o f ten  j u s t  those important p rope r t ie s  which we wish 
to  conjecture  about when we say of A r i s to t l e  t h a t  he might have done 
so and so. We can say, with p e r f e c t ly  good sense, th a t  H i t l e r  
might never have risen to power.
Although we use important p roper t ie s  as an easy way of 
identify ing  the individual who i s  c a l led  ' a / , in some other  world, a 
world of con jec tu re ,  or f i c t io n ,  the very property we use to  id entify  
the ind iv idua l  could be absent. So we come back to the original  
question about e s s e n t i a l  properties. In the f i r s t  place we were 
more concerned about those properties which an individual would have 
in a l l  possib le  worlds, Irrespective of how i t  was i d e n t i f i e d  in 
any one world.
So, perhaps i t  would be better  to  r e c a s t  the top ic  as 
" the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  there  might be some p rope r t ie s  which an i n ­
d iv idua l  has which are  e s s e n t i a l  to i t s  being the same so r t  of 
ind iv idua l  and a lso  the same p a r t i c u l a r  in d iv id u a l . "  For example,
•we would want to claim of our t i m e - t r a v e l l e r  t h a t  he i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
a person, t h a t  i s  the so r t  of ind iv idua l  he i s .  Also, he was the 
p a r t i c u l a r  person who invented a time machine and was born and l ived 
fo r  so many years in c e r t a in  ci rcumstances.
A p a r t i a l  formal iza t ion  of our claims about Wells would 
be set out as
P  Wells i s  a person & □ 0  (Wells i s  an inventor of 
a time machine, and was born and l ived e t c . )
The f i r s t  conjunct could be made in to
( i )  (Ex) a  (Px & X -  w)
provided that. *w* stood for 'Wells*
and 'Px '  fo r  'x i s  a pe rson , '
113
I t  follows ill both M^"Q = and M^ Q = t h a t  
( i i )  D (Ex)(Px & X ~ w) 
which may be s t ronger  than was intended, ( i i )  makes i t  p la in  t h a t  i t  
follows from ( i )  t h a t  Wells appears in a l l  possible  worlds. All we 
would want to claim i s  t h a t  Wells, appears in any world then he
( i t )  i s  a person, A weaker claim can be se t  out as
( i l l )  □ ((Sx)(x  “  w) 3  Pw)
3 1This w i l l  do the j o b  in =, but not in M Q =. In the l a t t e r
system, since every ind iv idua l  in every world i s  in  every other
world,  i t  follows th a t  w i s  in  every world. So ( i l l )  should imply
( i i ) ,  and in  M^‘Q -  th a t  i s  the case.
I t  i s  tempting,  in  M' Q^ =, to t ry  to r e s o r t  to a formula
such as
( iv )  n  (Ux)(Px 6  0  (Tk 6  Lx) . 3  . x -  w)
where *Tx* stands for *x invented a time machine* and *Lx* stands for
*x was born and l ived e tc .*  But ( iv )  can be s a t i s f i e d  by Wells* not
being a person or not in  any world inventing a time machine e t c .
And i f  we want being a person to be an e s s e n t i a l  property  of Wells
then we cannot accept ( iv )  in  M^ Q =.
The d iscuss ion  of these  four formulae does l i t t l e  more 
than demonstrate t h a t  the no ta t ion  allows us to formalize statements 
about an indiv iduals*  having some property  in  a l l  poss ib le  worlds,  
and having some property  in  one possible  world.  But none of the 
systems we have constructed give any formal bas is  fo r  d i s t in g u ish in g  
between the e s s e n t i a l  and the non -essen t ia l  p rope r t ie s  of  any ind iv idua l  
We can say what we please .  The problem i s  that- i t  i s  not 
c l e a r  j u s t  what one expects of a logic  in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  There are 
two a l t e r n a t i v e s .  We might on the one hand, be asking t h a t  the
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e s s e n t i a l  p rope r t ie s  of an in d iv idua l  be the p rope r t ie s  which, when
predicated  of t h a t  ind iv idua l  w i l l  y ie ld  log ica l  t r u t h s  of the form
O ^  Ho On the o the r  hand we might simply want a no ta t ion  in  which
we can say of £  t h a t  b has c e r t a i n  p roper t ie s  in  a l l  possib le  worlds.
The former demand might be j u s t  too much to ask of any
lo g ica l  system. In  speaking about the reasonalbe idea t h a t  J u l iu s
Caesar i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a man, Wiggins w r i te s ,
Of course the  in c o n ce iv a b i l i ty  of J u l iu s  C aesar ' s  not 
being a man i s  not lo a ic a l  incon ce ivab ility . The point 
of c a l l in g  a sentence a log ica l  t ru t h  i s  that i t s
den ia l  can be shown by logic  alone to involve contra-
d i c t i o n .  A log ica l  t r u t h  i s  a t ru th  forced upon us by 
the meanings of the log ica l  cons tan ts .  By t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  
not even ' a l l  bachelors  are unmarried'  q u a l i f i e s .  For 
'bachelor* i s  no more a log ica l  constant than 'Caesar* 
i s . l
In  a footnote  to t h i s  passage Wiggins draws a d i s t i n c t i o n
between what i s  l o g i c a l ly  possib le  and what i s  conceivable or concep— 
2t u a l l y  poss ib le .  ' Whatever one may want to say about t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  
in  the long run,  i t  h ig h l ig h ts  the f a c t t t e t  in  our log ica l  systems 
the log ica l  cons tan ts  do not go beyond a formal account of negation,  
d i s ju n c t io n ,  'some* and ' a l l * ,  i d e n t i t y ,  ' i n  a l l  possib le  w or ld s ' ,  
and what can be formulated in  terms of these .
Apart from id e n t i t y  there  i s  no pred ica te  fo r  which 
consistency condit ions  have been given in our systems, nor i s  i t  
usual  in  any standard f i r s t  order logic  to have any other  predicate 
cons tan ts .  I t  i s  in  order to compensate fo r  t h i s  th a t  Wiggins 
develops the e s s e n t i a l i s t  theory th a t  he does in  "Essent ia l!sni ,
gC ont inu i ty ,  and I d e n t i t y . "
1
' Ib id ,  fn .  42, p. 358
Op. c i t ,  p. 350, 
2.
^Ibid. pp. 332-337, 347-349,
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The l a t t e r  demand, for a no ta t ion  in  which we can say 
o f  H th a t  a_ has c e r t a i n  properties in  a l l  possible  worlds,  i s  
s a t i s f i e d  in  our systems. We can c e r t a i n l y  use the nota tion  to say 
of  a. t h a t  B has some property, , in  a l l  possible  worlds. But 
t h i s  i s  cur ious ly  u n s a t i s f a c to r y .  Since,  in  our systems, there  i s  
no treatment of  particular predicates other  than i d e n t i t y ,  i t  makes 
i t  seem as though an in d i v i d u a l ' s  possession of a property in  a l l  
possib le  worlds i s  somehow cont ingen t .  The ind iv idua l  j u s t  happens 
to have th a t  property  in every world in  which i t  e x i s t s .  In formal 
terms, we can express t h i s  contingency by saying t h a t  we can const ruc t  
a model system such that *_a’ occurs in  every model s e t  in  the system 
and in  a formula * H* i»  every model se t  in  the system but
* a* i s  not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  I t  i s  t h i s  n o n - s e l f - s u s t a i n a b i l i t y
which makes fo r  the u n s a t i s f a c to ry  nature of the systems fo r  dealing 
with e s s e n t i a l  p ro p e r t i e s .
Because of these  d i f f i c u l t i e s  we now tu rn  to  the o ther  
s ide  of the  coin,  so to speak. We now take up the quest ion of an 
i n d iv id u a l ' s  p rope r t ie s  being r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  in  some possible  
world.
Radical  d i f f e rences
Let us now consider j u s t  what i s  involved in  saying t h a t  
the in d iv idua ls  can be r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  from world to world. We 
tu rn  to e cons idera t ion  of the  notions bound up in  the express ions  
" ind iv idua l"  and "one and the same ind iv id u a l" .  I f ,  f o r  the  moment, 
we could agree t h a t  we understand the f i r s t  part of the sentence 
"Each ind iv idua l  constan t in any one system, il. , w i l l  always
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designate  one and the same ind iv idua l"  then we would need to se t
out j u s t  what i s  bound up in  the l a t t e r  port ion of the sentence.
In  the s c i e n c e - f i c t i o n  s tory  which we have been using
we have been concerned to say t h a t  Welis^ i s  one and the same
find iv idua l  as Wells'  * But l a t e r  we wanted to know j u s t  what th i s
amounted t o .  In  our l a t e r  remarks we did take i t  f o r  granted th a t
Cf fWells‘S was the same person as Wells'  « Had we been completely neu t ra l
in t h i s  matter we need not have supposed th a t  the ind iv idua l  ( in
the  techn ica l  sense) designated by "Wells^" had any of the p roper t ie s
predicated of Wells® in  when designated by "Wells^" and so
described in  p^. But t h i s  i s  j u s t  the point a t  which one ba lks .
I t  j u s t  does not a t  f i r s t  seem to be conceivable,  for
example, t h a t  some ind iv idua l  could be a person, with c e r t a in
memories, with s e l f - c o n sc io u sn es s , and with a human body in  one
poss ib le  world, but be, fo r  example, a ray of l i g h t  t r a v e l l i n g  on in
a vacuum fo r  ever in  some o the r  possib le  world. On f i r s t  s igh t  there
seems to be a range of p rope r t i e s  which can be var ied  when making the
o fclaim th a t  w’^ i s  one and the same ind iv idua l  as w , but there  seems
to  be a range of  p ro p e r t i e s  which cannot be so e a s i l y  va r ied .  P a r t l y ,
i t  seemsas i f ,  for any i n d i v i d u a l , i t  would cease to  e x i s t  i f  i t  no
longer had some p a r t i c u l a r  property ,  as Marcus contends.
Kripke contends the same, to  a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes,
i n  the course of d iscuss ing  a r a th e r  e labora te  case of the  Queen of
England supposedly not being the daughter of King George VI and
El izabeth.^ The case he d iscusses  i s ,  b r i e f l y ,  t h a t  a h i t h e r to  unheard
of  daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Truman has been passed o f f  as the daughter
^Op. c i t . ,  pp. 312-314.
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o f  George VI and E l izabe th ,  The Trumans' daughter i s  now the Queen 
of England, Then Kripke asks.
Now, one quest ion i s ,  in  t h i s  world, was Elizabe th  
h e r s e l f  ever  born? L e t ' s  suppose she wasn ' t  ever born. 
I t  would then be a s i t u a t i o n  in  which, though Truman and 
h is  wife have a ch i ld  with many of the  p rope r t ie s  of 
E l izabe th ,  Elizabeth h e r s e l f  d i d n ' t  e x i s t  at a l l .
Kripke then adds,
One can only become convinced of t h i s  by r e f l e c t i o n  on 
how you would descr ibe  t h i s  s i t u a t io n .
One can only suppose t h a t  by t h i s  la s t  sentence Kripke
means to ind ica te  t h a t  were the s i t u a t io n  described discovered to
be t rue  the usual way of making the s i tu a t io n  known would be by
saying something l i k e ,  "George VI and Elizabeth have never had any
daughter ca l led  'E l izabeth* .  The present Queen of England i s  r e a l l y
El izabeth  Truman, not El izabe th  Windsor, There i s  no such person as
E l izabe th  Windsor," Even though t h i s  i s  a reasonable supposit ion,
i t  seems j u s t  as reasonable  to assume th a t  the d i sc lo su re  of t h i s
amazing f a c t  would run l i k e ,  "E l izabeth  Windsor i s  the adopted
daughter of George VI and E l izab e th ,  The Queen i s  not of royal
blood, e t c , ,  e t c . "
In  t h i s  case 'E l izabe th  Windsor' has been fi rmly
es tab l i sh ed  as the name of the  ind iv idua l  who, in  the  ac tu a l  world,
i s  the occupant of the  throne of England, The sense of the name i s
fi rmly  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  and would bo j u s t  as f irmly e s t a b l i sh e d  in  the
poss ib le  world descr ibed ,  Kripke leans  very much toward the idea
t h a t ,  fo r  people,  the name given a t  b i r t h  i s  the r i g i d  des igna to r
of  t h a t  person. I t  may well  be the case t h a t ,  f o r  people, the name
given a t  b i r t h  i s  a r i g i d  des igna to r ,  but o ther  names may a lso  be
^Ib id , p, 313,
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given,  a t  adoption fo r  example, So i t  i s  un l ike ly  t h a t  E l izabe th  
Windsor would be said  not to e x i s t ,  but r a th e r  than E l izabe th  Windsor 
was the daughter of  Hr. and Mrs. Truman, or even, t h a t  E l izabe th  
Windsor was El izabeth  Truman,
ins  a lso  takes Kripke up on t h i s  point  " t h a t  anything
coming from a d i f f e r e n t  o r ig i n  would not be t h i s  object ,"^ '  What t h i s  
amounts to ,  says Wiggins, i s  that Kripke wants a pro h ib i t io n  on 
'backwards'  conditionals . We are to be prohib i ted  from specu la t ing ,  
fo r  example, about a person in  such a way as to a l t e r  t h e i r  o r ig i n s .  
We cannot r e a l l y  cons t ruc t  a possib le  world in  which the J u l iu s  
Caesar of t h i s  world i s  born of d i f f e r e n t  parents, "But",  asks 
Wiggins r h e t o r i c a l l y ,  " is. there  r e a l l y  any such p r in c ip le  l im i t ing
pthe cons t ruc t ion  of possib le  worlds?"" I t  i s  not c l e a r  t h a t  there i s .  
Kripke 's  claim th a t  by specula t ion  about o r ig ins  o the r  than those 
possessed by an ind iv idua l  we would " ' l o s e '  the  very ob jec t  we mean
3to  be specula ting about" has not been c l e a r ly  demonstrated.
Yet, even i f  we se t  aside Kripke 's  claim about o r ig in s  
there  i s  h is  claim t h a t  he wants a lso  a c o n s t r a in t  on " the  th lnn kind 
of the ind iv idua l  concerned” in  our specu la t ion .  Wiggins i s  somewhat 
convinced by t h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  or a t  l e a s t  t r e a t s  i t  sympathet ica l ly .  
He wr i tes
A man who e n t e r t a i n s  a contrary-to-fact specula tion  
about J u l iu s  Caesar must leave himself  room to rebut the 
charge t h a t  he has l o s t  Caesar,  This Roman consul need 
not have been a consul,  need not have been a Roman, need
^Ib id ,  p. 314. 
^O p .c i t .  p. 334, 
^ Ib id ,  p. 335.
119
not have been male perhaps . but  unless  anything might 
be anything there  must be some f  such that, no matter 
what e ls e  he i s ,  he can be picked upon as t h i s  f . And 
what e l se  can f  stand fo r  here than the most general  
s o r t a l  s p e c i f i c a t io n  of the  objec t  which i s  capable of 
ind iv idua t ing  i t  f ix in g  i t s  existence or pe rs is tence  
condit ion and answering the qjuestion "what i s  i t ? "
Wiggins seems to want to ru le  out specula tions  based on
the assumption th a t  "anything might be anything".  And ye t  we know
t h a t  people have speculated about whether heat was a f l u i d ,  or
whether meteorites were angels ,  or whether atoms were holes with in
ho les .  And even more in t e r e s t i n g  are  specula tions  about whether
matter can be t r a n s fe r r e d  from place to place by becoming energy, or
by some such process .
Speculation  need not simply by coun te r - fac tu a l  in  kind.
J u s t  as i n t e r e s t i n g  i s  specu la t ion  of the kind mentioned by Hintlkka
when he t a lk s  about 'p o ss ib le  courses of e v e n t s ' .  Future cond i t iona ls
are most i n t e r e s t i n g  here ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when use i s  made of p red ica tes
which, in a sense,  inc lude i d e n t i t y .  These are  the pred ica tes  which
do not a s s e r t  t h a t  something i s  the same f  as something e l s e ,  qu i te
the con tra ry .  Such p red ica tes  are "became", or "changed in to ” , or
"changed h i s ( i t s )  form". These f a l l  in to  a general  category of
pred ica tes  of i d e n t i t y  through change, or i d e n t i t y  through t ime. We
do allow th a t  something can change r a d i c a l l y  through t ime, fo r
example, something's changing from matter to energy.
I t  could be said t h a t  in cases l ike  an atomic p a r t i c l e ' s
change in to  energy the p a r t i c l e  i s  dest royed, t h a t  i s ,  ceases to
e x i s t ,  and a new in d iv idua l  i s  c rea ted ,  or begins to e x i s t .  Two
^Ibid, p. 335-336.
2In "Semantics fo r  P r ep o s i t io n a l  A t t i tu d es" ,  op. c i t ,
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problems a r i s e  here. F i r s t ,  the re  i s  the problem of whether i t  can 
be said  t h a t  anything changes a t  a l l .  Second, the re  i s  the problem 
which a r i s e s ,  in  specu la t ion ,  about changes back in to  mat te r .  For 
example, when someone specula tes  about matter transfer, can we say 
anything l i k e ,  "The ob jec t  i s  converted in to  energy which i s  t r a n s ­
mitted over a d is tance  and then changed back in to  the ob jec t"?  I t  
might be said t h a t  t h i s  i s  simply an example of an in d iv id u a l ' s  
ceasing to  e x i s t  and then beginning to  e x i s t  again.  I f  t h i s  i s  the 
stance to  be taken then we are back to the problem of con t inu i ty  
through r a d ic a l  change.
In the context of our modal logics  we could take the 
possib le  worlds to be s t a t e s  of the  world (or possib le  s t a t e s  of the 
world) a t  p a r t i c u l a r  poin ts  of t ime. So, i f  the claim i s  then 
made th a t  in d iv idua ls  can change rad ica lly  from time to t ime, we can 
i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  by saying th a t  in d iv idua ls  can be r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from world to world.  Anything can become anything, but with one 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  which we now come t o .
& tter.G U idjiesc]^^
I f  we allow t h a t  ind iv idua ls  can be r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from world to world then the in d iv id u a ls  look very much l ike  A r i s t o t e l ­
ian  matter ,  and "mat ter  only e x i s t s  as somehow d es ig n a te , "^  In our
formal systems we do not al low ind iv idua l  constants  to stand alone.  
Ind iv idua l  constants  requ i re  p re d ic a te s ,  and with a su i t a b le  p red i ­
ca t ion  we can show which ind iv idua l  i s  being des igna ted .  Sometimes 
t h i s  i s  done by means of a statement in  which a d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n
Anscombe, "The P r in c ip le  of Ind iv idua t ion" ,  Proceedings of the 
A r i s to te l i a n  Socie ty  Supplementary Vol. 27 (1953), p. 88.
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i s  used,  but not always. And j u s t  as an ind iv idua l  can change 
r a d i c a l l y ,  or have r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r i n g  pred ica tes  from world to  
world,  so"Watter e x i s t s  as somehow des igna te ;  but t h a t  i s  not enough 
to secure the permanent i d e n t i f i a b i l i t y  of a once designate b i t  of 
i t , "  ^ In o ther  words, we can provide in one world an iden t i fy in g  
d e sc r ip t i o n  of an in d iv id u a l ,  but there  i s  no guarantee on th a t  
b as is  t h a t  any id e n t i fy in g  d e sc r ip t i o n  w i l l  be t r u e  of that ind iv idua l  
across a l l  possib le  worlds,
Searle  has pointed out t h a t  d e f in i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  do not 
designate  a n a l y t i c a l l y .  Furthermore,  as he a lso  points  out,  although 
ind iv idua ls  can be designated by a complete d e sc r ip t i o n ,  the 
d e sc r ip t io n  i s  not a name, nor i s  i t  the sense of the  name (or names)
which also designate  the in d iv id u a l .  In  terms of our theory t h i s
i s  c e r t a in l y  ru le s  out,  but i t  could be argued th a t  a d e f i n i t e  
d e sc r ip t io n  could be used to  determine the r e f e r e n t  of  the name and 
so the sense.  But t h a t  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  What Searle i s  g e t t in g  a t  
i s  t h a t .
I f  we t r y  to present a complete d e sc r ip t io n  of  the objec t  
as the sense of a proper name, odd consequences would 
ensure,  e .g .  t h a t  any true statement about the object  
using the name as sub jec t  would be a n a ly t i c ,  any fa l se  
one s e l f - c o n t r a d i c to r y ,  t h a t  the meaning of the name
(and perhaps the i d e n t i t y  of the ob jec t )  would change ^
every time there  was any change a t  a l l  in the o b j e c t . , . . .
Searle  contend that "though proper names do not normally 
a s s e r t  or specify  any c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  t h e i r  r e f e r r in g  uses none­
th e le s s  presuppose t h a t  the ob jec t  to which they purpor t  to r e f e r
3has c e r t a in  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , "  Which c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i s  l e f t  open.
^Ib id .  p. 88,
R. Sear le ,  "Proper Names", Mind 67, 1958, p. 169, 
^Ibido p. 171,
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This  accords well with our understanding of in d iv id u a l s .  As f a r  as 
log ica l  names are  concerned, we are given a l i s t  of them, so there  
w i l l  be no confusion about whether or not some symbol (word) i s  a 
name or not,  as there  can be in  a n tu ra l  language. So whenever a 
name i s  mentioned we know th a t  we have an express ion which designates  
some ind iv id u a l ,  and v;e know th a t  we can use the name in some formula 
in  order to show wliicii ind iv idua l  the  name designa tes  in  terms of  the 
p roper t ie s  the ind iv idua l  happens to have. But the only n e ce s s i t i e s  
determining the ind iv idua ls  having those p roper t ie s  are those which 
can be formalised in terms of c o n s i s te n t  formulae. In o ther  words 
an indiv idua l  designated  by £  may have any property formali sable  by 
Fci, but may never be descr ibed by 6
I t  i s  t h i s  very l a s t  point  which makes fo r  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  
or  purported d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  about the systems = ( l < i < 4 ) .  At 
f i r s t  s igh t  i t  may seem as though any d i f f i c u l t y  we had about an 
in d i v i d u a l ' s  having some se t  of p rope r t ie s  when in  one world but a 
completely d i f f e r e n t  s e t  in  another could be discounted so long as we 
observe the ru le  of the i n d e s c e r n i b i l i t y  of id e n t i c a l s  within  any 
world.  But i f  we must observe t h i s  ru le  within  any world, why should 
we not have to observe i t  across  worlds? Otherwise i t  lookj as i f  the 
ne ce s s i t i e s  of consistency are a r b i t r a r i l y  suspended, or simply 
suspended.
But su re ly ,  t h a t  i s ,  in  a sense, what acceptance of an 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  changing r a d i c a l l y  must involve .  I t  i s  not an a r b i t r a r y  
suspension of consis tency , i t  i s  a recogni t ion  th a t  i f  an ind iv idua l  
changes then i t  has new p rope r t i e s  and not the ones i t  had previous ly .  
Nevertheless,  in  a given context  some account I s  usua l ly  expected of 
how the i n d iv id u a l ' s  p rope r t ie s  have changed. The account need not
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be a neat causal  account or any r igorous account.  With our t ime-
t r a v e l l e r  we in se r ted  a time machine,^ In a sense t h i s  i s  an attempt
to provide a sense of con t in u i ty  running through the specula t ion  and 
2f i c t i o n .  " The supposi t ion of con t inu i ty  of ind iv idua ls  through change 
or from world to  world seems to be fundamental.  In as much as we 
understand what i s  said in  contra ry  to f ac t  statements or conjec tu res  
about the fu ture  or past  we seem to be supposing such co n t inu i ty  or 
pe rs is tence  of in d iv id u a l s .  But always we must be c l e a r  about the 
context in  which such specula t ions  are made. What i s  al lowable in 
physics w i l l  be more r e s t r i c t e d  than vjhat i s  al lowable in f i c t i o n .  
Anything can become anything, provided we can account fo r  the changes 
(o r d i f f e r e n c e s ) .
Worlds ^and desiohations
The idea t h a t  anything can become anything i s  open to 
m is in te rp re ta t io n .  For example, i t  might be suggested th a t  Ar is tok les  
might have been P e r i c l e s  and P e r i c l e s  might have been A r is tok le s ,  
since anything can be, or could have been, anything.  And i f  
P e r ic le s  were to have been A r is tok les  then Per ic les*  nickname would 
sure ly  have been 'P la to* .  So P e r i c l e s  would have been P la to .
But, as has a lready been mentioned, even Quine t r e a t s  
i d e n t i t y  in a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  fashion to his treatment of o ther
^Cf, a comment by I ,  Asimov in  Where do we go f r oin here? Book I ,
Sphere Books, London, 1974: "A s c i e n t i f i c  p r inc ip le  i s  d e l ib e r a t e ly
bent fo r  the sake of making a p a r t i c u l a r  p lo t  po ss ib le . "  p. 9.
2C f, Thomason, op, c i t .  p. 138.
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p ro p e r t i e s ,^  We are c e r t a in l y  t r e a t i n g  i d e n t i t y  in a fashion 
d i f f e r e n t  to the  way in  which we are t r e a t i n g  o ther  p red ica te s .  
Although I  have argued aga ins t  e s se n t ia l i sm ,  I have a lso  argued in 
favour of r ig id  des igna t ion .  So, what i s  to be said about the sor t  
of case ou t l ined  above where P e r i c l e s  would have been P la to ,  and 
Ar is tok les  P e r i c l e s?
In the f i r s t  place we need to do some d isen tang l ing  of 
the example. As s e t  out above, the  example can be qu i te  confusing.
The following i s  what i s  involved:
P e r i c l e s  might have been ca l led  'A r is tok les* ,  A r is tok le s ,  
with the broad shoulders,  might have been called  
' P e r i c l e s *
One way of spe l l ing  t h i s  out in  terms of possib le  worlds i s  to  say 
th a t  in world £  (the  r e a l  world) there  i s  one ind iv idua l  ca l led  
'Pe r ic les*  and another ca l led  'A r i s tok le s* ,  and t h a t  in  world n.
( the  world conjectured) the in d iv idua l  ca l led  ’Per ic les*  in £  i s  
c a l l e d  'A r i s to c l e s * , and the ind iv id u a l  ca l led  'Ar is tokles*  in  g 
i s  ca l led  ' P e r i c l e s ' .  I f  t h i s  i s  a d e sc r ip t ion  of what people are 
ca l l ed  in £  and £ ,  then we can say th a t  P e r ic le s  i s  not A r is toc les  in 
world £  nor i s  P e r i c l e s  A r is tok les  in  world _n. But there  seems to 
be a place fo r  the following transworld i d e n t i t i e s  
P e r i c l e s  = Aris tok les  
A r is tok les  -  P e r i c l e s  
vdiere the l o f t  s ides  of  the i d e n t i t i e s  are the names of ind iv idua ls  in  
£,  and the r i g h t  s ides  are the  names of in d iv idua ls  in  world ji.
I f  we i n s i s t ,  then,  on the theses  t h a t
^'Supra p .  84,
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(A) a ~ b s  n (a = b)
and
(B) a ^  h ~  [ ] ( a  ^  b ) ,
then i t  looks, as though these  theses  and our example toge the r  with the 
transworld i d e n t i t i e s  w i l l  lead to con t rad ic t io n .
The main point we need to make i s  th a t  al though t h i s
example looks as though i t  w i l l  lead to con t rad ic t ion ,  i t  w i l l  only 
do so i f  i t  i s  framed-up in  a c e r t a in  way formally.  But i f  i t  i s  so 
framed-up there  i s  a grave d i f f i c u l t y  about the fo rm al i sa t ion .  This 
can be seen i f ,  for =, we l e t
stand for  'Ar is tokles*  
and *b"* stand for ' P e r i c l e s ' ,
Then we have;
( % ) ( % ) (x  ?' x =  a." & X = k" ❖ (x  = b" & X = a"))  ^
i . e .  the non- iden t ica l  in d iv idua ls  which are ca l led  *a"'  and 'b!?® in—I —1
world 11 a re ,  in  some possib le  world, ca l led  *bj* and *a_"' re sp ec t iv e ly ,  
So i t  follows tha t
f  & c? = a; & a; = o (c; = & a; = &;)) =
fo r  some c,” and some d” . So i t  follows tha t
where i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to This w i l l  be con t rad ic to ry .  Lest
someone ob jec t  to formalizing
Aris tok les  might have been ca l led  'Pe r ic les*  
as “  b j )
we can simply se t  up the two model s e t s ,  in  the one model system, both 
containing a l l  the i d e n t i t i e s  which are contained in the o ther  and we
w i l l  get  the same c o n t rad ic t io n .  We begin with
(Ex)(Ey)(x  ^ y & x = a" & x " b?) g jti ,
the n
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(Ex)(Ex)(x = ï  & X = a" & X kj)  e
then,  to show t h a t  Ar is tok les  in  world £  i s  P e r i c l e s  in  world m and
th a t  P e r i c l e s  in  world _n i s  A r is tok les  in  world m, we have
n _ I n p . n _ n .-  kl & &i - âj M„  ^ Pm-
Even though t h i s  does lead to co n t ra d ic t io n ,  and w i l l  a lso  do so in
M^ Q = so long as we use 'a.^' fo r  'A r is tok les*  and *k^' fo r  ' P e r i c l e s ' ,
there  i s  a problem which a t  once becomes obvious i f  we look a t  the
l a s t  formula above.
This formula, a,” = b" & k j  “  hJ , j u s t  does not convey
the f u l l  sense of what i t  i s  supposed to convey. I n t u i t i v e l y ,  one
would l ike  to se t  out a symoblism l ik e :
Let
' n " ' stand for 'A r is tok les  (in  world ji) *
'bi* stand fo r  'P e r i c l e s  ( in  world n) '“ I —
'a ? '  stand fo r  'A r i s tok le s  ( in  world m) '
'jbj * s t a nd for 'P e r i c l e s  ( in worId m) '
Then we would have, in s tead  of aï' ~ b, & b? = a?,T « « I
n _ , ni e , 11 „  m“ 1 "  —1 -1 "
as the transworld i d e n t i t y  formula, and no con t rad ic t io n  would r e s u l t .  
But, i f  we follow such i n t u i t i o n s  vje are  saying th a t  when 'A r i s to k le s '  
i s  used as a name in world £  i t  i s  not necessa r i ly  the same name as 
'A r i s to k l e s '  used in  world m. The symbols 'a,"' and 'a^^' are qu i te  
d i f f e r e n t  ind iv idua l  cons tan ts ,
Kripke deals  with t h i s  problem by pressing  j u s t  t h i s  
po in t .  He d iscusses  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  'Hesperus* and 'Phosphorus'  
might have been used to name two qu i te  separa te  s t a r s  or p lane t s .
He says
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i t  could have turned out. t h a t  Hesperus was not 
Phosphorus; t h a t  i s ,  in  a counter fac tua l  world in which 
'Hesperus* and 'Phosphorus'  were not used in  the way 
t h a t  we use them, as names of t h i s  p lane t ,  but as names 
of some o ther  o b j e c t s , , . * .  But we, using the names as 
we do r i g h t  now, can say in  advance, t h a t  i f  Hesperus 
and Phosphorus are one and the same then in  no o ther  
possib le  world can they be d i f f e r e n t .  We use 'Hesperus'  
as the name of a c e r t a in  body and 'Phosphorus'  as the 
name of a c e r t a in  body. We use i t  as the name of those 
bodies in  a l l  possib le  worlds.^
The emphasis here i s  on our  use of the names in the r ea l  world. The
r e a l  world has p r i o r i t y .  The names r i g i d ly  designate  what the
names are in  f ac t  the names o f .
There might be a poss ib le  world in  which, a possible  
coun te r fac tua l  s i t u a t i o n  in which, 'Hesperus '  and 'Phos­
phorus '  w eren ' t  names of the things they in f a c t  are 
names of But s t i l l  t h a t ' s  not a case in  which 
Hesperus wasn ' t  Phosphorus.^
Kripke 's  reasons fo r  emphasising our use of the words i n  the r ea l
world are revealed in  a footnote  where he says,
Recall  t h a t  we descr ibe  the s i t u a t io n  in  our language, 
not the  language t h a t  the people in  t h a t  / c o u n t e r f a c t u a l /  
s i t u a t i o n  would have used. Hence we must use the terms 
Hesperus and Phosphorus with the same reference  as in  
the  ac tua l  world. The f a c t  th a t  people in  t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  
might or might not have used those names fo r  d i f f e r e n t  
p lanets  i s  i r r e l e v a n t .
I t  i s  not simply a matter of decla r ing  th a t  the r e f e r e n t  
of  a name in  the r e a l  world i s  i t s  primary re fe rence ,  or,  in our
terms, determines i t s  sense.  For Kripke, there  i s  a sense in  which
the a l t e r n a t iv e  uses suggested mean t l ia t  a d i f f e r e n t  language i s  
being used by those who use the names not in  the way in  which we use 
them. The words, 'A r i s to k l e s '  ' P e r i c l e s '  'Hesperus ' ,  Phosphorus’ ,
^Op. c i t .  p. 300,
^ Ib id .  p. 307,
^ Ib id ,  fn 50 p. 350, c f .  p. 289 l a s t  paragraph.
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as words remain the same, but as names they are d i f f e r e n t .
The primacy of the ac tua l  world i s  a l so  emphasised by
Kripke when he argues t h a t  " i t  i s  because we can r e f e r  ( r i g id ly )  to
Nixon, and s t i p u l a t e  t h a t  we are speaking of what might have
happened to him (under c e r t a in  c ircumstances),  t h a t  ' t ransworld
1i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s  * are  unproblematic in  such cases ."  "We can r e f e r  
to  the object  and ask what might have happened to x t .  So, we do not 
begin with worlds . . .  and then ask about c r i t e r i a  of transworld 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;  on the contra ry ,  we begin with the o b je c t s ,  whicli we
9jiave, and can id e n t i f y ,  in the ac tua l  world.
Apart from the d i f f i c u l t y  of accepting the notion t h a t ,  
in  the world where 'A r i s to k l e s '  i s  the name of the person we c a l l  
' P e r i c l e s '  and ' P e r i c l e s '  i s  the name of the person we c a l l  'A r is tok les* ,  
the re  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  language being spoken (perhaps a d i a l e c t  of 
Engl ish) ,  there  i s  a lso  the question of whether the names of f i c t i o n a l  
or imaginary ind iv idua ls  are  r i g i d  designa tors  fo r  Kripke.
The l a t t e r  question could be answered in  terms of the  p r i ­
macy of the world in  which the ind iv idua l  named i s  i d e n t i f i e d  as such. 
Roughly put,  we can say th a t  a name l ike  "Pegasus" i s  a r ig i d  designa­
t o r ,  but in  order  to  i d e n t i f y  the ind iv idua l  re fe r red  to by "Pegasus" 
we should consider f i r s t  the world of Greek mythology. That world i s ,  
as Kripke says, a s t ip u l a t e d  world. Once we know what was s t ip u la te d  
of  Pegasus in  the primary world of Pegasus '  ex is tence  then we can 
t r e a t  "Pegasus" as a r ig id  des ig n a to r .  This means t h a t  possib le  
worlds are v i r t u a l l y  indexed. One w i l l  be the r e a l  world,  another  the
h b i d .  p. 270.
® Ibid. p, 273.
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world of Greek m y t h o l o g y ,  another  the  world of some coun ter fac tua l  
con jec tu re ,  and so on.
Rennie appropr ia tes  the symbol as a constant fo r  the  
r e a l  world and the symbol fo r  the  t e n se - lo g i c a l  world of  the
p resen t .  In  t h i s  way the worlds can be indexed. Our use of super­
s c r i p t s  on ind iv idua l  constants  could be seen as a way of in d ica t ing
the world in which the constant i s  e s tab l i shed  as a r i g i d  des igna to r .
2The supersc r ip t  o on ind iv idua l  constants  in M Q = w i l l  not be of
3any r ea l  use in  in d ica t in g  the world of primary use.  But in  IiFQ =
2and M'Q “  (with the except ion mentioned) the su p e r sc r ip t s  could be most
h e lp fu l .  We have a lready ind ica ted  how one might s e t  out a d ic t io n a ry
fo r  ' a ? ' ,  ' a ? ‘ , 'bï'* and to capture  the f u l l  sense of the•“"1 *"*1 —i  ‘
P e r id e s -A r i s to lc les case .
F in a l ly ,  we re tu rn  to the  quest ion of Napoleon and 
Hannibal 's  son. I f  we accept the idea t h a t  the r e a l  world has p r i o r i t y  
and t h a t  some account should be given of changes from world to world,  
then the f l a t  d e c la ra t io n  t h a t  Hannibal ca l led  h is  son "Napoleon” in  
the  world of conjec tu re  w i l l  j u s t  not do as an account of how 
Hannibal 's  son might be the Emperor Napoleon. We have j u s t  argued 
t h a t  what some one might have been ca l led  i s  secondary both to what 
they were ca l led  in f a c t  and a lso  to how the name in  quest ion i s  used 
in  f a c t .  I t  i s  a quest ion of g iv ing names. Of course,  some inventive  
w r i t e r  might give an account of how the Emperor Napoleon did such 
and such and became Hannibal 's  son. For the purposes of  th a t  account 
we might accept t h a t  Hannibal 's  son was Napoleon, but not on the bas is  
of an account which says only t h a t  Hannibal c a l led  h is  son "Napoleon."
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Language and e s sen t ia l i sm
When we tu rn  to the question of a d i f f e r en ce  of language 
from world to  world we w i l l  f ind th a t  Kripke i s  s t rong ly  committed 
to t h i s  view. I t  w i l l  not do fo r  us simply to say th a t  i t  i s  the 
same language but with some a l t e r a t i o n s  in  nomenclature.  In the 
f i r s t  place,  those a l t e r a t i o n s  in  naming might not a f f e c t  the syntax 
of the language but they must a f f e c t  the  semantics.  Truth condit ions  
w i l l  change from world to  world i f  we ins is t ,  t h a t  the semantics must 
deal  with words as words, or even i f  we i n s i s t  t h a t  the same names 
are being used. But a lso ,  fo r  Kripke,  not only can a change in 
nomenclature mean a change in  naming, i t  can a lso  mean a change in 
p red ica t ing .  We can not only say th a t  Aris tokles  might have been 
ca l led  " P e r ic l e s " ,  but we can say t h a t  the property of being a 
philosopher might have been ca l led  the property of "being a democratic 
le ader" .  So, a change in  nomenclature could most c e r t a in l y  mean a 
change in  language. In  some poss ib le  world the sentence "P e r ic l e s  
was a democratic leader"  would mean th a t  Aris tok les  was a phi losopher .
Even i f  we say t h a t ,  in  the world where "P e r ic l e s  was a 
democratic leader" means t h a t  A r is tok les  was a philosopher,  English 
i s  simply being used in  a non-standard way, non-standard English i s  
not standard English .  " In  descr ib ing  th a t  world, we use English with 
our meanings and our re fe rences ."
3This leads us on to  make the point t h a t  in  M"Q =, as 
opposed to  “ , when we have
(Ey.) (x ^  V & X = a "  & V = b") f i . , 
the e x i s t e n t i a l  i n s t a n t i a t i o n  w i l l  use ind iv idua l  constants  of the  
supersc r ip t  i  to g ive ,  for example,
4  # d-i & 4  ~ - Ï  & i l  = k"
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The q u a n t i f i e r s ,  being world r e l a t i v e  and not in  the scope of any
modal opera tor ,  bind the va r iab le s  which range over the ind iv idua ls
in  world i . and r i g i d l y  designate  in  world and so make
'a^ ' and ' r i g i d l y  designate  in d iv idua ls  in  world
n XThe ind iv idua l  named by ' a_^  ' and *c  ^' may or may not
e x i s t  in any o ther  world than world (i_ i s  not n e ce s sa r i ly  d i s t i n c t
1Î Xfrom ji) ; but \a^ * and 'c^ ' are r i g i d  designa tors  nonetheless .  So
we could say of world m th a t  a'  ^ does not e x i s t :
(Ex)(x = a") <a u *“ ““ “ 1 * m
Yet even here *a?' r e f e r s  to a?.*■”1 -“'1
I f  we are to have any e ssen t ia l i sm  then i t  can only be, 
from a lo g ica l  point  of view, an e s se n t ia l i sm  based on the co n s i s ten t  
use of language. Names should always ( in  a l l  possib le  worlds) 




In the f i r s t  chapter  of t h i s  essay a question ivas asked 
about whether i t  i s  possib le  to consider s i tu a t io n s  in which named 
and e x i s t e n t  ind iv idua ls  no longer e x i s t e d .  In the t h i r d  chapte r of 
t h i s  essay we, in  f a c t ,  did consider such s i t u a t i o n s .  In the 
log ica l  systems = ( 2 < i < 4 )  we considered a v a r i e ty  of s i t u a t io n s  
where named ind iv idua ls  ex i s t ed  in but one world and did not e x i s t  
in another.  We now tu rn  in  more d e t a i l  to logics which take account 
of the f ac t  th a t  some th ings  do not e x i s t .  Such logics  are known 
as e x i s t e n t i a l  presunnosi t ion free  Ionics ,  or simply free  Ionics .
Free logics  were constructed on the assumption th a t  
there  could be log ica l  names which did not designate  e x i s t in g  
in d iv id u a ls .  This assumption i s  qu i te  contrary  to  R u ss e l l ' s  and 
Qui,ne's assumptions. We sh a l l  tu rn ,  in  the next s ec t io n ,  to  a 
cons idera t ion  of Quine 's  th e o r ie s  in  t h i s  area .  But before we do 
we should note t h a t  the notion of r i g i d  des ignation does not involve 
the  assumption t h a t  what i s  designated must e x i s t .  A r ig id  
des igna tor  has the same reference  in a l l  possible  worlds,  says 
Kripke, but
I a lso  d o n ' t  mean to imply th a t  the th ing e x i s t s  in  a l l  
possib le  worlds, j u s t  th a t  the name r e f e r s  r i g i d l y  to 
t h a t  th ing.  I f  you say 'suppose H i t l e r  had never been 
bo rn ’ then ' H i t l e r '  r e f e r s ,  here, s t i l l  r i g i d l y ,  to 
something th a t  would not e x i s t  in the coun te r fac tua l  
s i t u a t i o n  d e sc r ib e d .1
Furthermore,  Kripke in troduces  the notion of a s trongly  
. r j j i j l  des igna to r ,  which i s  the des igna to r  of something which i s
^Op. c i t .  p. 290.
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n e ce s sa r i ly  e x i s t e n t . ^
Emp-U^  Singular Terms
I t  seems to be one of Quine’s main content ions  th a t  the
use of names to r e f e r  to non-exis ting  th ings ,  such as Pegasus,
r e s u l t s  in  complete confusion. He has two l ines  of argument. One
i s  concerned with q u a n t i f i c a t i o n ,  the o ther  with t ru th  values ,
Quine’ s arguments about names and q u a n t i f i e r s  and th ings
th a t  don’t  e x i s t  are marked by a to r tuous  avoidance of the expression
" e x i s t s ” and i t s  cognates toge ther  with the use of " the re  i s"  to mean
both " the re  e x i s t s "  and " the re  i s  a t  l e a s t  one."
0In  the essay "On What there  is"'" Quine uses ’ex is t s*  and
i t s  cognates in  only one paragraph. In tha t  paragraph he says t h a t
since a group of philosophers have ruined the word ’e x i s t ’ " I ' l l  t r y
3not to use i t  again:  I s t i l l  have ’i s ’ ." He then ru ins  the word
’i s ’ .
In Word and Obje c t  he l inks  ex is tence  and q u a n t i f i c a t io n  
toge the r  in  a very strong way. He w r i te s  " there  i s  l i t t l e  evident 
sense in ’ (x)(x  e x i s t s )  ’ or ’Gx^(x  e x i s t s ) A  look a t  ’ (3x)
(x e x i s t s ) ’ suggests t h a t  our embarrassment may be one of r iches :  
t h a t  ’e x i s t s ’ has perhaps no independent business in  our vocabulary 
when ’ (3x) ’ i s  a t  our d i s p o sa l . " ^  La te r  he goes on: "Such i s  simply
h b i t i .  p. 270.
^Ï.V.O. Quine, From a lo a ic a l  point  of view 2nd Ed. Harvard Univers i ty  
P res s ,  Massachusetts (1964).
^ Ib id .  p. 3.
^ O p .c it, p. 176.
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the  intended sense of the q u a n t i f i e r s  ’ (x) ’ and 'G x ) * :  ’every ob jec t  
K is  such t h a t , ’ ’there  i s  an ob jec t  x such t h a t , ’"^
But perhaps we should n e i th e r  be embarrassed, nor f a i l  to 
see some sense in * G x ) ( x  e x i s t s )  % For example, j u s t  as ’(3x)(x 
e x i s t s )  ' can be read as,  ’something ex is t s*  so we can read ’ ■-^(3x)(x 
e x i s t s ) '  as 'something does not e x i s t '  ( e .g .  Pegasus),  The 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between these  l a s t  two readings w i l l  be l o s t  i f  we get 
embarrassed.
Furthermore,  Quine’s intended readings of the q u a n t i f i e r s  
show th a t  he packs more in to  the q u a n t i f i e r s  than pure matters  of 
q u an t i ty .  By doing t h i s  he i s  able to misread o ther  w r i t e r s  and 
say i t  i s  t h e i r  confus ion. He w r i t e s ,  "We find philosophers  allowing 
themselves not only a b s t r a c t  terms but even p re t ty  unmistakable 
q u a n t i f i c a t io n s  over a b s t r a c t  objec ts  ("There are concepts with
which " . . . som e of which proposit ions  " . . . t h e r e  i s  some­
thing t h a t  he doubts or b e l i e v e s " ) ,  and s t i l l  blandly disavowing, 
with the paragraph, any claim th a t  there  are such o b je c t s .  Pressed,
they may expla in  t h a t  a b s t r a c t  ob jec ts  do not e x i s t  the way physical  
oones d o . " ' (my i t a l i c s )  I t  i s  c l e a r  here t h a t  Quine s l id e s  from 
"There are " to  " <j> e x i s t s . "  He goes on to  say th a t  unless  we 
make such a s l ide  we must hold th a t  there  are a t  l e a s t  two senses fo r
" the re  a re" ,  one for physical  ob jec ts  and one fo r  a b s t r a c t  ones. But
why?
We could j u s t  as well  say th a t  " the rea re"  i s  purely 
q u a i i t i f i c a t i o n a l . We can say “There are ob jec t s" ,  or  " the re  are 
concepts",  or " the re  are  f i c t i o n a l  charac te rs"  and be merely saying
^Ib id .  p. 242.
^ Ib id .  p. 241.
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t h a t  we can l i s t  a t  l e a s t  one of each. Hence *(3x)( '^x  e x i s t s  & x = 
Pegasus) '  could be read as 'Pegasus can be entered on the l i s t  of 
th ings  which do not e x i s t . '  In case the word ' t h i n g s '  causes 
trouble  we can take i t  i n  the  same sense as i t  has in  "Some th ings  do not 
e x i s t " , o r  we could read the formula as 'Pegasus can be entered  on 
the l i s t  as not e x i s t i n g ' .
There i s ,  i t  seems to me, a purely q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which can be given to  q u a n t i f i e r s .  In the standard 
se t  th e o re t i c  semantics we i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  purely q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l  
sense in  terms of a non-empty set  of ob jec t s .  We cons ider what 
q u a n t i f i e r s  involve,  not in terms of the kinds of ob jec ts  we put 
in the  s e t ,  but in terms of how a l l  or a t  l e a s t  one r e l a t e .
But gen e ra l ly ,  i t  i s  more to the point to include in  the 
sense of the q u a n t i f i e r  the a b s t r ac t io n  predicate  which e s t a b l i s h e s  
the membership of the  non-empty s e t .  For Quine, t h i s  means the kind 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  he g ives .  Then ' (  3  Pegasus) ' can be read
as 'At l e a s t  one e x i s t in g  th ing i s  Pegasus '  j u s t  as Quine suggested.  
S im ila r ly ,  ' ( x ) (  -3 %) (x -  y.) ' reads as 'every e x i s t in g  thing i s  such 
th a t  i t  i s  something which e x i s t s . '
I f  we in troduce  a d d i t io n a l  q u a n t i f i f i e r s , such as ' ( H x ) '  
and *( ^  x ) ' ,  as purely q u a n t i t a t i v e ,  t h e n •*(T lx ) (3 j ) ( x  ™ reads as 
' everything e x i s t s ' ,  and ' (£^  x ) — ( 3  v)(x = x ) ’ reads as 'Something 
does not e x i s t .
Free logics  usual ly  begin by giving the standard q u a n t i f i e r s  
the add i t iona l  Quinean s t r e n g th .  In tliese logics the q u a n t i f i e r s  not 
only in d ica te  quan t i ty  but a lso  p red ica te  ex is tence  o f  those 
ind iv idua ls  over which the bound v a r iab les  range.  A c e r t a in  analogy
^R. Routley, "Some tilings do not e x i s t " ,  Notre Darne Journal of Formal 
Loqic (7) 1966
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can be seen here between such a f r ee  logic and the systems se t  out 
above -  ( K  i 4  4 ) ) ,  This analogy can break down a t  a point
which we d iscuss  l a t e r .
I f  we took à model system in  which one model set  
described the world of e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  then the bound va r iab les  
in  th a t  model s e t  would range over e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  and the names 
occurring (except in  i d e n t i t i e s )  would designate  e x i s t in g  in d iv id u a ls .  
In every o ther  model se t  the names used (except in ’ i d e n t i t i e s )  would 
designate  non-exis ting ind iv idua ls  in  any one of severa l  domains of 
non-exis ting in d iv id u a l s .
In the systems se t  out above we have the add i t iona l  
complication th a t  we have, in  terms of our analogy, severa l  domains 
of non-exis ting ind iv idua ls  toge the r  with q u a n t i f i c a t io n  over these  
domains. This complication i s  s e t  out in a d i f f e r e n t  fashion in each 
”  (1 < i < 4 ) .
Free logics  have a lso  been made more complicated by 
var ious w r i t e r s .  The f i r s t  move, as mentioned above, i s  to in troduce  
an add i t iona l  q u a n t i f i e r  to  range over both domains. Formulae of 
the form " ( E x ) ^  " are then read as "There e x i s t s  a t  l e a s t  one x 
such th a t  ^  " ,  w h i l s t  formulae of the form "( ZZ x) d  " are read as
"There i s  a t  l e a s t  one possible  or  e x i s t in g  x such th a t
The second move i s  to allow the free  v a r iab le s  to 
designate  impossible o b je c t s .  This move means t h a t  we in troduce a
th i r d  domain of in d iv id u a l s ,  a domain of impossible in d iv id u a ls .
Attempts have been made to in troduce  a q u a n t i f i e r  to range over a l l  
th ree  domains. This has met with only l imited  success .
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Free Modal Logic
In "Modal Logic and Metaphysics",^ as we have already
2noted, " Thomason develops a free  modal logic  ca l led  ' Q 3 \  The 
re l a t i o n s h ip  between the s e t s  of ind iv idua ls  in  each world i s
9analogous to our There are  three  main d i f f e r en ces  between
9 9Thomason's Q3 and o u ï : M'QI, The f i r s t  i s  t h a t ,  whereas in  M QI,
we assume th a t  there  i s  a t  l e a s t  one ind iv idua l  common to  a l l  worlds
and perhaps denumerably many, in  Q3 i t  i s  possible  fo r  tliore to be
no ind iv idua ls  common to  a l l  worlds.  In  t h i s  way Q3 i s  more l ike  
3 2M QI than M'QI, The second i s  t h a t  the q u a n t i f i e r s  have as t h e i r
domain those ind iv idua ls  which are common to a l l  worlds.  The
ind iv idua l  va r iab le s  range over e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  only, and the
e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  are the substances only.  As Thomason says,
We w i l l  construe ind iv idua l  v a r iab les  as ranging over 
subs tances ,  and thus take se r ious ly  the c l a s s i c a l  doc tr ine  
t h a t  only substances are "beings" in  the  f u l l e s t  sense of the word.
This means t h a t  the q u a n t i f i e r s ,  in  any one model system fo r  Q3, 
w i l l  a l l  have the same domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  from world to world.
The th i r d  d i f fe rence  i s  t h a t  the d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  are not empty
pas in  M"QI, What are commonly ca l led  'empty d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t i o n s '  
are given values which are non-substances.  This i s  l i k e  saying th a t
9 3d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  in  M"QI (or M QI) can designate  ind iv idua ls  
not common to a l l  worlds, or ind iv idua ls  which occur in one world only.  
So d e sc r ip t io n s  can designate  ind iv idua ls  without
^Op.c it .  pp, 138 f f ,
^Supra p. 96,
^Op.cit,  p, 138-139.
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designating  the values of v a r i a b l e s .  When we come to names such as
"Socrates"  or "Texas",  Thomason a t  f i r s t  v a c i l l a t e s ,  but even tua l ly
decides  to take them as he does d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s .  He says
The quest ion of how to  handle ind iv idua l  constants  
i s  d e l i c a t e .  Most uses of proper names seem to be of 
the so r t  in  which substances are intended; e .g .
"  Socra tes  3  O x = Socrates)and
(x ) (x  = Texas 3  a  x = Texas) 
have a ring of t r u t h .  This would suggest  t h a t  in  Q3 
ind iv idua l  constan ts  sliould be t r e a ted  l ike  ind iv idua l  
v a r i a b le s .  There a re ,  however, some uses of proper 
names (roughly c l a s s i f i a b l e  as t i t u l a r y  uses) which do 
not meet the condit ion .  For example, i f  we c a l l  anyone 
holding a c e r t a i n  p o l i t i c a l  o f f ice  "Caesar",  then 
various  people may be Caesar in  d i f f e r e n t  possib le  
worlds,  and
(x ) (x  “  Caesar 3  □ x ~ Caesar) 
or  e q u iv a len t ly ,
E □ Caesar*
i s  f a l s e  . . . .  I t  seems r a th e r  a r t i f i c i a l  to make a 
s y n ta c t i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between these  and o ther  s o r t s  of 
namings, and the re fo re  in  Q3 I w i l l  t r e a t  ind iv idua l  
constants  more l ike  d e sc r ip t ions  than ind iv idua l  v a r i a b l e s , .  
The supposit ion th a t  an ind iv idua l  constant r e f e r s  to a 
substance can, however, always be made e x p l i c i t l y ,  by 
means of a ss e r t io n s  of the sor t  
E D a e
This means t h a t  names can be used to r e f e r  to  non-exis ten t  
in d iv id u a ls ,  so empty s ingu la r  terms in  general  can be given values in  
s e t s  of non-exis ten t  i n d iv id u a l s .  This a lso means th a t  ind iv idua l  
constants  need not be r ig id  de s ig n a to r s .  Ju s t  as d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t io n s  
can r e f e r  to a d i f f e r e n t  ind iv idua l  from world to world,  so can 
Thomason's names. This becomes q u i te  c l e a r  when he gives a counter ­
example to
(x) a  Ex 3  (Ea 3  O En)
In  the counterexample the value given to i s  d i f f e r e n t  from world
4 b i d .  p. 139-140.
* This i s  defined by Thomason as ( 3  x) □ (x ™ Caesar) i . e .
'Something i s ,  in  a l l  worlds,  C a e s a r ' ,  or ,  'Caesar i s  a subs tance ' .
Also Ea = ( 3  x ) (x  = a)djL ^
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1to  world.
In  a l l  our logics  we have assumed th a t  a l l  the ind iv idua ls  
in  each world e x i s t  in  t h a t  world.  So our ind iv idua l  constants  have 
designated e x i s t in g  in d iv id u a ls .  D ef in i te  de sc r ip t io n s  have not 
always done so. I f  we wanted to make our logics  in to  f ree  modal 
logics  t)ien we have open to  us c e r t a in  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  We could, on 
the  one hand, cons t ruc t  a log ic  s im i la r  to Q3, or on the o ther  
hand, we could simply extend our present systems. The f i r s t  d i f f e rence  
between these  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  th a t  fo r  the former we adopt a policy 
of having j u s t  one se t  of e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  fo r  a l l  worlds, 
whether empty or not, but fo r  the l a t t e r  we simply have in  each 
world a se t  of e x i s t in g  and a se t  of non-exist ing ind iv idua ls  without 
assuming t h a t  the ind iv idua ls  which e x i s t  in  some a r b i t r a r y  world n. 
w i l l  a l l  a lso  e x i s t  in  any o ther  world.  The second d i f fe rence  i s  
t h a t  fo r  the former we would have to  consider s e r ious ly  the policy of 
taking names to be r ig id  des igna tors  with a view to dropping i t ,  
whei-eas fo r  the  extending of our own systems we would s t i l l  operate 
on the presupposi t ion of r i g i d  des igna t ion .
Taking up the second area of d i f fe rence  f i r s t ,  I would 
want to argue aga ins t  the abandonment of the p r in c ip le  of names' 
being assumed to be r ig id  d e s igna to rs .  The reasons a lready set  out 
in  favour of names’ being assumed to be r ig id  des igna to rs  w i l l  make 
up part  of the case .  The o ther  pa r t  of the case i s  t h a t  names 
should not be t r e a te d  exac t ly  l ike  d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s .  Thomason’s 
f i n a l  move in  the long passage quoted above i s  not simply to l e t  
names designate  non-exis ten t  in d iv idua ls  l ike  d e f i n i t e  de sc r ip t ions  
can, but to  t r e a t  names as though they are non-r ig id  d e s igna to rs .
^Ibid. p. 140,
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Much of Thomason's argunient here depends on the example he 
uses — Caesar.  Although he begins with 'S o c r a t e s ’ and 'Texas ' ,  which 
are names, the example of Caesar i s  one of t i t l e .  Now i t  seems 
methodologically wrong to t r e a t  a l l  names in a c e r t a in  way because 
some are  exceptional r a th e r  than in  another way which most would 
in d ic a te .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  since the exceptional names are t i t l e s  i t  
seems even more unsound. Many t i t l e s  are c le a r ly  d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s ,  
and e sp e c ia l l y  so in t h e i r  f u l l  form, "The Queen" could be shor t  fo r  
"The Queen of Great B r i t a in ,  A u s t ra l i a ,  Canada, New Zealand and the 
o ther  Dominions and t e r r i t o r i e s .  Defender of the F a i t h , ’ but i t  could 
a lso  be short  fo r  the f u l l  t i t l e  of ttie Queen of the Netherlands,  
or the Queen of Denmark. On t h i s  point  I should r a th e r  take constants  
to  be r ig id  des igna tors  and deal with t i t l e s  s epa ra te ly .
As to the f i r s t  area of d i f f e r en ce ,  we have a lready seen 
th a t  we are looking for a logic  in  which we can express the idea t h a t  
ind iv idua ls  e x i s t in g  in one possib le  world do not e x i s t  in  another.
So i t  seems best  to extend our own systems.
Before cons t ruc t ing  any formal system we once again follow 
the procedure of s e t t i n g  out a policy to guide our moves. In t h i s  
case we need to be c l e a r  about the ro le  of q u a n t i f i e r s  in  t i e  logics  
proposed. As the systems M^Q = (1 4  i 4 4 )  stand a t  the momext the 
q u a n t i f i e r s  combine both the p a r t i c u l a r -u n iv e r s a l  quan t i ty  ro le  and 
the e x i s t e n t i a l  r o l e .  I f  in the f r ee  logics  we cons t ruc t  the  i n d i ­
viduals  in each world w i l l  be in  j u s t  one of two d i s j o i n t  s e t s ,  one 
an inner domain of e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  fo r  t h a t  world and the o ther  
an ou te r  domain of non-exis t ing  ob jec t s  fo r  t h a t  world,  then we must 
decide whether the present symbols, 'U* and *E', are to be the q u an t i ty  
q u a n t i f i e r s  or to be the e x i s t e n t i a l  presupposi t ion q u a n t i f i e r s .  For
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the  sake of uniformity  with H in t ik k a ' s  work^ we w i l l  use *U' and ’B* 
as the q u a n t i f i e r s  fo r  domains of e x i s t in g  o b je c t s .  We v d l l  i n t r o ­
duce * 7T * and ' S  * to rep lace  'Ü ' and ’E * in  the present ru le s .
So we begin to  extend = ( l < i < 4 )  by rep lacing  a l l
occurrences of *U ' by ’ :f[ * in  a l l  the se ts  of ru le s  (14 1 4  4) 
to give r e s p ec t iv e ly .  Needless to say, we add ' jT * and ' S  * 
to the improper symbols fo r  each system. Appropriate formation ru l e s ,  
analogous to the ru le s  fo r  quan t i f ied  formulae with 'Ü ’ and are
a lso  added. These w i l l  be found in Appendix I I .  The extended 
systems are M^ QF ( l 4 i < 4 ) .
We are  now faced with the problem of construct ing  ru le s  
fo r  formulae of the forms (Ux)A and (Ex)A. F or tuna te ly  the work has
already been done fo r  us,  so we can borrow the ru les  from H in t ikka ' s  
2work. Some modif ica tion i s  needed, but not much. We have to allow
fo r  the various r e s t r i c t i o n s  based on the supersc r ip t ing  of ind iv idua l
1 Icons tan ts .  We begin with ru le s  to be added to to give C^:
(C,E ) I f  (% )  A (z u €•: n  then (Ex)(x = a) c  u and (A(a/x))0 . I I I  —  —  In  —  — » —
e fo r  some ind iv idua l  constant a^ ,
(C.U ) I f  (Ux)A G u e and i f  (Ex(x = a) e u then0  i n  — ' / n
(C.E S  ) I f  (Ex)A € u e n  then ( D x)A e  u ,I n — — r  n
(C, K U )  I f  (TÎ x)A u <E n .  then (Ux)A e  u ,*'* I n — rn
The f i r s t  ru le  simply in d ic a te s  t h a t  i f  some e x i s t in g  th ing i s  such 
t h a t  A then something, namely e x i s t s  and a. i s  such th a t  A, The 
second ru le s  i n d ic a te s  th a t  we can only un ive rsa l ly  i n s t a n t i a t e  
formulae of t]ie form (Ux)A to  values in  the se t  of e x i s t in g  ind iv id u a ls .
^Especially in  Knowledge and Bel ie f ,  
" Ib id .  pp. 126-131.
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The th i r d  ru le  i n d ic a te s  t h a t  i f  a t  l e a s t  one e x i s t in g  thing i s  such 
th a t  A then a t  l e a s t  one th ing i s  such t h a t  A, The four th  ru le  
in d ic a te s  t h a t  i f  every thing i s  such th a t  A then every e x i s t in g  
thing w i l l  be such t h a t  A,
2 2Next, the ru le s  to be added to Cp- to give C^:
(C.R % ) as above, and (C/Jl  U) as above, and
(C.E2) I f  (Ex)A ^ (E .0 then e i t h e r  (Ex)(x = a_") <=:
and (A (a" /x ) ) c  or  = a*) e: and
(ACaVx)) G fo r  some indiv idua l  constant a,  ^ or  a^ .^
(C.U*) I f  (Ux)A (Z n e f T  and i f  (Ex)(x = a") e iif n — ' r n
then (A( a^"/x) ) «
3 4The ru le s  to be added to both Cp.^ , and Cp,;. to give ,  
r e sp ec t iv e ly ,  the s e t s  Cp and Cp are  (C.E 21) ,  (C.Tl U) and (C.U*) 
and also :
(C.E*) I f  (Ex)A e ill € f l  then (Ex)(x -  a^) e u and— — i n  —' — in
(A(a”/ x ) )  G 11 fo r  some ind iv idua l  constant a".—• • r n
All the systems M^QF(14i<^3) are s im i la r  to Q3 in  t h a t  
the re  i s  no presupposit ion  th a t  an ind iv idua l  which does not e x i s t  
in  one world has to e x i s t  in  a t  l e a s t  one o ther  poss ib le  world.  So 
i t  i s  possib le  to say of some in d iv id u a l ,  a,, t h a t  i t  does not e x i s t  
in  any possib le  world.  We have a lready seen t h a t ,  in  03, we can say 
t h a t  an ind iv idua l  e x i s t s  in  a l l  possible  worlds. The same can be 
said in  any of M'^QF(14 i < 3 ) ,
The systems are a lso  s im i la r  in t h a t  the formulae 
(Ux) <> (Ex) (x =: x) 
and (Ux) D O (Ev)(x = x)
are s a t i s f i a b l e  (not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ) .  As Thomason says,  " I t  the re fo re  
i s  co n s i s ten t  in Q3 to suppose t h a t  everything i s  pe r i shab le ,  or even
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t h a t  everything i s  nece ssa r i ly  pe r i shab le ,"^
The vailles of va r iab le s
In  our d iscuss ion  so f a r  we have r e l i e d ,  very informal ly ,
upon the standard kind of se t  t h e o r e t i c  semantics in  order to i n t e r ­
p re t  our formal languages. The f a c t  t h a t  such semantics pos tu la te  
domains of in d iv idua ls  can lead to the assumption th a t  these  i n d i ­
v iduals  are somehow " in  the world" or somehow " r e a l " .  This assumption 
can then lead fu r th e r  to the cons idera t ion  of j u s t  what these 
ind iv idua ls  a re .  Various kinds of being are then a t t r i b u t e d  to these 
somehow " re a l "  in d iv id u a ls .
Some log ic ians  simply r e f e r  to these  ind iv idua ls  as the 
y a lues"’ of the cons tan ts .  The domain of non-exis ten t in d iv idua ls  in
any world turns  out to be the domain of values fo r  empty s ingu la r
terms, Real o b jec t s ,  or substances ,  or atoms, or some such th ings  
are  the members of the domain of e x i s t in g  in d iv id u a ls ,  What then i s  
a value which i s  not a r ea l  ob jec t ,  or  a substance?
One response to  t h i s  question i s  simply to say t h a t  the 
question i s  p o in t l e s s .  Empty s ingu la r  terms are terms "purport ing
3to  r e f e r  to a well -def ined  objec t"  but for which in f a c t  there  i s
no r e fe r e n t .  I f  we give such a term a value then we do no more than
acknowledge t h a t  i t  purpor ts  to  r e f e r .  That i s  what the value amounts
to in  our formal semantics.  Empty names are used in  language, and
the users  are well aware t h a t  there  do not e x i s t  any ob jec ts  which 
a re ,  in f a c t ,  the r e f e re n t s  of those names. The names are used as
^Op, c i t .  p. 143,
2Cf. Thomason, op .c i t .  p. 130,
^J ,  Hintikka,  Knowledge and B e l i e f , Cornel l  Univers i ty  Press,  I thaca ,  
1962, p. 126.
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names and, although they are not given to objects  which e x i s t ,  
c r i t e r i a  fo r  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of t h a t  to which a name i s  given can 
be s t i p u la t e d ,  “Pegasus" i s  the name of  a winged horse which does 
not e x i s t .  So we give "Pegasus" a value in  a domain of values fo r  
non-exis ten t items. The value of an empty s ingu la r  term i s  an ob jec t  
which does not e x i s t .
This response i s ,  in  a sense,  the putt ing  o f f  of the 
problem. The response i s  t h a t  since in our language we can speak of 
ob jec t s ,  some of which e x i s t  and some of which do not, in our 
semantics we w i l l  simply provide a se t  th e o re t i c  framcivork to r e f l e c t  
t h i s  fea tu re  of language. V/e w i l l  have a se t  of th ings  said to e x i s t ,  
and a se t  of th ings  said not to e x i s t .  Problems about what i t  i s  
fo r  something to  e x i s t  or not to e x i s t  can be l e f t  aside  for 
philosophical  d iscuss ion .
Another response to  the problem of the values of empty 
s ingu la r  terms i s  the  response given by those who i n t e r p r e t  quan t i ­
f i c a t i o n  in a su b s t i t u t io n a r y  fashion ra th e r  than in an ob jec tua l  
fashion. The d i f f e r en ce  between these  two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of 
q u a n t i f i e r s  and the v a r iab le s  they bind i s  the subjec t  of much debate .  
According to a s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a un iv e rsa l  q u a n t i f i ­
ca t ion  (ll^A of a f i r s t - o r d e r  language i s  t rue  i f  every replacement 
of X everywhere in A by an ind iv idua l  constant i s  t r u e ,  an 
e x i s t e n t i a l  one (EX)A t rue  i f  some replacement of X everywhere In A 
by an ind iv idua l  constant i s  t r u e ,^  According to the ob jec tua l  i n t e r ­
p re ta t io n  a un iversa l  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  (UX)A i s  t rue  i f  every object  in 
the domain of the q u a n t i f i e r  i s  such th a t  A, an e x i s t e n t i a l  one 
t rue  i f  some ob jec t  in  the domain i s  such th a t  A.
The two kinds of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  are often  contras ted  in 
terms of the values of the ind iv idua l  v a r ia b le s .  I t  i s  said t h a t  the
^This sentence i s  almost word for word from H. Leblanc "Truth-value 
Semantics fo r  a Logic of Ex is tence" ,  NojUne^Dam^^
Logic., Vol. 15, 1974, p. 153.
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ind iv idua l  v a r i a b le s ,  from a s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  point  of view, are taken 
as placeholders fo r  ind iv idua l  cons tan ts .  So (EX)A i s  t rue  i f  the 
p lace (s )  held by X in  A can hold some constant and so y ie ld  a t rue  
in s tance .  At l e a s t  one of (A(a/2p),  (A(b/X) ) ,  ( M ^ / X ) ) , . . .  w i l l  have 
to  be t rue  fo r  (EX)A to be t ru e .  By c o n t ra s t ,  i t  i s  said t h a t ,  from 
an ob jectual point  of view, ind iv idua l  va r iab les  r e f e r  to objects  
of some s o r t .
Those who respond in  terms of a su b s t i t u t io n a ry  i n t e r ­
p re ta t io n  of q u a n t i f i e r s  m i l  say t h a t  we do not need to consider 
what i t  i s  to which any s ingu la r  term r e f e r s .  We only need to  know 
th a t  such terms are what they a re ,  and th a t  they purport  to r e f e r .  
Questions about what they r e f e r  to are ques t ions  of ontology.
Logical  systems are s e t  up b a s ic a l ly  to provide us with a means of 
deciding on the v a l i d i t y  of arguments.
Leblanc, supporting s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  w r i te s ,
Some l ik e  t h e i r  logic  mixed with a l o t  of ontology.
To them f i r s t - o r d e r  log ic ,  fo r  example, ad jud ica tes  on 
basic  matters  of ex is tence ,  and any semantic account of 
i t  should come with things,  s e ts  of th in g s ,  and r e la t i o n s  
between th ings  . . . .
Others p re fe r  t h e i r  logic  s t r a ig h t :  they view i t  as
a handbook (of a highly  sophis t ica ted  kind, to be sure) 
fo r  drawing in fe rences .  Of course,  there  are th ings ,  
and i f  one i s  to d iscourse  about them, he must - -  sooner 
or l a t e r  — think of them as belonging to s e t s  bearing 
r e l a t i o n s  to one another ,  and so on. But f i r s t - o r d e r  
logic  can be, ami hence i s  perhaps b es t ,  expl ica ted  without 
recourse to "models": What i s  dispensable  i s  not of the
essence .
Since we have been making use of H in t ikka ' s  model se t  
model system semantics,  and w i l l  make use of his epistemic logic  in 
another Chapter,  we w i l l  now tu rn  to  the quest ion of the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
Leblanc,  "On Dispensing with Things and Worlds" in  Looic and 
PjSfoleriy, Sd, M.K, Muuitz, New York Univers i ty  P res s ,  New York, 1973, 
p. 241,
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of  q u a n t i f i e r s  in h i s  log ic .  In  the l i g h t  of such a d iscuss ion  we 
should be able to a r r iv e  a t  some conclusion about the response given 
to  the quest ion ra i sed  about ind iv idua ls  — the response t h a t  a 
su b s t i tu t io n a ry  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i e r s  w i l l  solve the problem.
The so lu t ion  i s ,  of course,  to remove the quest ion from logic  and 
place i t  in  ontology.
The ranne of q u a n t i f i e r s ,
Hintikka has argued th a t  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  in to  opaque 
contexts can be i n t e rp re te d  in such a way as to make 
sense.  As a matte r of f a c t ,  Hin t ikka 's  semantics does 
make sense i f  the values of the va r iab les  are taken to be 
express ions ,  i . e .  s ingu la r  terms th a t  are sub s t i tu ted  
fo r  the v a r i a b le s .  However, Hintikka does not Intend to 
give t h i s  kind of ' s u b s t i tu t io n a l*  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  He wants, and I think r i g h t l y ,  the ^
values of v a r iab les  to be " r e a l ,  fu l l f ledged  i n d iv id u a l s . ”
Or, as Hintikka himself  w r i t e s ,
At l e a s t  one reader  of KB (Knowledge and B e l i e f ) has got 
the impression th a t  I am there  re ly ing  on some so r t  of 
unconventional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i e r s  in  terms of 
s u b s t i t u t i o n - in s t a n c e s  of quan t i f ied  sentences r a th e r  than 
the normal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  according to which bound v a r iab les  
range over genuine ind iv idua ls  of some s u i ta b le  so r t  . . .
I  am on the contra ry  re ly ing  heavi ly  on the idea th a t  the 
values of  bound va r iab le s  have to be r e a l ,  fu l l f ledged  
ind iv idua ls  which seems to me the only way of making 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  sense of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n ,^
S u b s t i tu t i o n a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
Although Hintikka i s  qu i te  d e f i n i t e  about the way q u a n t i f i e r s  
should be in t e r p r e t e d ,  l e t  us consider f i r s t  whether the kind of 
semantical  model in  Knowledge and B e l ie f  i s  open to e i t h e r  a
^Dagfinn F o l l esda l :  "Quine on Modality" ^ n t h e s e .  Vol. 19 No. 1/2,  
December 1968, p. 150.
^J.  J .  Hintikka,  " In d iv id u a ls ,  Poss ib le  Worlds, and Epistemic Logic", 
Nous, Vol. 1 No, 1 p. 38.
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s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  or  a standard s e t  t h e o re t i c  type of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
and secondly,  i f  the  semantical  model i s  open to e i t h e r ,  then why 
Hintikka th inks  i t ' s  so important to i n t e r p r e t  i t  in h i s  way.
The following passages from Knowledge and B e l i e f  are
c ru c ia l :
The in t roduc t ion  of our symbolic nota tion could be 
r e in te rp re te d  as the in t roduc t ion  of the notion of a 
formula. The r e l a t i o n  of formulas and the sentences we 
are studying w i l l  then be such th a t  the l a t t e r  are 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  ins tances  of the former, (Sentences may 
be su b s t i t u t ed  for  atomic formulas,  names for free  
ind iv idua l  symbols, and so on,)  From t h i s  point  of 
view, we can conveniently  specify  the sentences we are  ^
i n t e r e s t e d  in  as s u b s t i t u t io n - in s ta n c e s  of the formulas
We recognize the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some of our atomic (and 
a f o r t i o r i  nonatomic) sentences may conta in names and 
o ther  s in g u la r  terms each purporting to r e f e r  to a w e l l -  
defined ob jec t .  Such terms w i l l  be represented  in  our 
symbolic nota tion by free  indiv idual s y m b o l s . %
How are the e x i s t e n t i a l  presupposi t ions  to be avoided?
We want to r e s t r i c t  the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of (C.U) to 
ind iv idua l  symbols b which are not empty. In o ther 
words, we want to make the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of (C*U) con- g 
t in g en t  on the presence of the sentence ']j e x i s t s '  in  p.
These passages not only make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  we can i n t e r p r e t
the v a r iab les  s u b s t i t u t i o n a l l y , but t h a t  t h i s  seems to be in d ica ted .
The f i r s t  quota tion  seems to say as much. But the th i r d  i s  even
more dec is ive .
The th i r d  quota t ion  shows us t h a t  in  order to provide
an exis tence  presupposi t ion free  system we are to make (C.U)'s
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  cont ingent ,  not on whether or not b r e f e r s  to or
designates  something e x i s t i n g ,  but on whether or not there  occurs
a sentence "b e x i s t s "  in  a s e t  of sentences.  So, whatever name
^Op.c it .  p. 11, 
^ Ib id .  p. 126,
^ Ib id .  p. 129. The ru le  (C.U) re fe r red  to i s  v i r t u a l l y  the same as 
our ru le  (C.U) (see Appendix I I  p. ) .
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may be t r u l y  or de fens ib ly  s u b s t i t u ted  fo r  x in £  when we have the
sentence (Ux)^(x/b).  This i s  what the ru le  (C.U^) can be seen as
saying in both H in t ikka ' s  log ic  and our own above.
Furthermore,  i t  i s  not read i ly  obvious how one would
give the semantical model in  Knowledne and B e l ie f  the kind of
in t e r p r e t a t i o n  which Hintikka wants. Purely the system
deals  with se ts  of express ions ,  not with domains of in d iv id u a ls .  We
are not concerned about whether b i s  in  the domain of e x i s t in g
ind iv idua ls  or not, we are concerned about whether the sentence
"b e x i s t s "  i s  in  the se t  of sentences which we are given to deal with .
Even so,  in  H in t ikka ' s  pre fe rred  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  the
union of the tvio s e t s  w i l l  be "the t o t a l i t y  of objec ts  which our
language speaks o f T h e  se t  of e x i s t e n t  ind iv idua ls  w i l l  be the
2se t  of e x i s t in g  ob jec ts  in  " the ac tua l  world".
For Hint ikka,  of  the ob jec ts  of which our language 
speaks,  some can be re fe r red  to in a c t u a l i t y ,  o thers  cannot. Bound
3va r iab le s  range over the former. Yet, when we look a t  the ru les  
in  Knowledoe and Bel ie f*  i t  i s  easy to read them as saying t h a t ,  of 
the objects  of which our language speaks, some are s poken of as 
e x i s t i n g ,  and o thers  as not e x i s t i n g .  For bound v a r i a b le s ,  we can, 
with the re levan t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  according to the q u a n t i f i e r ,  s u b s t i t u t e  
defens ib ly  the name of an ob jec t  which i s  said to e x i s t .
^"Semantics for P ropos i t iona l  A t t i tu d e s " ,  p. 23,
^ Ib id .  p. 23.
3In "Semantics fo r  P ropos i t iona l  A t t i tudes"  Hintikka gives the more 
formal ru les  which w i l l  enable us to i n t e r p r e t  the system in  
Knowledge and B e l i e f  in  the way j u s t  ind ica ted ,
* Hereaf te r  we r e f e r  to H in t ikka ' s  epis temic  logic  as ' HS4' .  The 
ru les  are found in  Appendix I I I ,
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At l e a s t  on f i r s t  s igh t  there  seems to be as much 
warrant fo r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  q u a n t i f i e r s  in  HS4 s u b s t i t u t i o n a l l y  as 
in  any o ther  way. But there  i s  a general  cons idera t ion  th a t  adds 
weight to t h i s ,
HS4 has a semantics which t e l l  us which formulae of the 
system are defens ib le  ( s a t i s f i a b l e )  in  terms of s e t s  of formulae,  not 
in  terms of s e ts  of in d iv id u a l s .  So i t  seems th a t  HS4 formalizes 
what can defens ib ly  be sa id .  I f  HS4 were to be understood as a 
s t r i c t  way of speaking t r u t h f u l l y  about objects  in  the world and 
imagined (or possib le )  o b jec t s ,  including  people, in  terms of ex ten-  
s ional  pred ica tes  and p ropos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e s ,  then sure ly  a se t  
th e o re t i c  semantic model would have I>een more he lp fu l .
Reference
Nevertheless ,  Hintikka i n s i s t s  upon the non-subs t i tu t iona ry  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  This turns  out to be important because Hintikka i s  
at tempting to e s t a b l i s h  a r e f e r e n t i a l  theory of meaning fo r  f i r s t  
order languages.  This he i s  t ry ing  to  do by incorpora t ing  a r e f e r e n ­
t i a l  aspect in to  the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the q u a n t i f i e r .
But i t  i s  not c l e a r  j u s t  why, i f  one holds to a r e f e r e n t i a l  
theory of meaning, one should r e s i s t  a su b s t i t u t io n a r y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of q u a n t i f i e r s .  Nor i s  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  a set  t h e o re t i c  semantics must 
be t h a t  much more r e f e r e n t i a l .
There seems to be no reason v/ny the kinds of  ru le s  
Hintikka gives in  "Semantics fo r  P ropos i t iona l  A t t i tudes"  cannot be 
used to apply the semantical  model of HS4 to the world.  Given some 
model system fo r  ÎÎS4 in  which a l l  the  q u a n t i f i e r s  have been resolved 
in to  the appropr ia te  in s tances  we s t i l l  have to s e t t l e  the on to log ica l
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quest ions  about what ind iv idua l  constants  name. Given the formula 
(Ex)(x b ),  which i s  one way of formaliz ing "b does not e x i s t " ,
and resolv ing i t  in to  a s e r i e s  of i n s t a n t i a t i o n s ,  we have not somehow 
r id  ourselves of the problem of what ' b '  des igna tes .  We have to come 
back to  ontology a t  some poin t .
Set th e o r e t i c  semantics,  using se t  th e o re t i c  models which 
Leblanc so d i s l i k e s ,  are not by any means ad jud ica to rs  or on to log ica l  
ques t ions .  There are se t  t h e o r e t i c  semantics in  which the domains of 
ind iv idua ls  are e x p l i c i t l y  not domains of r e a l  ob jec ts  in any meaning­
f u l  onto log ica l  sense.  C er ta in ly  they are not the objec ts  v;hich we 
suppose e x i s t .  For example, Hughes and Cresswel l ,  in t h e i r  semantics 
fo r  f i r s t - o r d e r  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  theory ,  use as the domain of ob jects
the s e t  of a l l  the  in d iv id u a l -v a r i a b le s  themselves, ^
considered as ob jec ts  ( l e t t e r s ,  typographical  e n t i t i e s ) .
I t  can hardly be claimed th a t  t h i s  i s  an ob jec tual  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  in 
any on to log ica l ly  meaningful sense.
So f a r ,  then,  i t  seems as though n e i th e r  the  su b s t i t u t io n a r y  
nor the ob jec tua l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i e r s  w i l l  r e a l l y  determine 
what empty s ingu la r  terms take as values in free  log ic .  But in  
d iscuss ing  these  two views one th ing emerges. Atomic formulae, 
contain ing no q u a n t i f i e r ,  are of c r u c ia l  importance. I t  i s  to them 
t h a t  we make basic  assignments of t ru th -v a lu e .  So we need to consider 
the  various  options open to us in the assigning of t ru th -v a lu e  to 
formulae containing empty s ingu la r  terms. Ins tead of asking " to  what 
do empty s ingu la r  terms r e f e r ? " ,  or "what are t h e i r  va lues?" ,  v/e ask 
"Since empty s ingu la r  terms have no r e f e r e n t s ,  on what bas is  do we 
ass ign t ru th -va lue  to statements in which such terms occur?"
^ O p .c i t ,  p, 161.
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Truth  Value Gaps
In the simplex* (non-moclal) e x i s t e n t i a l  p resuppos i t ion -f ree
log ics ,  such as those se t  out by Leblanc and Thomason,^ various
options are open as regards the t ru t h  of statements containing a
constan t which does not designate  any value of a v a r iab le  or does
designate  something not a value of a v a r i a b le ,  Leblanc and Thomason
se t  them out as:
( i )  the statements in  question may be denied any t r u t h -  
value whatsoever; ( i i )  they may a l l  be assigned some 
t r u t h  value o ther  than the c l a s s i c a l  T and F_; ( i l l )  some 
may be assigned T or F, and the r e s t  assigned no t r u t h -  
value; ( iv )  they may a l l  be assigned the t ru th -va lue  T;
(v) they may a l l  be assigned the t ru th -va lue  F; and (v i )  
some (but not a l l )  may be assigned T, and the r e s t  F . , , ,  
(v i* ) ,  in  which a l l  atomic statements conta ining a non- 
designa ting  constant  are a r b i t r a r i l y  assigned one of the 
two t ru th -v a lu e s  T and F , and the t ru th  value of non- 
atomic ones i s  determined by the standard semantical  ru les  o f  t r u t h , 2
For Quine, in  a sense,  option ( i )  app l ie s .  He w r i te s ,
" f o r  us who know th a t  there  i s  no such thing as Pegasus,  the sentence
3'Pegasus f l i e s *  counts perhaps as n e i th e r  true  nor f a l s e . "  That i s ,  
i f  we allowed "Pegasus" as a name, then option ( i )  would apply,  so 
Quine contends, and s ince opt ion ( i )  i s  a " t ru th -v a lu e  gap" option 
and t r u t h  value gaps are undesi rable  when a sentence i s  not an open 
sentence,  then i f  we want to avoid the undesi rab le  consequence we 
must not allow "Pegasus" as a name.
Leblanc and R. Thomason, "Completeness Theorems fo r  Some 
P resuppos i t ion -f ree  Logics", Fundamenta Mathematicae, 62, (1968), pp. 123-164.
^ Ib id .  p. 126.
^Quine, lYord_aM Obioct, p. 176.
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But, not only i s  ( i )  not the only option,  most of us would 
say tha t  "Pegasus f l i e s "  i s  t ru e .  And i f  "Pegasus f l i e s "  i s  not true
i n  a p la in  bald sense of ' t r u e ' ,  then a t  l e a s t  i t  i s  t r u e “in-mythology.
I t  i s  t h a t  simply because the name "Pegasus" was s t i p u l a t i v e l y  given 
to the winged horse on which Bellerophon rode. We might not be able 
to say whether Pegasus '  hooves are gold or black or white,  but we can 
say th a t  Pegasus f l i e s .  So, a t  l e a s t  in  some cases,  we would be
inc l ined  to drop option ( i ) .  Option ( i i )  could give us the p o s s i b i l i t y
of introducing the value mythically  t ru e ,  or even, t rue  in  some 
f i c t i o n a l  s to ry .  Perhaps we could introduce an option ( i i ' ) :  the
statements  in quest ion could be assigned any one of severa l  t r u t h -  
values o ther  than the c l a s s i c a l  T or F,  Under ( i l l )  we could in troduce 
M fo r  mythical ly  t rue  and A for mythically  f a l s e ,  and so assign M to 
"Pegasus f l i e s "  and A to "Morpheus i s  the god of s leep ."
Leblanc and Thomason concern themselves with ( i y ) (v )  and 
( v i ' ) ,  ( iv )  could be j u s t i f i e d  in a weak so r t  of way by simply saying 
t h a t  anything i s  poss ib le  of f i c t i o n a l  or possib le  o b je c t s .  But t h i s  
option would allow us to  af f i rm t r u l y  of Pegasus, fo r  example, th a t  
he f l i e s  and does not f l y .  That i s  j u s t  absurd. Conversely,  we could 
in troduce  modal i t ies  in to  the assignment of t ru t h  values to statements 
containing non-designating cons tan ts ,  and so say th a t  i t  i s  possib ly  
t ru e  t h a t  Pegasus f l i e s  and possibly  f a l s e .  But such a move would be 
more in l in e  with option ( i i )  than ( i v ) .
Option (v) i s  a kind of Russell ian  opt ion .  Were he to 
allow such th ings  as non-designating constants  i t  seems l i k e ly  t h a t  
he would cound a l l  statements  containing  them as f a l s e .  But here 
again ,  i f  we allow non-designating constants  then sure ly  statements 
such as "Pegasus f l i e s "  or "Pickwick i s  fa t"  or "Sxcal ibur i s  inv inc ib le"
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should be counted as t ru e .
Option (v i*) seems to be a reasonably agreeable one.
But i t  does s u f fe r  from the de f ic iency  th a t  i t  i s  analogous to some
= with only two possib le  worlds,  one being the rea l  world. This 
def ic iency  means t h a t  what i s  said about f i c t i o n a l  or possible  ob jec ts  
must be cons is ten t  in the standard t r u t h  func t iona l  sense.  So we 
could not use a formal system which r e f l e c t s  (vi*) to r a t i o n a l i s e ,  
fo r  example, a se t  of th ree  books, each of which i s  cons i s ten t  in 
i t s e l f ,  one being an accurate  h i s to r y ,  one being a f i c t i o n a l  s tory  
s e t  in t h a t  same h i s t o r i c a l  period,  and the o ther  being a s to ry  with
tlie same charac te rs  but doing d i f f e r e n t  th ings .
In a free  logic  we could r a t i o n a l i s e  the example i f  we
gave d i s t i n c t  log ica l  names to a l l  the cha rac te rs .  For example, i f
the King fea tured in each book, we could designate  him in  the h i s to ry  
by k^, in  the f i r s t  work of f i c t i o n  by kg , and in  the  second by k^.
I t  would not be open to us to a s s e r t  'k^  ^ = kg* because of the d i f f e r ­
ing p red ica te s .
But in  the systems (M^ Q ( l < i < 3 )  we could r a t i o n a l i s e  
the three  books and have *k^* designate  the King in  each. This i s
the point a t  which the analogy between free  logic  and the  systems
= ( l 4 i < 4 )  can break down. The analogy can be res to red  i f  we 
take up the option set  out as ( i i * ) .  What we do i s  Introduce the
t r u t h  values *M* and *rvN* to be 'poss ib ly  t r u e ’ and 'no t  possib ly
true* re sp ec t iv e ly .  In o ther  words, we have modalised free  log ic .
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CHAPTER SIX 
KNOWING, REFERRING AND QUANTIFYING
One of the problems with which we began t h i s  essay was
F rege ’s problem about tlie d i f f e rence  in cognit ive  value between ’a -
and “ b* when a, and b are the same e n t i t y .  F r e g e ’s problem can
be seen as a problem about the d i f fe rence  in t ru th  condi tions  between
a. knows th a t  b ~ b
a, knows th a t  b “ £
when b = £  (as i t  must be, when the second formula above i s  t r u e ) .
I f  we frame F reg e ’s problem in t h i s  way then any fu r th e r
d iscuss ion  w i l l  involve both the logic  of knowledge and also the
reference  of s ingu la r  terms in  the scope of the p ropos i t iona l
a t t i t u d e  of ’knowledge th a t* .  The reference  of such s ingu la r  terms
can be discussed in  the course of d iscuss ing c e r t a in  problems about
i d e n t i t y  and q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  in  the logic  of knowledge. So we turn
to  the logic  of knowledge and the work of the most important
philosopher in  th a t  f i e l d ,  Hintikka .^
H in t ik k a ’s i n t e r e s t  in  modal logic, as we have seen, i s
consequent upon his  b e l i e f  t h a t  modal logic can be used to provide
explanatory  models fo r  p ropos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e s .  We saw in  an e a r l i e r  
2s e c t i o n '  how the problems of des igna t ion  and cross world i d e n t i t y  a r i s e  
in  epistemic m oda l i t ie s .  The p a r t i c u l a r  modality with which we d e a l t  
was the modality of b e l i e f ,  the "doxas tic"  modality as Hintikka c a l l s
^J, Hintikka,  Knowledoe and B e l i e f ,
p^ upra, p, 9.
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i t .  Problems of exac t ly  the same so r t  are to be found when dealing 
with the modality of knowledge, fo r  which Hintikka reserves  the term 
"epis temic” .
In h is  many publ ica t ions  on the logic of knowledge 
Hintikka has always maintained t h a t  quantifying in to  epistemic  
contexts i s  of v i t a l  importance to h is  understanding of the  epistemic 
p ropos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e .  One of the  things to be discussed in t h i s  
chapte r i s  the e x p l ic a t io n  of quanti fy ing  in to  epistemic  contexts ,  
H in t ikka’s views w i l l  be used as the bas is  for t h a t  d iscuss ion .  We 
need to d iscuss  H in t ikka’s views about quant ify ing in to  epistemic 
contexts  because they are  p e r t in en t  to what Russell  says about 
naming and being acquainted.
We have a lready seen how Russell  maintained t!iat a log ica l  
name could only be applied to a p a r t i c u l a r  with which the speaker 
i s  acquainted.  Hintikka has attempted to appropr ia te  some of what 
Russell  maintains fo r  h is  epis temic  log ic .
The t m t h  condit ions  of
(8) ( 3  x )£  a knows th a t  (x = bl7with a contexTual"^ q u a n t i f i e r  are the same as the t ru th  
condit ions  of
(9) B knows b
in  ordinary  language. . . .  The framework we have to r e ly  on 
here i s  t h a t  c reated  by one’s f i r s t - h an d  knowledge of 
people and th ings ,  . . .  Another way of descr ib ing  the force
of (8) and (9) i s  of course to say th a t  they are
equivalent to ^
(9)* a. i s  acquainted with b , "
The q u a n t i f i e r  ( 3  x) i s  not to be confused with (Ex).
The values of the va r iab le  for the ’contextual* q u a n t i f i e r  are per­
ceptual ob jec t s ,  i . e .  ob jec ts  which can be indiv iduated in  some 
demonstrative way.
p'J ,  J ,  Hintikka "Objects of Knowledge and B e l ie f :  Acquaintances and
Public F igures" ,  Journal of Philosophy Vol. LXVII, 21, Nov, 1970, pp. 
878-879.
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The former has as i t s  domain perceptual ob jec t s ,  t h a t  i s  ob jec ts  
which can be indiv iduated  in  some demonstrative way. At any r a t e ,  
t h a t  i s  what Hintikka says of ( 3  x ) .  The o ther  q u a n t i f i e r  (Ex) was 
o r ig i n a l ly  introduced as a simple f r ee  logic q u a n t i f i e r  but modified 
as d iscuss ion  progressed.  Eventua lly  i t  was seen as ranging over the 
ind iv idua ls  of whom i t  i s  known who or what they a re .
At f i r s t  Hintikka said th a t  the formula
(Ex) a. knows t h a t  (x = b) 
was the appropria te  fo rmal iza t ion  of knows who b i s . ” More 
recen t ly  he has been emphasising the importance of acquaintance to  
knowing wlio someone or something i s .  So lie has Introduced the 
q u a n t i f i e r s .  In t h i s  way he i s  t ry ing  to appropr ia te  something of 
R u s s e l l ' s  view.
In order to show the relevance of H in t ikka ' s  e f f o r t s  here 
fo r  t h i s  essay we w i l l  need to s e t  out b r i e f l y  the epistemic  logic 
which Hintikka began to cons t ruc t  in  Knowledge and B e l i e f ,  and we 
w i l l  concentra te  our a t t e n t io n  on those sec t ions  of the logic  which 
deal with the quest ion of what i t  i s  to know who or what somebody or 
something i s .
E p ij t e j d c _ lg n ic .
H in t ikka ' s  epistemic logic  seems to have no fixed form. 
Each time he w r i tes  about i t  he suggests changes. But the re  are 
some th ings  which have remained fixed through a l l  the debates ,  a l t e r ­
a t ions  and re v i s io n s .  I sh a l l  s e t  out an e a r ly  simple form of his  
epistemic log ic ,  which sh a l l  be ca l led  'HS4' . The so r t  of nota tion 
which we have been using w i l l  be used,  and where possib le  the ru les  
we have se t  out above.
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In  HS4 two new improper symbols are int roduced:  K, P,
These occur,  l ike  modal opera to rs ,  in  formulae of the form K A and
P^A, where 'a,* i s  an ind iv idua l  cons tan t ,  and ’A* i s  any formula.
*K A* i s  read as *a knows t h a t  A*. ‘P A’ i s  defined as ^  A \  and
i s  read as ' I t  i s  poss ib le ,  fo r  a l l  t h a t  a, knows, th a t  A'.
IÏS4 i s  s e t  out in terms of model set  model system
semantics, and what we c a l l  ' s a t i s f i a b i l i t y '  Hintikka c a l l s  ' d e f e n s i -
b i l i t y ' o  There i s  a s e t  of consis tency  condi t ions .  The propos i t iona l
opera to r  conditions  are e f f e c t i v e l y  as we have them: (C , ‘~ ) ,
( C . 3  ) and ( C , 3  ) .  The ru le s  fo r  q u a n t i f i e r s  are free  logic  ru l e s .
Only the q u a n t i f i e r s  E and U are used.  The ru le s  (C.E^) and (C.U^)
are adopted. These are:
CC,E ) I f  (Ex)A e u c-. .Cl then (Ex)(x -  a )  g u and 0 f 1^ .... r n
(A(a/x)) e u for some ind iv idua l  constant a,•i.-o «.-w i n w **
(C.n^) I f  (Ux)A e CL and i f  (E.'^Xx “  £)
then (A(ay.x.)) e
We a lso  se t  out again
( C . s e l f  7^ ) b ^  b y
There i s  a lso  a r e s t r i c t e d  vers ion  of (C,=)
(C,K=) I f  A € u and a = b e u and A i s  an atomic r n — I n
formula or i d e n t i t y  then (Ala//))) e ii
The r e s t r i c t i o n  here ensures t h a t  no modal opera tors  occur in Jl,
'modal o p e ra to r s '  here r e f e r r i n g  to the epis temic opera tors  K and P,
There are a lso  the ru les
(C,=K) I f  K A e n and a = b e u then ILA e u"qay i n  r n f n
(C.=P ) I f  P A f  u and a = b e ii then P, A e na I n i n  “ by’*  ^ n
The ru les  for epis temic  opera tors  are analogous to  the ru les  we used 
fo r  -  except th a t  there  i s  no analogue fo r  (C. n  d  - ) ,  The
lo î
systems we se t  out above have been analogous to  S5, but MS4 i s
analogous to  S4. The ru les  are
(C.P*) I f  P A £ u £ Cl then the re  i s  in  -G- a t  l e a s t  one modelf n
s e t ,  such as i i ,  such t h a t  A e ii, and ii , i s  an a lterna- / m i m / ni ——-----
t ive  to II, with respec t  to a in Cl ,
(C.lO I f  K A £ u € Cl then A g u ,'ya'-'* I tl I n
(C,KK*) I f  G G -Cl and i s  an a t l e r n a t i v e  to with 
respec t  to a in  Cl then K A < u ,I m
I t  can be seen th a t  the a l t e rn a t iv e n e s s  r e l a t i o n  i s  made r e l a t i v e  to 
the knewer.
The genera l  p ic tu re  th a t  t h i s  logic  gives i s  tha t  i f  a. 
knows th a t  A, then A i s  t rue  and a l l  a l t e r n a t iv e  worlds must be co n s i s ­
t e n t  with £*s knowing th a t  A, And i f  we want to hold t h a t  i t ' s  poss ib le ,  
fo r  a l l  t h a t  b knows, t h a t  A, then A w i l l  be t rue  in  a t  l e a s t  one 
possib le  world. These worlds are r e l a t e d  to one another in  terms of 
what ' s  possib le  fo r  a l l  t h a t  _a knows. In t h i s  sense we can say th a t  
they are ' ep is tem ic '  a l t e r n a t i v e s .  So, in  d iscuss ing  the p ropos i t iona l
a t t i t u d e  of knowing t h a t ,  we " r e s t r i c t  our a t t e n t io n  to  those
possib le  worlds in  accordance with t h i s  a t t i t u d e , " ^
One p a r t i c u l a r  poin t ,  which we have mentioned a lready in
2discuss ion ,  which should be borne in  mind i s  th a t  i f  b knows th a t  b
i s  F then £  w i l l  be F in  a l l  ep is temic  a l t e r n a t iv e s  and i t  must be
the same person (or in d iv idua l )  who i s  ca l led  ' b ' in  a l l  these  a l t e r ­
na t iv e s ,  Ind iv idual  constants  have to be r ig id  des igna tors  or  we
w i l l  be in  danger of los ing the ind iv idua l  of whom £  knows something 
as we move from epis temic  a l t e r n a t i v e  to epistemic a l t e r n a t i v e .
^"Semantics for P ropos i t iona l  A t t i tu d e s " ,  op .c i t .  p. 25, 
^Supra p.
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At t h i s  point  we d ig res s  s l i g h t l y  to point  out th a t  
there  are some major d i f f i c u l t i e s  in HS4. There are  two main 
problems assoc ia ted  with the purely p ropos i t iona l  por tion  of HS4, 
and there  i s  a c l u s t e r  of problems in  the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l  pa r t  of 
the  system. In  the p ropos i t iona l  por tion  of HS4 there  i s ,  f i r s t ,  
the  KK~thesis which makes i t  a fea tu re  of the logic  t h a t  K p D K K ü—-a—-- ct n
i s  s e l f - s u s t a in in g .  Secondly, there  i s  th a t  f e a tu re  of
the logic  which makes i t  inde fens ib le  to say of any person a. t h a t  he
does not know T where T i s  any tau to logy of p ropos i t iona l  ca lcu lus  or
any s e l f - s u s t a in in g  formula of 11S4. K T i s  inde fens ib le ,  so K T
i s  s e l f - s u s t a in in g .  This fea tu re  of the logic i s  o f ten  ca l led  the
2"deductive omniscience" f e a tu re .
3Elsewhere I have d e a l t  with these  two problems and have 
shown th a t  al though these  problems show HS4 to be an u n s a t i s f a c to ry  
log ic ,  a logic  can be const ructed which overcomes these problems 
and i s  f a r  more appropr ia te  as an explanatory  model fo r  understanding 
" the  workings of our ord inary  language."^ Hence, we w i l l  not be 
concerned with these  problems here .  But the reconst ructed  logic  i s  
s e t  out in  Appendix IV in  both axiomatic and semantic forms. These 
problems are not c en t r a l  to our concerns here .  Our main concern i s  
fo r  the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l  part  of HS4.
H'here has been considerable  debate about t h i s  t h e s i s :  See e sp e c ia l l y :Syjithese Vol. 21 (1970.
o' J .  Hintikka,  "'Knowing th a t  one knows' Reviewed", I b id .  p, 142.
3R.A. G i r le ,  "Epistemic Logic, Language and Concepts", Lord quo e t  
Amly.se 63, 1972,
^J ,  Hintikka,  "Epistemic Logic and the Methods of Phi losophica l  
Analysis",  Aust ra las ian  Journal of Pp.ilosoohy 46 (1968), p. 40.
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Quanti M  na i n to . epi stemi c contexts
I  have discussed the problems of the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a l  
p a r t  of H in t ikka ' s  logic  in  the paper "Quantifying in to  Bpistemic 
Contexts**.^ In  t h a t  paper I  show th a t  a rad ica l  modif ica tion  of 
H in t ikka ' s  d ic t io n a ry ,  h is  recommendations for formaliz ing,  w i l l  
provide us with a simple and more s t ra igh tfo rward  epis temic  logic  
than the complex, and even contor ted ,  one he i s  s t i l l  modifying. 
Indeed, the system se t  out above i s  not the system a r r ived  at. by the 
end of Knowledoe and B e l i e f , HS4 i s  only the s t a r t i n g  poin t .
But the reasons fo r  a l l  the modif ications  are to be 
found in  two main a reas .  F i r s t ,  there  i s  lack of c l a r i t y  about the  
domains of q u a n t i f i e r s .  Secondly, there  i s  H in t ikka ' s  qu i te  i d i o ­
syncra t ic  way of t r e a t i n g  formulae in which a q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  outs ide  
the scope of an epis temic  opera tor  binds a va r iab le  within  the scope.
The lack of c l a r i t y  about the domains of q u a n t i f i e r s  
d isp lays  i t s e l f ,  a t  f i r s t ,  in  a lack of c l a r i t y  a t  every poin t t h a t  
the q u a n t i f i e r s  range only over e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  w h i l s t  the con­
s ta n t s  can designate  non-exis ten t  in d iv id u a ls .  To be prec ise ,  
" ex i s t ing"  means " ex i s t in g  now", I f  q u a n t i f i e r s  range over e x i s t in g  
ind iv idua ls  then they range over ind iv idua ls  who e x i s t  a t  p resen t .
I t  might be argued th a t  t h i s  i s  too r e s t r i c t i v e ,  t h a t  we should allow 
the q u a n t i f i e r s  to range over ind iv idua ls  which have, a t  some time, 
ex is ted  or w i l l  a t  some time e x i s t .  Ins tead  of reading 
(Ex)Fx
as Something which e x i s t s  now is F,
R, A. G i r le ,  "Quantifying in to  epis temic  con tex ts" ,  Looinue e t  
Ana lyse 65-66, 1974, pp. 127-142. Some of the argument from th a t  
paper i s  reproduced here ,  of necess i ty ,  fo r  the sake of co n t in u i ty .
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we should allow the reading
Something which has ex is ted  or e x i s t s  or w i l l  e x i s t  i s  F. 
I t  w i l l  c e r t a in l y  be e a s i e r  fo r  our purposes i f  we do allow the more 
generous reading of the  q u a n t i f i e r .  We can then allow th a t
(Hx)(x = Socra tes)  
and (Ex)(x = Nixon),
In  order to be p rec ise  we wi11 use " e x i s t s "  as an abbrev ia t ion  fo r  
"has ex is ted  or e x i s t s  or w i l l  e x i s t " .  We w i l l  use an a s t e r i s k  on 
the  cognates of " e x i s t s "  to make them ' t imeless* a lso .
Our main point i s  not t h a t  the domain of  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  
in  f r e e  logic  must be the se t  of ind iv idua ls  which e x i s t  r ig h t  now, 
but t h a t  the domain must be some s e t  of ' e x i s t e n t '  ind iv idua ls  from 
the  present,  the past  or the  fu tu r e ,  or even from a conjectured 
universe ,
V/e w i l l  adopt the convention t h a t  the domain of q u a n t i f i ­
ca t ion  i s  of ind iv idua ls  which e x i s t * .  In  the l i g h t  of t h a t  we tu rn  
to  some cases of reading formulae.
Consider the following less  problematic cases:
(1) (&LEx
(2) K (Ex) Fx--------
(3) (Ex9(x = b )
( i )  £  knows th a t  everything i s  F
( i i )  £  knows t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one th ing i s  F ,
( i i i )  a knows t h a t  b e x i s t s * .
For the sake of p rec is ion  we must say th a t  only (3) and
( i i i )  can be a ssoc ia ted .  To a sso c ia te  (1) with ( i ) ,  and (2) with ( i i )  
i s  not r igorous enough. I t  takes  point  away from having a f ree  log ic .  
We need
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(.1*) £  knows t h a t  every e x i s t i n g ’ x i s  F, and
( i i ’) B knows t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one ex is t ing*  x i s  F,
to a ssoc ia te  with (1) and (2) r e sp e c t iv e ly .  Some awareness of  t h i s
point i s  to  be seen in  H in t ik k a ’s a r t i c l e  ""Knowing Oneself" and
o the r  problei's in  Epistemic Logic".^
This  lack of c l a r i t y  about the  domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n
has a lso  been admitted more r e c en t ly ,  and qu i te  e x p l i c i t l y ,  when
Hintikka wrote of what was said in  Knowledge and Bel i e f .
I t  was in  e f f e c t  said t h a t  in express ions  l ike  ’(Ex)
/  _a knows th a t  (b -  x j ? '  ( i . e . ,  in express ions  in  which 
one q u a n t i f i e s  in to  a knowledge context)  the bound 
var iab le  in  a sense ranges over ind iv idua ls  known to  £.
What was intended was not the se t  of £ ’s acquaintances,
but something th a t  can be expressed more appropr ia te ly
by speaking of in d iv id u a ls  of whom b knows wlio they are,""
But in  e i t h e r  case the domain of the q u a n t i f i e r  would be
d i f f e r e n t  in (Ex)K Fx and (Sx)K, Fx, This would make the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of formulae l ike
= v) & (x = c)_7
immensely d i f f i c u l t .
I f  we accept t h a t  the  q u a n t i f i e r  quan t i f ied  over those 
in d iv idua ls  of whom we are to  say th a t  £  knows who they are ,  ins tead  
of  always quanti fy ing over ex is t ing*  in d iv idua ls ,  then we should read
(3) as:
( i i i )  a. knows th a t  the re  i s  a t  l e a s t  one person out of those 
of whom a. knows who they are  who i s  b.
This i s  c e r t a in l y  not the same as .a knows th a t  b e x i s t s*  (or e x i s t s ) ,
and the logic  i s  no longer f r ee  in  any sense.
^In Th eo r ia . Vol. 32 (1966) pp. 4-5.
2' J . J .  Hintikka: "Objects of Knowledge and B e l ie f :  Acquaintances and
Public  F igu res ."  The Journal of Philosoohv, 67, 21, 1970, p. 080.
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This lack of c l a r i t y  about the domain of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  
makes the problem of understanding q u a n t i f i c a t io n  into episteniic 
contexts  more d i f f i c u l t  than i t  should be. We turn  to t h a t  problem 
now, and look a t  fo rm al iza t ions .  Consider the formulae and readings:
(4)
(5) C&x)K^fx
(6) (Ex)K'^ (x “ b)
( iv )  Everyone known to  a i s  known by a, to be F.
(v) Someone known to  a. i s  known by a, to be F.
(v i )  .a knows who b i s .
In Knowledne and B e l i e f  (4) (5) and (6) were assoc ia ted
with .Civ) (v) and (v i )  r e sp e c t iv e ly .  Subsequently Hintikka decided 
th a t  i t  would be b e t t e r  to assoc ia te  ( iv )  with
( 4 ' )  Cx)(x = X .  3  .K gF x)/
All of  these  a ssoc ia t ions  can be seen to be counter 
i n t u i t i v e ,  e sp e c ia l l y  when we t r y  to  build  up the a ssoc ia t ions  from 
the  well  formed p a r t s .  For example, we can e a s i l y  build  up. the 
a ssoc ia t ion  of (1) with ( i ) .  (x) Fx assoc ia tes  with:
Every ex is t ing^x  i s  F.
K Fx becomes:
a knows th a t  every e x i s t i n g 'x  i s  F .
Let us begin therefore as follows:
(7) K Fb
(8) K (b ”  c)
( v i i )  a knows th a t  b i s  F,
( v i i i )  a_ knows th a t  b i s  _c.
I f  we a ssoc ia te  (7) with ( v i i ) ,  and (8) with ( v i i i ) ,  we can then
^O p.cit, p. 33 f f .
164
proceed to  find out what happens with the in t roduct ion  of q u a n t i f i e r s .  
On the bas is  of the  a ssoc ia t ion  of (7) with ( v i i )  we would read (5) 
as:
( ix ) There i s  a t  l e a s t  one ex is t ing*  x such th a t  a knows 
t h a t  X i s  F.
( ix )  does not say t h a t  what a_ knows i s  known to be F , but th a t  what 
£  knows to be F a c tu a l ly  e x i s t s * .  Another way of put t ing  t h i s  would be
(x) One of what a knows to be F, e x i s t s* .
For example, a, may know t h a t  Romeo, J u l i e t  and Caesar are charac te rs  
in  Shakespeare’s plays,  so we can say:
(Ex) K X i s  a ch a rac te r  in Shakesceare*s plays.
Sim ilar ly  we would read (6) as:
(x i)  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one ex is t ing*  x such th a t  a knows th a t  
X i s  b,
or as ( x i i )  What ^  knows as b, e x i s t s * .
(x i )  does not say th a t  a_ knows b ex i s t s*  ( i i i ) ,  nor th a t  a. knows who 
b i s  (v i )  (unless  knowing who someone i s  i s  knowing t h e i r  name), but 
t h a t  something which £  c a l l s  ’b ’ happens to e x i s t * .  A case in  point  
would be someone who has heard of Hamlet but does not know whether 
or not he e x i s t s * .
Also we would read (4) as:
( x i i i )  Each and every ex is t ing*  x i s  such th a t  a knows x i s  F.
For a l l  p r a c t i c a l  purposes we could not t r u t h f u l l y  s u b s t i t u t e  the 
name of some human being fo r  a_ in  ( x i i i ) .  The name of some omniscient 
( in  some sense) being would be required .  We can note here t h a t  while 
we have read (1) K^(x) Fx as in d ica t in g  th a t  ü knows a un iversa l  
g e n e ra l iz a t io n ,  we have re f ra ined  in (4) (x) K^Fx from a t t r i b u t i n g  
to a any knowledge of the un ive rsa l  generalization (x)J'x, I t  j u s t
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happens th a t  when we consider the l i s t  of th ings  of which a_ knows th a t  
they are F we discover  th a t  they exhaust the domain of ex is t ing*  
th ings .
Although we could accept the a ssoc ia t ion  of (4) with ( x i i i )  
(5) with (x) ,  and (6) with ( x i i )  fo r  tlîe sake of i n t u i t i v e  elegance,  
t h i s  w i l l  not be a s u f f i c i e n t  reason for such an acceptance,  even i f  
i t  i s  a weighty reason. Reasons of a more conclusive nature can be 
found i f  we consider the  questions of the domain and scope of the 
q u a n t i f i e r s  and the scope of the  epistemic opera tor.
Before going fu r th e r  we should noie th a t  one way of seeing 
H in t ikka ' s  suggestions about the domain of q u a n t i f i e r s  i s  to see i t  
as a suggestion t h a t  not only should the domain change from person 
to  person, but a lso  according to whether or not the q u a n t i f i e r  binds 
a va r iab le  in  the  scope of an epistemic  opera tor when the q u a n t i f i e r  
i s  outs ide th a t  scope. The parentheses in the quo ta t ion  above,
" ( i . e . ,  in expressions in  which one q u a n t i f i e r s  in to  a knowledge 
con tex t )" ,  could be read t h i s  way.
So we would read (1 ) ,  (2) and (3) as ( i ) ,  ( i i )  and ( i i i ) .  
But (4) (5) and (6) would have to be t r e a ted  qu i te  d i f f e r e n t l y .  For
example, we should read (6) (Ex)K (x = b) as:
(xiv) At l e a s t  one person from those of whom ^  knows who they
are knows to be b.
(b) should be read in t h i s  way because (6) i s  of the form (Ex)A
where the q u a n t i f i e r  ranges over the ind iv idua ls  of whom someone knows
who they are .  So (Ex)A should read as
(xiv*) At l e a s t  one person of those of whom someone, say a.,
knows who they are i s  such th a t  A.
Hintikka in d ica te s  ti iat i f  the formula i s  of the form (Ex)K A, then
the someone who knows who or what things are i s  We then modify
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(xiv*) to bring i t  c lo se r  to (6):
(xiv**) At l e a s t  one person, x, of those of whom a knows who 
they are i s  such th a t  K (x -  b ) .
This then gives (xiv) as suggested.
But,  i f  we read (6) as (xiv) then we should not read (6)
as:  B knows who b i s .  I t  might be the case tha t  (xiv) i s  t r u e ,  but
i t  does not follow th a t  b knows who b i s .
For example, l e t  us draw up a l i s t  of in d iv id u a ls  such 
t h a t  £  knows of each who he i s .  We declare  t h i s  l i s t  to be the domain 
of q u a n t i f i c a t io n .  In  t h a t  l i s t  there  i s  the name *c_*, which i s  read
as *Dr. J eky l l* .  So a knows w!io c. i s .  Now, l e t  i t  be the case th a t
a_ has heard of Mr. Hyde, but does not know who he i s .  I t  can t h e r e ­
fore be t r u l y  said of a. tha t
(9) (Ex)K (x = b) 
where *b* i s  read as *Mr. Hyde*. This formula i s  true  of b because,  
a. does not know i t ,  b does designa te  one of the ind iv idua ls  of whom we 
can say th a t  a. knows who he i s  (Dr. J e k y l l ) ,
Since the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  outs ide  the scope of the 
epis temic  opera to r  in  (9) ,  we cannot assume th a t  a. does know the 
information conveyed by the q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  We have been observing a 
general  p r in c ip le ,  as i t  were, t h a t  when the q u a n t i f i e r ,  no matter 
what i t s  domain, i s  outs ide  the scope of the epistemic  opera tor  i t  i s
bes t  to read the bound va r iab le  in  such a way tha t  we make c l e a r
th a t ,  fo r  example in  (9 ) ,  a. does not necessa r i ly  know th a t  the 
a b s t r ac t io n  p red ica te  fo r  the  domain of the q u a n t i f i e r  i s  predicated 
of the ind iv idua l  designa ted by x„ In  the case of (9) read as (xiv)
the  a b s t r ac t io n  p red ica te  i s  knows who . . .  i s . "  In a standard
free  logic  the  a b s t r ac t io n  p red ica te  i s  " . . . e x i s t s " ,  or in  our case 
i t  i s  " . . . e x i s t s * " .
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Never theless ,  there  could be an ob jec t ion  to our whole
procedure above in  der iv ing  readings fo r  formulae (4) (5) and (6)
from the  well  formed formulae which fea tu re  in t h e i r  construct ion*
Although i t  i s  not c l e a r ,  we could read the parentheses in the
quota t ion  above from "Objects of Knowledge and B e l ie f :  Acquaintances
and Public Figures"  as in d ic a t in g  th a t  when a q u a n t i f i e r  q u a n t i f i e s
in to  an epistemic  context  then i t  should be t r e a te d  in  a fashion
d i f f e r e n t  to when i t  does not. In  f a c t ,  Hintikka does j u s t  t h i s .
Not only does he cliange the domain of the q u a n t i f i e r  from context  to
context ,  but he proposes spec ia l  ru le s  for c e r ta in  formulae.
Because of what Hintikka a c tu a l ly  does Aqvist contends t h a t  he has
i n f i n i t e l y  many q u a n t i f i e r s  in  h i s  log ic ,^
There i s  a more t e l l i n g  passage in  Knowledge and the Known
where Hintikka claims th a t  the t r u t h  value of statements of the form
(10) ( 3  x) a knows t h a t  (b -  x)
" i s  not determined by the t ru th -v a lu e  of simpler statements  involving
no q u a n t i f i e r s .  Our f r iend  a /s  knowledge of any number of de fac to
i d e n t i t i e s  of the form *b = does not by i t s e l f  determine whether
2he knows b or n o t , ” And Hintikka claims th a t  i f  a knows b then a 
knows who b i s ,  and conversely.
So i f  we want to t e s t  the t ru t h  of (IQ)we need not bother 
to i n s t a n t i a t e .  All we w i l l  get  are formulae of the form K (b ~ d),  
and no number of these  w i l l  help*
1 oL, Aqvist , ’ Modal Logic with subjunct ive cond i t iona ls  and d i s p o s i t i o n a l  
p red ica te s" ,  Journa l  of Ph i losophica l  Logic . Vol 2 (1973) p. 53,
See a lso M. Rennie, op .c i t*  p. 115,
2J* Hintikka,  Knowledge and the Known. Heidel Dordrecht, 1974, p. 222*
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There are general  d i f f i c u l t i e s  about going fu r th e r  with 
the d iscuss ion  of l l in t ik k a ' s  epis temic  log ic .  One d i f f i c u l t y  i s  th.at 
the logic  i s  not in f i n a l  form. Revisions are being made continuously,  
and new problems are being found. U nt i l  Hintikka can f i n a l i s e  h is  
logic  i t  w i l l  s u f f ic e  fo r  us to operate  with a le ss  problematic system — 
one which does not have i n f i n i t e l y  many q u a n t i f i e r s .
We r e tu rn ,  th e re fo re ,  to the o r ig in a l  HS4 with the rev ised 
recommendations fo r  formal is ing and in t e r p r e t i n g .  We assume t h a t  the 
q u a n t i f i e r s  have as t h e i r  domain the domain of ex is t ing*  ind iv id u a ls ,  
whether a, knows who they are or not. We also  assume th a t  ind iv idua l  
constants  (not d e f i n i t e  d e sc r ip t i o n s )  are r i g i d  des igna tors  and can 
be empty. There, th e re fo re ,  seem to be no rea l  problems with formulae 
( l ) - ( 3 ) .
We can give added s t reng th  to our proposed readings of (4)
(5) and (6) by e i t h e r  of two methods. On the one hand we can take a 
sample of r e p re sen ta t iv e  formulae, t e s t  them for s e l f - s u s t a i n a b i l i t y ,  
and see whether the readings  we propose support the r e s u l t  of formal 
t e s t i n g .  On the o ther  hand we can apply our theory of proper names 
in  a d iscuss ion  of the t ru th -co n d i t io n s  of (4) (5) and (6) and 
r e l a t e d  formulae.
Taking the f i r s t  method f i r s t ,  we consider the Barcan 
formulae and i t s  converse fo r  epistemic log ic ,  the analogous 
formulae with e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i e r s ,  the analogous formulae with 
e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i e r s  and i d e n t i t y ,  and the formulae which w i l l  
enable us to decide on the  v a l i d i t y  of:
(A) Premise K (b = c)"3. -  -
Premise (Ex) (x = b)
Conclusion (Ex)K^(x = c)
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and
(B) Premise K (b = c)
Premise (Ex)(x = b)
Conclusion K (Ex)(x = c)•—.1» MM M<i4
I t  turns  out th a t  ne it i ie r  the Barcan formula nor i t s  
converse are s e l f - s u s t a in in g  in  the system. Counter models are to 
be found in Appendix I I I ,  This accords with our readings  and i n t u i t i v e  
evalua t ion  of the formulae. The Barcan formula i s
(11) (Ux)K Fx . 3  . K (Ux)Fx.
This w i l l  be f a l s i f i e d  i f  the antecedent i s  true  and the consequent 
f a l s e .  On our readings ,  the antecedent  would read as "Everything 
which ex is t s*  i s  what knows to be F ."  The consequent would be f a l s e  
i f  ^  did not know th a t  everything ex is t ing*  was F, th a t  i s ,  i f  he 
believed of one of the things which he knew to be F th a t  i t  was non-
e x i s t e n t* .  This i s  c e r t a i n l y  p oss ib le .
Consider then the formula:
(12) K (Ux) Fx , 3  . (Ux) K Fx.
The antecedent reads as "a^  knows th a t  everything which ex i s t s*  i s  F ."  
The consequent w i l l  be f a l s e  i f  the re  ex is t s*  something of which b 
does not know t h a t  i t  i s  F.  This i s  possib le ,  for unless  a i s  
omniscient we cannot guarantee the t ru t i i  of the consequent.
When we tu rn  to the analogues of (11) and (12) with
e x i s t e n t i a l  q u a n t i f i e r s  we find th a t  they are not s e l f - s u s t a in in g
e i t h e r .  This accords with our i n t u i t i v e  evalua t ion  of the im pl ica t ions .  
Consider f i r s t :
(13) K (Ex) Fx . ^  . (Ex)K Fx
This could be the fo rm al iza t ion  of a cond i t iona l ,  the antecedent
being "a_ knows t h a t  there  a c tu a l ly  ex is ted  a t  l e a s t  one person who was
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a c h a ra c te r  i  n Shake s pe a r e ' s  p lays ,"  t  he co n seque nt be i ng " there  
a c tu a l ly  ex is ted  a t  l e a s t  one person of whom a knows th a t  he was a 
charac te r  in  Shakespeare 's  p lays ."
C lea r ly ,  someone could know th a t  Shakespeare wrote plays 
in  which h i s t o r i c a l  charac te rs  appeared without knowing who any of 
the  charac te rs  were in  any play.  Of such a person we could not say 
t h a t ,  of the charac te rs  he knows to be Shakespearean, a t  l e a s t  one 
ex i s t ed ,  because lie knows none of the Shakespearean ch a rac te r s .  Of 
suoli a person we can aff irm the antecedent of (13) and deny the 
consequent.
S im ilar ly  for
(14) (Ex) K Fx . D , K (Ex) Fx
There i s  nothing c o u n te r - in tu i t i v e  in  saying, "The person known by _a 
as a charac te r  in  a play ac tu a l ly  ex is ted  but a does not know th a t  
some charac te rs  in  plays a c tu a l ly  e x i s t * . "  Once again we can aff i rm 
the antecedent and deny the consequent.
The formulae analogous to (11) and (12) with e x i s t e n t i a l  
q u a n t i f i e r s  and i d e n t i t y  are
(15) (Ex)K (x = b )  D K (Sx)(x = b)
and i t s  converse (16) .  In HS4 (15) i s  not s e l f - s u s t a in in g ,  but i t s  
converse i s .  We have a lready explained th a t  the antecedent  of (15) 
can be t rue  without ^ ' s  knowing th a t  b e x i s t s .  But i f  a_ knows th a t  
b e x i s t s  then i t  does follow th a t  what a, knows as b, e x i s t s .
As for the arguments (A) and (B), on our reading (A) i s  
v a l id  but (B) i s  not.  The system HS4 shows j u s t  t h i s ,
Oratjx) rec ta  and Ora tio  obliouia
We now turn to the a p p l ica t io n  of our theory of proper
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names to the d iscuss ion  of t r u t h  condit ions  fo r  (4) (5) and (6 ) .
F i r s t  WG consider
(5) (Bx)K Fx.
Our claim i s  t h a t  (5) w i l l  be t m e  i f  H^ FjC and (Fx)(x -  X) are t rue  
where X i s  some ind iv idua l  constan t ,  t h a t  i s  i f  _a knows th a t  X i s  F 
and X e x i s t s  (whether a knows t h a t  or  no t) .  Vie would want to say 
f u r th e r  th a t  K^ FX i s  true  (ivhere X i s  some indiv idua l  constant)  i f ,  
and only i f ,  _a knows th a t  something, named by some name, i s  F. I t  
i s  not s u f f i c i e n t  th a t  a knew th a t  something i s  F , but what he should 
know i s  th a t  ^X, vdiere X i s  some name. Let us assume th a t  the name 
i s  *b’ ( in  typ ica l  e x i s t e n t i a l  i n s t a n t i a t i o n  fash ion) .
I f  .a knows th a t  b i s  F, then,with  one proviso ,  on our 
account,  a understands t h a t  ’b* i s  a name, and hence th a t  there  i s  
something named by ' b \  and whatever i t  i s  t h a t  i s  named by *b' i s  F, 
That one proviso I s  of tremendous importance,  i t  i s  t h a t  we are 
considering v/hat ^  knows in  the sense of knowledge by d e sc r ip t io n .
We are considering what _a would a f f i rm  as knowledge, in  h is  terms, 
e s p e c ia l l y  the  s ingu la r  terms.
This i s  not to deny th a t  people can know people,  th ings
or p laces .  Nor i s  i t  to deny t h a t  a person can know of some objec t
t h a t  i t  has p rope r t i e s  without ever  giving th a t  ob jec t  a name or
put t ing  in to  words the knowledge of t h a t  o b j e c t ' s  p ro p e r t i e s .  Some­
times accounts are given of what a person knows without taking account 
of the terms in  which th a t  person would enunciate what he knows. For 
example, we might say "Jones knows th a t  the cen t r i fuge  i s  switched 
on by the door" , and then q u a l i fy  t h i s  by adding, "but he d o e sn ' t  know 
th a t  i t  a c en t r i fu g e " .  Perhaps Jones j u s t  saw someone switch i t  on 
one day. I f  Jones were asked to  say what he knows about switching on
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" t h a t  machine over th e re " ,  he may well  name the machine, or use the
demonst rat ive.  I t  i s  what he would say or a ff irm th a t  concerns us.
When we formalize in to  formulae of the  form K^ A we could 
say th a t  the 'K . , .  ' s tands fo r  'a, knows t i iat  the proposit ion  expressed 
by , , ,  i s  t r u e ' .  This i s  to emphasise the importance of the terms in 
which would a r t i c u l a t e  his  knowledge. But t h i s  r a i s e s  problems fo r
(5) unless we take the q u a n t i f i e r  in a s u b s t i t u t io n a ry  fashion. I t  
i s  not c l e a r  t h a t
(xv) There e x i s t s  some x such th a t  ^  knows t h a t  the proposit ion
expressed by 'Fx'  i s  t r u e .
even makes sense. But
(xvi)  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one name, * x ' , of an e x i s t in g  ind iv idua l  
such t h a t  ,a knows th a t  the proposit ion expressed by 'Fx' 
i s  t ru e .
does make sense.  Since I  have argued above th a t  i t  does not r e a l l y  
matter whether we i n t e r p r e t  q u a n t i f i e r s  s u b s t i t u t i o n a l l y  or o b je c tu a l ly ,  
and since I have argued in t h i s  sec t ion  tha t  we must concentrate on 
tiie terms in which a knower expresses  his knowledge, i t  follows th a t  
there  Is  good sense in  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the q u a n t i f i e r s  s u b s t i t u t i o n a l ly  
in epistemic log ic .
I f  we do not do so then prima face there  would be consid­
e rab le  d i f f i c u l t y  in  in t e r p r e t i n g  (6 ) .  At f i r s t  s igh t  i t  looks as 
though the only way of taking account of the terms which the knower 
would use or a ff irm i s  to accept an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which takes 
account of names and p red ica te s .  The s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of q u a n t i f i c a t io n  i s  in  terms of names. I f  we do not adopt the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i e r s ,  a t  f i r s t  s ig h t ,  i t  
looks as though we are not taking account of the names which the 
knower would use or acknowledge.
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I f  we adopt an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  which ignores  the terms 
in  which the knower would express h is  knowledge then i t  would be 
v i r t u a l l y  impossible to  deal with the problems of opaque contexts  
in  any log ic .  The problem which i s  most important i s  the problem of 
the s u b s t i t u t i v i t y  of i d e n t i c a l s .
I t  i s  genera l ly  agreed th a t  the following argument i s
inva l id :
(C) Jones knows th a t  Cicero addressed the Senate.
Cicero i s  Ta l ly
There fore ,  Jones knows th a t  Tul ly adressed the Senate.
But the argument w i l l  be inav l id  only so long as we i n s i s t  tha t  what 
we claim Jones knows should be put in  terms of what he would say or 
a f f i rm.  I f  we do not so i n s i s t ,  then we could claim th a t  the argument 
i s  va l id  even though Jones does not know th a t  Tul ly  i s  Cicero.  The 
same i s  equal ly  t ru e  of the o ther  p repos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e s  such as 
'b e l i ev es  th a t* ,  'remembers tha t* ,  'hopes t h a t ' ,  and so on.
Because i t  i s  usua l ly  claimed th a t  argument (C) i s  
in va l id  i t  i s  said t h a t  we cannot i n t e r s u b s t i t u t e  i d e n t i c a l s  in 
contexts  of p ropos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e .  These con tex ts ,  toge ther  with
quota t iona l  con tex ts ,  are said to  be opaque. I t  i s  notable th a t
p ropos i t iona l  a t t i t u d e s  contexts  are grouped with quo ta t iona l  contexts  
There i s  an analogous argument to (C) which i s :
(D) Jones sa id ,  "Cicero addressed the Senate"
Cicero i s  Tul ly
There fore ,  Jones sa id ,  "Tully adressed the Senate".
This i s  c l e a r ly  in v a l id .  Here we d o n ' t  have to i n s i s t  on framing 
premises and conclusion in j u s t  those terms which Jones wonId use,  
we are repor t ing  what he sa id .  I t  i s  j u s t  because we do repor t  what
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he said th a t  argument (D) I s  p la in ly  in v a l id .
The analogy between (C) and (D) can be made s t ronger ,  
not only by means of the genera l  consensus as to what counts as an 
opaque context ,  but a lso  i f  we allow th a t  one can r e a d i ly  move back 
and fo r th  from o ra t io  obliqua to  o ra t io  r e c t a .  There seern to be good 
reasons for Jiolding th a t  one can re a d i ly  move back and for th  from 
o ra t io  oblioua to o ra t io  r e c ta ,  and i f  one can re a d i ly  so move then 
i t  can be argued th a t  we are not forced to adopt the s u b s t i t u t io n a r y  
in t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i e r s .
Geach argues tha t  we can so move. In Logic Matters  he
w r i t e s ,
To describe  the words and a t t i t u d e s  of others we may 
use e i t h e r  the or a t i o  obliqua cons t ruc t ion ,  as in:
(1) James be l ieves  t h a t  his wife fears  t h a t  she has cancer ,  
or the o ra t io  rec ta  const ruct ion :  ^
(2) James be l ieves  "My w i fe ' s  fea r  i s  ' I  have cancer, '* '
Geach acknowledges t h a t  philosophers do not l ike  the or a t i o  recta
form and argue aga ins t  i t s  use.  But he says.
I t  i s  c l e a r  in advance th a t  these arguments are 
s o p h i s t i c a l ;  fo r  forms l ike  (2) are common in  a l l  
vernacula rs  ( c f ,  the King James Bible) and p e r fe c t ly  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  and t r a n s l a t i n g  from or a t i o  rec ta  to
o ra t io  obliqua and back i s  an easy exerc ise  fo r  an
i n t e l l i g e n t  schoolchild ,  d i f f i c u l t  as i t  would be to 
formulate exact ru les  fo r  this.-"
I f  we agree with Geach then (C) can be t r a n s l a t e d  in to
( C )  Jones knows "Cicero addressed the Senate"
Cicero i s  Tully 
Therefore Jones knows "Tully addressed the Senate",  
Unfortunately  (O') does not s i t  as well  as (2 ) ,  But with the small 
add i t ion ,  in  the case of 'knows' only,  of ' i s  true* we can get
1P.T, Geach, Logic Matters .  Blackwell,  Oxford, 1972 p. 167.
^ 'Ib id . p. 167
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( C ' )  Jones knows "Cicero addressed the Senate" i s  true  
Cicero i s  Tul ly  
Therefore Jones knows "Tully  addressed the Senate" i s  t r u e ,  
(G**) reads well and f a l l s  in  with Geach's cases.  One might the re fore  
assume t h a t  Geach‘s vers ion of (xvi)  would be somewhat l ike :
( x v i ' )  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one name, ' x \  of an e x i s t in g  ind iv idua l
such th a t  ^  knows 'F x ' i s  t ru e ,
I  say 'somewhat l i k e '  because Geach's example (2) has 'my' i_n the
quo ta t iona l  context  r e fe r r in g  back to 'James'  which i s  not i n the
quota t iona l  context .
This ,  i t  seems to me, i s  a most important f e a tu re  of
Geach's (2 ) ,  Here we have what can be seen as a form of q u a n t i f i c a t io n
in to  opaque context ,  A va r iab le  wi th in  the context i s  bound by 
something ou ts ide .  But the whole sense of Geach's (2) i s  qu i te  
neu tra l  about whether the binding of the va r iab le  i s  to be in t e rp re te d  
s u b s t i t u t i o n a l l y  or o b je c tu a l ly .  'My' can be seen as a space for the
name 'James'  ( in  the possessive as i s  'My') o r  can be seen as
re f e r r in g  to th a t  to which 'James'  r e f e r s  because 'James'  binds 'my'.
An o ra t io  rec ta  reading of (xvi)  could th e re fo re  re le ase  
us from any bondage to  a su b s t i t u t io n a r y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i ­
ca t ion .  Such a reading of (xvi)  would be
( x v i ' )  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one e x i s t i n g  ind iv idua l  of which a_ 
knows ' i t  i s  F ' i s  t rue ,  
care must be taken to  see the ' i t '  here as being bound by 'which'  
and not as a demonstrative .  The use of ' x ' in  (xvi)  makes the binding 
c l e a r ,  so we won't  r e j e c t  (x v i ) .  The important th ing i s  t h a t ,  care 
taken, we can move backwards and forwards between (xvi)  and ( x v i ' ) .
The argument suggested e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  we need a s u b s t i t u t i o n ­
a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  in order to take account of the
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names a knower would use or acknowledge, i s  shown to be unsound i f  we
allow th i s  movement from o ra t io  obiInna to o ra t io  r e c t a . Furthermore,
we have seen t h a t  in  allowing the movement back and fo r th  we cannot
ignore ,  in  o ra t io  obl ioua ,  the terms a knower would use or acknowledge.
I t  seems to me th a t  Geach's apjteal to the vernacula r and
to  the ease with which one can move back and fo r th  between p r a t i g
rec ta  and o ra t io  oblioua c o n s t i t u t e  an exce l len t  bas is  for h is  claims.
But he also se ts  out to argue aga ins t  some arguments of  philosophers
who do not want to allow moves back and fo r th ,  lie says th a t  the
underlying pre judice  aga ins t  moves back and fo r th
i s  express ib le  as follows: "(2) i s  only language about 
language, and t h i s  can touch only the physical  express ion 
of a t t i t u d e s ,  not describe  the a t t i t u d e s  t h e m s e lv e s . " '
Geach then se ts  out to ' d e n t '  t h i s  pre judice by arguing about the
nature of p rep o s i t io n a l  a t t i t u d e s  and propos i t ions .  Whatever the
v i r tu e s  of h is  arguments, and I have l i t t l e  sympathy fo r  them, i t
i s  c e r t a in  t h a t  he has pinpointed the p re jud ice .  The pre judice  i s  a
pre judice  for decla r ing  as much as possible in  ord inary  language to
be m e ta l in g u i s t i c .  This pre judice  when applied to  Geach's (2) sees
(2) as a m eta -m e ta - l ingu is t ic  s ta tement.  I t  i s  absurd to see
Geach’s (2) in  t h i s  way, whatever one be l ieves  about p ropos i t ions .
Returning then to formula (5) ,  we claim t h a t  (xvi)  gives
us a way of i n t e r p r e t i n g  (5) which can a lso  be used for (4) and (6 ) ,
Consider
(4) (Ux)K Fx,
and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  given by e i t h e r
Cxvii) Each name, ' x ' , of  e x i s t in g  ind iv idua ls  i s  such t h a t  a
knows th a t  the p ropos i t ion  expressed by 'F^ '  i s  t ru e .
^Ib id ,  p, 168,
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or  a Geachean
( x v i i ' )  Each e x i s t in g  ind iv idua l  i s  such t h a t  a knows ’i t  i s  F ’ 
i s  t r u e .
These accord with our s t ra igh tfo rward  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  of (4) as ( x i i i )  
or as
( x i i i ' )  What a knows to be F c o n s t i t u t e s  the t o t a l i t y  of 
. e x i s t i n g  th ings .
Consider a lso
(6) (Ex)K_(x -  b) 
and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  given by e i t h e r
( x v i i i )  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one name, 'x*, of an e x i s t in g  ind iv idua l
such t h a t  _a knows th a t  tiie proposit ion  expressed by
*x = b ’ i s  t r u e .
or by
( x v i i i ' )  There i s  a t  l e a s t  one e x i s t in g  ind iv idua l  such t h a t  a,
knows ' i t  i s  b ' i s  t r u e .
. I f  a. understands t h a t  ' b ' i s  a name then a w i l l  know th a t  b = b.
I f  b also happens to e x i s t  then (6) w i l l  be t ru e .  (6) w i l l  be f a l s e  
i f  b does not e x i s t  or ^  does not understand 'b ' to be a name. I f  a, 
does understand th a t  *b' i s  a name then ^  w i l l  unders tand, on our 
account,  th a t  something i s  ca l led  ' b ' .  I f  a understands t h a t  some­
th ing i s  ca l led  *b' and b e x i s t s  then (6) would be t rue  on the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  given by ( x v i i i ) .  Once again, so long as we are c a re ­
fu l  to take the ' i t *  in  ( x v i i i ' )  as bound by 'one e x i s t in g  in d iv id u a l '  
and not as a demonstrat ive,  then ( x v i i i* )  a lso  supports the reading 
we have given to (6 ) ,
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F r e q e ' s Problem
According to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  given to  epistemic 
contexts  we can say th a t  the two i d e n t i t i e s  which troubled  Frege 
have qu i te  d i s t i n c t  cogni t ive  value.  Consider 
(17) K. (b = b)
and (18) K (b = c)
The former i s  i n t e rp re te d  as:
(xix) ^  knows t h a t  the p roposi t ions  expressed by ‘b ~ li '  i s  t rue  
and the l a t t e r  as:
(xx) a knows t h a t  the propos i t ion  expressed by ’b “  c ' i s  t r u e .
In HS4 (17) i s  s e l f - s u s t a in in g  because of the deductive
omniscience fea tu re  of HS4. In the system I propose, which i s  se t
out in Appendix I I I ,  (17) i s  not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  Whilst one might 
not want to support deductive omniscience, a fea tu re  of H in t ik k a ’s 
logics  which t roub les  even him,^ one might want to  argue th a t  (IT) 
should be s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  There i s  a sense in  which everyone knows 
t h a t  b = b. (S imila r ly  for some o ther  things  l ike  (j) Z) _p). )  But (17) 
can be s e l f - s u s t a in in g  only i f  _a takes  *b' to be a name, a, might not 
have ever heard the  name before .  I f  a has heard the word *b’ , and 
understands i t  to be a name, then (17) w i l l  follow. (17) follows 
because i f  a understands 'b* to  be a name, then a w i l l  know th a t  what 
i s  named by ' b ‘ cannot but be i d e n t i c a l  with what 'b* names.
But from an understanding th a t  *b' i s  a name and th a t
i s  a name (18) does not follow. For (18) to be t rue  a. has to
know t h a t  what *b' names i s  a lso  named by
Our theory of proper names allows us to maintain th a t  the
Hintikka,  " 'Knowing th a t  one knows* Reviewed", Synthèse 21 
(1970) p. 142.
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sense and reference of proper names are the same in  d i r e c t  and I n d i r e c t  
speech. We do not have to r e s o r t  to the Fregian notion th a t  the 
re fe rence  of a proper name in  i n d i r e c t  speech i s  i t s  own sense.
Conclusion
I have argued fo r  a theory of proper names, and have 
argued tha t  the theory i s  of help in  dealing with c e r t a in  phi losophical  
problems. The theory i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a simple theory t h a t  emphasises 
the naming r e l a t i o n .  Read in  one way, the theory advocated i s  t h a t  
names liave no meaning. Names simply r e f e r  and t h e i r  sense i s  tha t  
they r e f e r .  But i f  the ro le  of names in  statements i s  to be re levan t  
to the t ru t h  condit ions  of s ta tements ,  and i t  i s ,  then ?;e can say 
t h a t  names have meaning in  context ,  and our theory shows how names 
play out t h e i r  r o l e .
The sense of a name i s  i t s  r e l a t i o n  to t h a t  to which i t  
has been given. I t  was M i l l ' s  view th a t  names had denota t ion  but no 
connotat ion.  In saying th a t  names have sense I  do not mean to say 
th a t  names have connotation.  I f  meaning i s  seen p r in c ip a l ly  in  terms 
of connotation then our theory implies t l iat  names have no meaning.
As Wiggins says in  a footnote to "Essen t ia l ism ,  Cont inu i ty  and I d e n t i t y " ,
Champions of tlie des igna t iona l  view of proper names 
defended here are sometimes asked, when (unl ike Kripke) 
they present t h e i r  view in  an in o the r  respec ts  Fregean 
framework, what i s  the re s idua l  u t i l i t y  of the notion of 
sense? The answer i s  th a t  the th ing designated i s  s t i l l
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in  a d i f f e r e n t  category from the sense of i t s  name, and 
th a t  sense i s  s t i l l  needed to s t a t e  the r e l a t i o n s h ip  of 
the meaning of the name and the meanings of the sentences 
in  which i t  f ig u r e s .  Sense mediates between the t ru t h  
grounds of the l a t t e r  and the con t r ibu t ion  of the former 
to t r u t h - g r ounds.
The giving of a name i s  qu i te  c ru c ia l  to  t h i s  theory.
There may be a stock of proper-names or indiv idua l  constan ts  in  a 
language, but these  are merely words or terms u n t i l  they have been 
given to something. This i s  not j u s t  a matter of pragmatics e i t h e r ,  
a matte r divorced from semantics.  In  standard se t  t h e o re t i c  semantics 
one gives names to ind iv idua ls  by means of va luat ion  func t ions .  In 
s u b s t i t u t i o n a l  semantics one assumes th a t  the names are the names of 
the th ings  of which we speak. Even in  deduction,  e sp e c ia l l y  with 
E x i s t e n t i a l  I n s t a n t i a t i o n ,  when one proceeds for example from
(% ) Rxy. 
to  ( % )  Rax.
what has been done "may be expressed in  words saying ’consider by way 
of example one in d iv id u a l ,  l e t  us name i t  a, of tl»e kind which i s  
a sse r ted  to e x i s t  by (Ex)(Uy/Rxy,*
Once a name has been given then i t  i s  f ixed as one of the 
arguments of the naming func t ion ,  and i t s  sense i s  t h a t  i t  names j u s t  
one ind iv idua l .
On tîie b a s i s  of t h i s  theory we have considered the problems 
involved in cross-world i d e n t i t y .  I t  has been shown th a t  i f  we adhere 
c lo se ly  to the theory then we can cons t ruc t  quan t i f ied  modal log ics ,  
and deal with problems about i d e n t i t y  in modal systems. We have seen 
e sp e c ia l l y ,  t h a t  in a v a r ie ty  of modal log ic s ,  i f  we adhere to the 
theory of names se t  out,  then there  i s  uniform agreement about the
LO p .c i t ,  p, 357, fn ,  29
"J, Hintikka "Quanti f ie  
The Moni S t  53 (1969), p. 222 (my i t a l i c s )
2J ca t ion  and the P ic ture  Theory of Language",
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v a l i d i t y  or s e l f - s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  of the formula
(a) (% )  W ( x  = 1  . 0 ( x  = %)).
This formula remains s e l f - s u s t a in in g  no matter how the donains of 
ind iv idua ls  are r e l a t e d  from world to  world. In t h i s  way our theory 
supports the notion th a t  a name i s  a r ig id  des igna to r .
The theory advocated has severa l  advantages over o ther 
th e o r i e s .  I t s  advantages over F reg e ' s  theory are th a t  f i r s t ,  the 
sense of a name i s  determined and not dependent on d i f f e r in g  users ,  
and second, th a t  the r e f e re n t  of a name i s  the same in  a l l  con tex ts .  
The advantages over R u s s e l l ' s  theory are t h a t  f i r s t ,  the term 'name' 
i t s e l f  i s  not so narrowly defined, and second, t h a t  non-exis ten t  
e n t i t i e s  can be named.
Above a l l ,  the theory accords wi th ordinary  language 
and provides a bas is  fo r  formal ising in to  f i r s t  o rder ,  modal and 
epis temic log ics .
APPENDIX I
A type theory  b a s i s  f o r  a theory  o f  proper names
In order to develop  the theory th a t  the senna o f  a
proper name i s  the r e l a t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the g iv in g  o f  th a t
name we w i l l  make use  o f  the sim ple  theory  o f  ty p e s .  We b eg in
by s e t t i n g  out R e n n ie 's  expanded and m od ified  account o f  Church’ s
2fo rm u la t io n  o f  the sim ple theory  o f  typ es  c R en n ie 's  account w i l l  
then be expanded in  c e r t a in  r e s p e c t s .
We b eg in  w ith  an in form al account o f  the syn tax  and 
s em a n t ic s .  There are three  type symbols in  R en n ie 's  system , o  c 
and/G: t r u th -v a lu e s  have type o ,  in d iv id u a l s  have type 6 , and 
p o s s i b l e  w orlds have type yc. Type symbols are r e c u r s i v e ly  s p e c i f i e d  
by:
1 . and Â: are type symbols
2 . I f  cc and ^  are type sym bols, so i s  .
The im portant f e a tu r e  o f  t h i s  n o ta t io n  i s  th a t  f u n c t io n s  from item s  
o f  type jS  to item s  o f  type oi have type * For example, (oo) i s
the type o f  one k ind o f  tr u th  fu n c t io n ,  and (o t )  i s  the type o f  
f i r s t - o r d e r  monadic p r e d ic a t e s .  Rennie argues th a t  (o^) i s  the type
3o f  p r o p o s i t io n s  . Type symbols always appear as s u b s c r ip t s  to 
v a r i a b l e s  and c o n s ta n ts  in  form u lae .  For any type s y m b o l t h e r e  
are the fo l lo w in g  denumerably many v a r ia b le s :
f w  >s , . . .
There are a l s o  the two c o n s ta n ts  o f  f ix e d  type:
^(OO)» ^ ( ( 0 0 ) 0 )
For any type symbol oc, we have the c o n s ta n ts :
1. k .K .R ennie Some U ses o f  Type Theory in  the  A n a ly s is  o f  Language 
Research School o f  S o c ia l  S c ie n c e s ,  Canberra, 1974
2 .  A.Church "A Form ulation  o f  the Simple Theory o f  Types" The 
Journal o f  Symbolic Logic (5 )  1940 pp« 96-68
3o O p .c i t .  pp 74-79
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^  (o (oa. ) ) ’  ^(cv (o#) )
There are a l s o  the improper symbols:
^  * ( * ) o
There are no o th e r  p r im it iv e  symbols in  the n o t a t io n .
Every formula has an a s s o c ia t e d  typ e ,  and formulae (w f fs )  and 
t h e i r  types are r e c u r s i v e ly  d e f in ed  as  fo l l o w s :
1c Any v a r ia b le  v^ i s  a w f f ,  and has type oc- .
2., Any c o n s ta n t  i s  a w f f ,  and has the type o f  i t s  su b scr ip t*
3c I f  A^ j^g  ^ i s  a w ff  o f  type {c(p) and i s  a w ff  o f  type
^  , then ) i s  a w ff  o f  type o> ,
4» I f  A^ i s  a w ff o f  type (X and v^ i s  a v a r ia b le  of  
type ^  , then ( X v ^  A^ ) i s  a w ff o f  type ,
As an example o f  the way in  which th ese  r u le s  work, c o n s id e r
t r u t h - f u n c t io n a l  l o g i c  o f  the c l a s s i c a l  kind where on ly  o i s  th e
b a s ic  type symbol. The v a r i a b l e s  take as  t h e i r  v a lu e s  on ly  t r u t h - -
v a lu e s ,  and the on ly  c o n s ta n ts  are ^ /o o )  ^ ((oo )o )®  l e t
~  f o r  the domain o f  t r u t h - v a lu e s .  Formation r u le  1
m atches the u s u a l  c la u s e  th a t  every t r u t h - f u n c t io n a l  v a r ia b le  (or
" p r o p o s i t io n a l  v a r ia b le "  as  they are u s u a l ly  c a l l e d )  s tan d in g  a lo n e
i s  a wff* The co n s ta n t  N, x d en otes  th a t  fu n c t io n  fr im  D to  filocQ o o
such th a t  i f  the  argument i s  1 the v a lu e  i s  0 , and i f  the argument 
i s  0 the va lu e  i s  1, i « e * t r u t h - f u n c t io n a l  n egation*  By r u le  2 
above s ta n d in g  a lo n e  i s  a w f f .  This i s  n o t  as in  c l a s s i c a l
t r u t h - f u n c t io n a l  l o g i c .  But  ^  ^ w ff by r u le  3« (N^^^^x ^ )
i s  o f  type o  and ) i s  a l s o  o f  type o  i f  A i s  a w ff  o f
type o  0 This matches the u s u a l  c la u s e  in  c l a s s i c a l  t r u t h - f u n c t io n a l  
l o g i c  th a t  i f  A i s  a w ff  then  so i s  ~A, and so we a b b rev ia te
(B (o o )A o )
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S im i la r ly  we a b b r e v ia te
( ( A ( ( . o ) . ) B e  )C. ) a s  (B„V cy  
s in c e  tbe i n c l u s i v e  d is j u n c t io n  op era to r  o f
c l a s s i c a l  t r u t h - f u n c t io n a l  lo g i c *  The reason  we can use monadic 
f u n c t io n s  to  d e f in e  d i s j u n c t io n ,  a dyadic f u n c t io n ,  i s  th a t  
A(BXG) and (A^)"
are  s e t  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  eq u iv a le n t*
I t  should a l s o  be noted  th a t  in  t h i s  n o ta t io n  the  
argument o f  a fu n c t io n  i s  in d ic a t e d  in  the ty p a l  s u b s c r ip t s  by 
the r ig h t-h a n d  type symbol and the va lu e  by the le f t -h a n d  type  
symbol. In  any p a ir ,  (=vp) , <%; i n d ic a t e s  the v a lu e s  and jS the  
arguments* For t h i s  reason  we have adopted the co n v en t io n , in  any 
s e t - t h e o r e t i c  n o t a t io n ,  o f  l e t t i n g  th e  le f t - h a n d  members o f  
ordered p a i r s ,  in  s e t s  o f  ordered p a ir s  which r e p r e se n t  f u n c t io n s ,  
be the v a lu e s  o f  fu n c t io n s *
As w e l l  as the  a b b rev ia ted  forms (~A^) and (B^v C^) 
we a l s o  u se  (B^& C^) . , (B^DC^) and (B^ S^ ) i n  the u s u a l  way*
When we turn to  f i r s t - o r d e r  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  th eory  we 
have v a r i a b l e s  o f  type ù a s  in d iv i d u a l  v a r i a b l e s  tak ing  t h e i r  
v a lu e s  from a non-empty domain * V a r ia b le s  o f  typ es  ( o f ) ,
serv e  as  v a r ia b le s  f o r  monadic, 2 - a d i c ,  
3 - a d i c ,  o .c p r e d ic a te s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  In order  to  in trod u ce  
q u a n t i f i c a t io n  we f i r s t  in trod u ce  the improper symbol X *
I n fo r m a lly ,  X i s  an op era to r  o f  f u n c t io n a l  a b s t r a c t io n ,  
and ( X Vy3 A^ ) d en o tes  a fu n c t io n *  The f u n c t io n  c o n s i s t s  o f  a 
s e t  o f  ordered p a ir s ,  one p a ir  f o r  each v a lu e  th a t  v can take  
i n  * For example;
X x (x2 )  =  [< 0 ,0 > ,  <1,1> , <4 ,2>  , <9,3>,<^6 ,4>  , . . .  }
1 8 5 .
where x  can take v a lu e s  in  {^ 0 ,1 ,2 ,3*4 ,  . , .  ] and x*s  v a lu e s
prov id e  the arguments o f  the f u n c t io n .  The v a lu e s  o f  th e  fu n c t io n
2are  provided by x in  the example. So
i s  a f u n c t io n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  o f  a monadic p r e d ic a te ,  such as
w ith  a f r e e  v a r i a b l e ,  such as  y ,  forming the e x p r e ss io n  
%
I f  *Rx' were taken as  i s  red * , and x  could take as i t s  v a lu e s  
the members o f  a s e t  o f  b i l l i a r d  b a l l s :   ^ p la in ,s p o t ,z -e d  j
then we could r e p r e se n t  *Rx' a s :
{  <0 , p l a i n > X 0 , s p o t> ,< j  , r e d > ]
C le a r ly  * Rx* i s  r ep re se n ted  by a fu n c t io n  o f  type («=*<:■), a fu n c t io n  
from in d iv id u a l s  to  t r u t h - v a l u e s , S ince the type o f  (Xx^f^^^^x^)  
i s  (o ^ ) ,  i t  f o l l o w s  th a t  vie can have
or
(o (o  t) )  ^^   ^ which has the type o  ,
^  (o (o i  ) )  ^ ) has v a lu e  1 i f f  ( X x^  ) has v a lu e  1 f o r  a l l  the
arguments from « So in  the b i l l i a r d  b a l l  example, s in c e  the
v a lu e s  f o r  %  are n o t  1 in  every  case
^ ( O  (OC))^ (^<D£. ) ^ 6 )
would have the v a lu e  0 . In  o th e r  words, i t  i s  f a l s e  th a t  a l l  the
b i l l i a r d  b a l l s  are  r e d .  ¥/e a b b rev ia te
(x ,)A o
and ( - ( x ^ ) ( - A ^ ) )  as
The c o n s ta n ts  (%(o%) ) b e s t  ex p la in e d  by c o n s id e r in g
 ^ { ( { o â ) ) "  ^ { ù { o c ) )  (^Gnotes a f u n c t io n  whose v a lu e  f o r  a g iv e n
su b se t  o f  as  argument i s  a member o f  th at s u b se t  u n le s s  the  
su b se t  i s  n u l l .  I f  the su b se t  i s  n u l l  then the va lu e  i s  an a r b itr a r y
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member o f  * Y<e a b b r e v ia te   ^ (^ o L \  as  ( 7 )A ^
I f  the v a lu e  o f  ^ { d o c ) )   ^ u n i t  s e t  then i t  a c t s  as a
d e f i n i t e  d e s c r ip t io n  o p e r a to r .
I d e n t i t y  f o r  any type i s  d e f in ed  in  two s t e p s .  F i r s t  
we a b b rev ia te
and then a b b rev ia te
In  g e n e r a l  we v / i l l  assume th a t  i s  the s e t  o f  item s  
o f  type <X , and adopt the a b b r e v ia t io n s  s e t  out
by R ennie, e s p e c i a l l y  w ith in  type sym bols. The most im portant o f  th ese  
i s  th a t  p a ren th eses  w i l l  be om itted  from type symbols accord in g  
to a p r in c ip le  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  to the l e f t .  So x ^  i s  an
a b b r e v ia t io n  o f  x ,y ,  \ \ \ .
Church’ s fo r m u la t io n  of  the sim ple th eory  o f  types  
c o n ta in s  no in d iv i d u a l  c o n s ta n ts  or anyth ing  a n a lo g o u s .  Here, a s  
e lsew h ere .  Church d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between f r e e  and bound o ccu rren ces  
o f  v a r i a b l e s ,  and, when the sem an tics  are  s e t  o u t ,  the f r e e  o ccu rren ces  
o f  v a r ia b le s  are  tr e a te d  a s  though they  were occu rren ces  o f  c o n s t a n t s .
A type f o r  symbols
S ince we wish to  g iv e  an account o f  proper names in  terms  
o f  the naming fu n c t io n  which r e l a t e s  a name to th a t  to  v/hich the  
name i s  g iv e n ,  we need to  be ab le  to r e f e r  to the names th e m s e lv e s .  
Although names, and a l l  the o th er  symbols o f  a form al or n a tu r a l
•jlanguage, are "part o f  the world" , and th e r e fo r e  members o f  , 
i t  seems b e s t  to  t r e a t  them a s  a sep a ra te  c a te g o r y .  ¥/e th e r e fo r e  
in tro d u ce  the domain o f  symbols: D ^  . I t  would seem then th a t  a l l
1 . M .J .C ressw e ll  L ogics  and Languages. Methuen, London(l973)
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we need to do i s  to  add cr to the type symbols and we w i l l  then be 
a b le  to  use e x p r e s s io n s  o f  type cr to  r e f e r  to the symbols o f  the  
form al language we have s e t  out above* U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  i t  i s  n o t  
a s  s im ple as  that® We cannot s in p ly  use 0  a s  a su rro g a te  f o r  
q u o ta tio n  marks. For example, to r e f e r  to  the name o f  x  ^ we use  
' x ^ ' .  I f ,  on the one hand, we simply r e p la c e  the in v e r te d  commas 
w ith  an a d d i t io n a l  s u b s c r i p t , 0  , to g e t  x , then we have a 
symbol which s ta n d s  f o r  something o f  the type o f  a fu n c t io n  from 
the domain o f  symbols to  the domain o f  in d iv id u a l s  but not f o r  a 
member o f  * I f ,  on the o th er  hand, we re p la c e  both the in v e r te d  
commas and the s u b s c r ip t ,  in  *x^' f o r  example, w ith  a ct s u b s c r ip t ,  
to  g e t  x^ f o r  example, then i t  i s  no t c l e a r  th a t  x ^ stands f o r  
the  name o f  ( th e  symbol) x^ or x ^  or x^, , Indeed , i t  lo o k s  as  
though x^ could d e s ig n a te  p art  o f  a p r im it iv e  symbol, th a t  i s ,  x ^  
cou ld  be seen a s  d e s ig n a t in g  the x in  a l l  the v a r i a b l e s  o f  the  
form x^ * But t h i s  s t i l l  l e a v e s  us v^ith the problem o f  d e s ig n a t in g  
the  names o f  x^ , x^ and x^.
I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  b e s t  to proceed a t  f i r s t  in  a way v/hich 
can be e x e m p lif ie d  by say in g  th a t :
' x  ’ =% XL V
x _0 r
’ x  1  — XA
We w i l l  concern o u r s e lv e s  a t  f i r s t  w ith  naming on ly  th ose  p r im it iv e  
symbols o f  our n o ta t io n  w ith  the ty p a l  s u b s c r ip t s  c , o  and k  . 
S y n t a c t i c a l l y ,  t h i s  i s  e a s i l y  coped w ith  by the s im ple p r o c e s s  o f  
adding V , T and j u  to  the type sym bols. The r e c u r s iv e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  
o f  the type symbols then  becomes:
1 * 0  o , £ , / i ' , V ' , ' £ ’ and are type symbols*
2* * I f  cx and are both type symbols, so i s  .
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I n fo r jh a l ly , the sem an tics  would then be co n stru c ted  to  
say t h a t ,  f o r  example:
' f o ; '  -  f r .
^ ( o ( o c ) )  I') )
The s t a t u s  o f  form ulae such as f w o u l d  then be q u ite  c l e a r ,  
t h i s  would be a v a r ia b le  o f  the  type o f  fu n c t io n s  from the names 
o f  in d iv id u a l s  to i n d i v i d u a l s .
What has been sk etch ed  out above could  a l s o  be seen  as  the  
sh o r t  (and e x p e d ie n t)  way o f  d e a l in g  w ith  p art  o f  a g en e r a l  
programme which should be s e t  o u t ,  but we are h ard ly  l i k e l y  to  
have to  r e s o r t  to  the g e n e r a l  programme. In a g e n e r a l  system we 
co u ld  use the a  symbol i f  we used i t  to  s u b s c r ip t  the  whole 
sym bol, i’or example, the name o f x^ would be d es ig n a ted  by x^ ,
In  o th e r  words, x  ^ i s  to  be seen  as an a b b r e v ia t io n  o f  x , and 
i s  to be seen  as  an a b b r e v ia t io n  o f  x^ , and i s  to be seen  
a s  an a b b r e v ia t io n  o f  x_ , S im i la r ly ,  u s in g  * —> ’ f o r  * i s  an 
a b b r e v ia t io n  f o r ’ , we have:
(o (a' 0 ( o O)^
In  each o f  th ese  c a s e s  we must t r e a t  the symbol <y a s  s u b s c r ip t in g  
not on ly  the whole symbol, such as  x  ^ , but a l s o  the s u b s c r ip t .
So the su b sc r ip te d  s u b s c r ip t ,  such as   ^ , can be seen  a s  what i s  
a b b r e v ia te d .  The symbol f^ .^ i s  no t an a b b r e v ia t io n  f o r  f  , but  
f o r  f^^  ^ ^, the square b ra ck e ts  showing the r e a l  sen se  o f  f ^ y « 
T h erefore , in  a g e n e r a l iz e d  n o t a t io n  u s in g  or we would a l s o  need  
to  use  square b r a c k e ts .  In the g e n e r a l iz e d  n o ta t io n  we have the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  form ulae such as x ;,fo r  *’x^ ’* , and so on,
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In  order to  prevent <s appearing as  o ther  than a subscript- to  
s u b s c r ip t s  the r e c u r s iv e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  type symbols would have 
to  read:
1 ’*. Of  i  and are type sym bols.
2*'o I f  and^/^are type sym bols, so i s  .
3 ” . I f  of i s  a type symbol, so i s  .
A b b rev ia t io n s  are:
per]
P  -  M  
^  N
I f  c o n ta in s  occu rren ces  o f  on ly  o  , t  and K  , then i f  (X/Y) 
i s  the r e s u l t  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g  X f o r  Y in  oO a t  every occurrence  
o f  Y , then
of ( v /  O  ) ( rJo ) —^
I t  must be noted  th a t  t h i s  n o ta t io n  does n ot perm it our r e f e r r in g ,  
by means o f  i t ,  to the p a r t s  o f  p r im i t iv e  symbols «
Naming and r e f e r r in g
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  w ith  t h i s  n o ta t io n  to d e f in e  a naming f u n c t io n
as  :
Xx^(xj^) —^  (x  )
For any in d iv i d u a l ,  x  ^ , t h i s  fu n c t io n  w i l l  g iv e  us i t s  name. But 
in  order to prevent any one name from being the name o f  more than  
one in d iv i d u a l ,  and so avo id  some o f  the hazards o f  ordinary  
language, we need to d e f in e  a fu n c t io n  which w i l l  ensure th a t  a 
g iv e n  name names on ly  one i n d iv i d u a l .  The fu n c t io n  i s :
=  ( Xx^ (Xy))y<)
The f i r s t  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  o f  "The name o f  . . . "  , the  second i s  o f  
"The r e f e r e n t  o f  . . .  " . I t  i s  t h i s  second f u n c t io n  which g i v e s  
the ’meaning’ or ’ s e n s e ’ o f  any proper name. The a p p rop ria te
1 9 0 ,
p r e d ic a te  co n s tru c ted  out o f  t h i s  second fu n c t io n  w i l l  be a 
dyadic  p r e d ic a te  o f  type :
k z y  Xw^ ( (7 y ^  ) ( z y  — ( Ax^ ( X y )  )y^ ) “  )
This can be ab b rev ia ted  l o o s e l y  a s ;
w i s  named by z 
or more s t r i c t l y  a s :
” “ " ( ( o O v )
Y/e can a l s o  take the examples "The name o f  a " and "The r e f e r e n t
of a " s and con stru e  th ese  a s  f o l lo w s ;
(a)  The name o f  a =  ) ] (a ^ )
“  ' a p
(b) The r e f e r e n t  o f  a =  (^y  ^ = (  X x^(X y))y^)
— the in d iv id u a l  named by a^
Example (b) i s  the more im portant o f  the two in  the fo rm u la t io n  
o f  a theory o f  proper names. By r e c o g n iz in g  a word to  be a proper  
name th a t  word i s  understood to  name some one i n d iv i d u a l ,  and i t  
names th a t  one in d iv id u a l  s im ply  in  the sen se  th a t  the name has  
been g iv e n  to  th a t  i n d iv i d u a l .  That a name stands in  such a 
r e l a t io n s h i p  i s  what g iv e s  a name i t s  s e n s e .  The p roperty  o f  
havin g  one and on ly  one r e f e r e n t  cou ld  be sa id  to  be what i t  i s  
f o r  a name to have a s e n s e .  Seen in  the r ig h t  way the fu n c t io n  
Xw^('?z^^)(z.^w^ (vy,  ) (w ,  == ( Ax^ (Xy))y, ) )
can be seen  as  the fu n c t io n  which g iv e s  the sen se  o f  any one name,
I d e n t i t y  and sense
In  the l i g h t  o f  t h i s  accou nt o f  the sen se  o f  a proper  
name we can account f o r  the d i f f e r e n c e  between "a-= a" and "a = b"
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which so concerned F r e g e .  His q u e s t io n  was d ir e c t e d  to  d is c o v e r in g  
how a p e r s o n ’ s understand ing  o f  "a-—a" d i f f e r s  from "a — b" in  such  
a way th a t  the tru th  o f  one i s  determ ined in  a way s p e c i f i c a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  to  the way used f o r  the o th e r .  And i t  i s  not n e c e s s a r y  
to p ro v id e ,  b e s id e s  a theory  o f  proper names, a theory o f  p r e d ic a te s  
such as  , I t  makes p e r f e c t l y  good sense  to say th a t  the d i f f e r e n c e  
in  understanding can be made c l e a r  in  terras o f  Q/, \ x and the ij  I )  !
sen se  o f  a^ and the sen se  o f  b^  ^ . Whereas we understand " a = a "  j
to be l o g i c a l l y  true because i t  i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  :
-  ( (X ) ( ( ? y p ( a ^ = ( ( A  X, )):
but "a — b" i s  e q u iv a le n t  to
) ( 8 y  = ( ( X x < ) ( X y ) ) y < ) ( ( 7 y ( ) ( b y  =  ( ( X x ^ ) ( x , ^ y ^ ) )  I
which i s  not l o g i c a l l y  true* In  order to d is c o v e r  whether the |
I
second i s  true or n o t ,  as  a m atter  o f  f a c t ,  one would have to  
d is c o v e r  what in d iv id u a l  a^ i s  the name o f ,  and o f  what in d iv id u a l  
by i s  the name.
D iv id ed  r e fe r e n c e
We have seen  th a t  a property  i s  r ep re se n ted  in  t h i s  
n o t a t io n  as a fu n c t io n  from D^  to . In  t h i s  case  by ’ property"  
we mean a monadic p ro p er ty .  I f  we l e t
denote the f u n c t io n  which w i l l  determine f o r  any in d iv id u a l
whether i t  i s  red or not then R^  ^ i s  the property  o f  b e in g  red
and R,-^  ^ i s  the g e n e r a l  term d e s ig n a t in g  the p r o p e r ty .I O-j
IV/o im portant q u e s t io n s  to ask a r e ,  does R^ ,^ (R^^  ^ ) 
r e f e r  to anyth ing  ? and, in  what sen se  might th a t  r e f e r e n c e  be a 
d iv id e d  r e fe r e n c e  ? These q u e s t io n s  are asked in  order  to  c l a r i f y ,  
i f  p o s s i b l e ,  Q uine’ s n o t io n  o f  d iv id ed  r e f e r e n c e .  Although wre m ight
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say th a t  r e f e r s  to the fu n c t io n  , t h i s  i s  c l e a r l y  n o t
what Quine in te n d s  by h i s  t a lk  o f  the d iv id ed  r e fe r e n c e  o f  g e n e r a l  
term s. What he means i s  th a t  R^^ r e f e r s  to  those  members o f  
such t h a t ,  as arguments f o r  the fu n c t io n  , the v a lu e
tru e  w i l l  be d e s ig n a te d .  The d iv id e d  r e fe r e n c e  o f  R^^ w i l l  then  
be members o f  some su b se t  o f  .
The p roperty  o f  a g e n e r a l  term o f  having  a d iv id e d  
r e fe r e n c e  i s  o f  type (o (c (-rv ) ) ) .  We can th e r e fo r e  d e f in e
(r y )  ) ) ~ d f  v)  ^ (-r,/ ^
For the sake o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s io n  we can be A r i s t o t e l i a n  and assume
th a t  a l l  g e n e r a l  terms are  p r e d ic a b le  o f  a t  l e a s t  one in d iv i d u a l .  
The fu n c t io n  in d ic a t e s  th a t  a term has d iv id ed  r e fe r e n c e  on ly  i f  
(%py)(3 y, )
i s  true f o r  th a t  term. But v/e have now returned  to  a q u a n t i f ie d
form ula . We must c o n s id e r  the sem an tics  f o r  q u a n t i f i c a t io n ,  and
the c r u c i a l  q u a n t i f i c a t io n  i s  ( 3  y ^ ) »
APPENDIX I I
The system s (1<i4'4)
P r im it iv e  sym bols:-
(a )  improper symbols: • D ~ U ( )
p r e p o s i t io n a l  v a r ia b le s :  ,r^ jp^, q2 >^ '’2 ^^3 »
in d iv id u a l  v a r i a b l e s :  , y ^ , z ^ . . .
• n . , n , n n n , n n n /in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t s :  ,b^ ,c^ja^jb^jC ^ja^ , Cn>1 ;
m-ary p r e d ic a te  v a r ia b le s :  (^>1 )
p r e d ic a te  c o n s ta n t :  —
(b) in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t s :  c^ja^jb^îC^ja^, » * *
Formation r u l e s : -
1e A p r e p o s i t io n a l  v a r ia b le  s ta n d in g  a lone i s  a w f f .
2o I f  F^ i s  an m-ary p r e d ic a te  v a r ia b le ,  and i f  ^
are m in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  ( n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  d i s t i n c t )  then  
TniD n n£  &'j&2 " ® âjQ
i s  a w f f .
2 ’ o I f  F^ i s  an m-ary p r e d ic a te  v a r ia b le ,  and i f  a^ , , . .  ,a^
are m in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  (n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  d i s t i n c t )  then
i s  a w ff  o
3 . I f  a and b are in d iv i d u a l  c o n s ta n ts  (not n e c e s s a r i l y  d i s t i n c t )
then ■ a =  b
i s  a w f f .
4 .  I f  A i s  a w ff  so i s  ~A .
5 . I f  A and B are w f f s  and a l l  the in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts
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occu rr in g  in  A and B o u ts id e  o f  atomic p a r t s  which are  
i d e n t i t i e s  have the same s u p e r s c r ip t ,  then so i s  (A D B) .  
I f  A i s  a w ff  and x i s  any in d iv id u a l  v a r i a b l e ,  then ,  
provided th a t  a l l  the in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  in  A have the  
same s u p e r s c r ip t ,
( U x ) (A ( x / /a ) )
i s  a w f f ,  where ( A ( x / / a ) )  i s  the r e s u l t  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g  x 
f o r  a a t  zero  or more o ccu rren ces  of a i n  A .
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6 ’ . I f  A i s  a w ff  and x  i s  any in d iv id u a l  v a r ia b le  then  
(U x ) (A (x / /a ) )
i s  a w f f ,  where (A (x//a_) ) i s  the r e s u l t  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g  x  
f o r  a a t  zero or  more o ccu rren ces  o f  a in  A.
To Terminal c l a u s e .
Formulae co n stru c ted  accord in g  to  r u le s  1. and 2 ,  are c a l l e d  
"atomic w ffs" ,  and form ulae co n s tr u c te d  a cco rd in g  to r u le  3 . 
are c a l l e d  " i d e n t i t i e s " .  The atom ic p a r ts  o f  any formula are the  
s m a l le s t  w e l l  formed p a r t s .
The normal d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  &, V , =  and E are  used .
A lso (A(X/Y)) i s  the  r e s u l t  o f  s u b s t i t u t in g  X f o r  Y a t  every  
occurrence  o f  Y in  A.
Model System ;-
A Model System , .Q , i s  such th at
Y1 f *Fp’ * • ® *^ n^* ^ (#^1)
and the members o f  i l  are model s e t s , i . e .  s e t s  o f  form u lae . The 
c o n d it io n s  which determ ine the membership o f  a model s e t  vary  
from system  to system , and are drawn from:
(C.p^) I f  A c o n ta in s  any in d iv id u a l  co n s ta n t  a^ o ccu rr in g
o u ts id e  o f  an i d e n t i t y  and ii^i, then A ^ .
i  k(C.DD) I f  a,j and b^ are in d iv i d u a l  c o n s ta n t s ,  (i^-1 ) (k -^1 ) ,  in  
any member o f  a member o f  i l  and i^ k^ then f o r  every
Pn “  ^  ® *
(C.DD^) I f  a j  and are in d iv i d u a l  c o n s ta n t s ,  ( i > 0 ) (k > 0 ) ,  in  
any member o f  a member o f  i l  and if^k then f o r  every
Pn ^  e  Pa -
(C .^) Not both A «£. u and ~A <= u .
(C ,~~) I f  -~A fe' then A e ju .^
(C. d ) I f  (a D B) e jLi^  then e i t h e r  ~A ju^  or B e  or b o th .
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(C«- D ) I f  - ( A D  B) € then A e and -B a p^ ,
(CoE^ )^ I f  (Ex)A e p^ then (A( a ^ / x ) ) e p^ f o r  a t  l e a s t  one
in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t  ,
(C.E) I f  (Ex)A € p^ then ( A ( a /x ) ) e p^ fo r  a t  l e a s t  one
in d iv id u a l  c o n sta n t  a^  .
(C.Ev) I f  (Ex)A € p^ then (A (a ^ /x ))  e p^ or (A (b ^ /x ))  e  p^
f o r  a t  l e a s t  one in d iv i d u a l  con stan t  a^ or one in d iv id u a l  
c o n s ta n t  b^ .
(C.XJ ) I f  (Ux)A e u then i f  b^ occurs i n  any formula in  p' n — — ' n^ — ' n
then (A (b ^ /x ) ) e p^«
(C.U) I f  (bx)A e p^ then i f  b occurs i n  any form ula in  
any p then ( A ( b / x ) ) e p
(C.U^) I f  (Ux)A € p^ then i f  b^ occurs i n  any form ula in
any p^  ^ then (A (b ° /x )  ) e  p^ .
( C . s e l f '7 )^ E tA b ^ p^ o
(G.&) I f  A 6  p^ and ( a ^ - b ^ )  e p^ then (A (a^ //b ^ ) e  p^ .
(C. — =) I f  A € p^ and a l l  the atom ic p a r ts  o f  A are  i n  the
form o f  i d e n t i t i e s  and a — b e p^ then (A (& //k) )  ^ p^ ■>
(C.p == ) I f  A € p^ and a l l  the  atomic p a r t s  o f  A are in  the
form o f  i d e n t i t i e s . )  then  f o r  each in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t ,
; which occu rs  i n  A w ith  i  =7  ^ n , A 6  p. , and i f
a^ occu rs  in  any form ula in  p then A £ p —j I m ~  "m
(G .“ ) I f  A € p and a = b e p then ( A ( a / /b ) )  e  p— ' n — — * n — — — I n
In  g e n e r a l  we l e t  ’ S ( n ) ' stand f o r  ' ( l i s  a model system  
whose membership i s  determ ined by a s e t  o f  r u le s  f o r  system S’ , 
or f o r  ’XI i s  an S model s y s t e m . ’ Furthermore, i f  S(Xl) then the  
membership o f  XI w i l l  be determined by a s e t  o f  c o n d it io n s  .
Vie w i l l  denote ^ by ’C^’ ( K i < 4 ) .
A s e t  o f  foi^mulae, X , i s  s a id  to be s a t i s f i a b l e  ( c o n s i s t e n t )  
i n  a system S i f f  the s e t  i s  inc lud ed  in  some p^  ^ in  some S
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model system . %e l e t  • SSat ( X ) ’ stand f o r  ’ X i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  
i n  S' « So we have
SSat (X ) 2= n ) ( 8 ( a )  & XI &
I f  X i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S then  we say th a t  each member o f  X i s
s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S, or j u s t  ' s a t i s f i a b l e '  i f  the c o n te x t  makes 
c l e a r  which S we in te n d .
• A formula i s  s a id  to  be l o g i c a l l y t r u e  in  S or  
s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  S i f f  th e  u n it  s e t  of  i t s  n e g a t io n  i s  not  
s a t i s f i a b l e  i n  S and the formula i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S. Ahen the
c o n te x t  makes i t  c l e a r  which system i s  under c o n s id e r a t io n  we w i l l
s im ply say th a t  a formula i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .  We l e t  ' S S e l f - s u s ( A ) ' 
stand f o r  'A i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  S ' , So we have
S S e l f - s u s  (A) = .  SSat ( { a | )  & ~ ( 3 a ) (  3 n ) ( S ( n )
& { ~ a ]  C  )
A formula w i l l  th e r e fo r e  be n ot s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  S i f f  e i t h e r  
the formula i s  n ot s a t i s f i a b l e  in  S or i t s  n e g a t io n  i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  
in  So
The p r i m i t i v e  symbols f o r  p^Q =  when i  i s  e i t h e r  1,3 o r  4 a r e  i n  
s e c t i o n  (a )  of the  p r i m i t i v e  symbols as s e t  ou t  on page 193of t h i s  
Appendix.
2The p r im i t iv e  symbols f o r  p Q~ are  in  s e c t i o n s  (a) and (b) o f  the  
p r im it iv e  symbols as  s e t  out on page193of t h i s  Appendix.
The form ation  r u le s  f o r
p^Q-  are 1 , 2 ' , 3 , 4 ,  5 , 6 ' and T (s e e  p 193 )
p^Q~ are  1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6  and T ( s e e  p 193)
3 2p Q= are as  f o r  p Q==
4 2p a re  as  f o r  p Q =
C^  =  { ( C . - ) , ( C . - ~ ) , ( C . D  ) , (G.~  D ) , ( C . E ) , ( C . ü ) , ( C . s e l f  ^  ) , ( C o - ) ,
( C « “  =) , ( C op == ) I
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c 2 * { ( c . p ^ ^ , ( C » D D ° ) , ( C . - ) , ( C . - ~ ) , ( C . 3 ) , ( C . ~ 3 ) , ( C . E 9 ) , ( C . U 2 ^ ,  
( C .U ° ) , ( C . 8 e l f  7 ^), ( C . i ) , ( C o - - ) , ( C . p ^ ) ]
C^= [ ( C . - ) , ( C , ~ ~ ) , ( C .  3 ) , ( C . ~ 3  ) , (C o E ^ ) , (C o U ^ ) ,(C .s e l f  ^  ) ,  
( c . - ) , ( c . - - ) , ( c . p - . ) ,  ( C o = ) ]
C ^ =  { ( C . p ^ ) , ( C . D D ) , ( C . ~ ) , ( C . - ~ ) , ( C . D ) , ( C . ~  D ) , ( C . E ^ ) , ( C . U ^ ) ,
( G . s e l f  ^  ) , ( G . - ) X G .  =  = ) , ( C . p ' - ) ]
To show in  th ese  system s th a t  a formula , A , i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  
we adopt a r e d u c t io  ad ahsurdum procedure. We assume th a t  the  
n e g a t io n  o f  the foz'mula i s  a member o f  an a r b it r a r y  . I f  such
an assum ption le a d s  to  a c o n tr a d ic t io n  o f  the r u le s  in  the  
ap p ro p r ia te  C^ ‘ ( H i < 4 ) , then u n le s s  the form ula i s  prevented  by 
(C.p^) from being  s a t i s f i e d , t h e  formula i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
For example, to  show th a t  (p D (q  D p ) ) i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in
4_ p  Q =  Î
1c - ( p 3 ( q D  p ) )  p^ Assumption
2 ,  p ' 1>y (C,~3) ) from 1
3* - ( q  D p) p^ by (Go- 3  ) from 1
4 .  q p^ by (G ,~ D )  from 3
5® - p  p^ by (C,«"D) from 3
but by 2 and 5 (Co-) i s  c o n tr a d ic t e d .
Since (C.p^^) i s  n o t  c o n tr a d ic te d  by 1 i t  f o l l o w s  th a t  
(p D (q  D p ) ) i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
Now co n s id e r  ( (Ux)Fx 3  Fa^) in  p ^ Q  =  ,
There are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s i
(a )  1o - ( (U x )F x  D Fa^) p^ (n 7  ^ 2) Assumption
but t h i s  c o n tr a d ic t s  (C.p^)
(b) 1 , ~ ( (Ux)Fx 3  Fa^) p^ Assumption
2 .  (Ux)Fx Pg by (C .- 3  ) from 1
3c "Fa^ Pg by (G.- 3  ) from 1
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4 ,  Fa^ € P2  from 2 ,3
which c o n t r a d ic t s  ( C . - ) .
The formula can belon g  to so i t  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
The system s Ivl^ Q-~ ( K i < 4 )
The p r im i t iv e  symbols f o r  these  system s are the same as  
those  f o r  the r e s p e c t i v e  p^Q~ ( K i < 4 )  as  s e t  out above w ith  the  
a d d it io n  o f  the improper symbol ' □  ' in  each system .
i  4The form ation  r u l e s  f o r  M Q-  are as  f o r  p Q -  (I4i^;3)
w ith  the a d d it io n  o f
7« I f  A i s  a w ff  so i s  OA ,
The form ation  r u l e s  f o r  are as  f o r  — w ith
the  a d d it io n  o f  7 and w ith  6 rep laced  by
6M. I f  A i s  a w ff  and x i s  any in d iv id u a l  v a r ia b le  and a
i s  any in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t ,  th en , provided th a t  a l l  the  
in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  in  A have the same s u p e r s c r ip t  and
provided th a t  no modal o p era to rs  occur in  A ,
(U x ) (A (x / /a ) )
i s  a w f f ,  where ( A ( x / / a ) )  i s  the r e s u l t  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g
X f o r  a a t  zero or more o ccu rren ces  o f  a in  A ,
We d e f in e  0 as
We denote ^ by ( K i< 4 )
Y/e have the a d d i t io n a l  r u l e s  to  draw from f o r  the ( K i< 4 )  ;
(C ,p ^  ) I f  A c o n ta in s  any in d iv id u a l  c o n sta n t  a"^  o ccu rr in g
o u t s id e  the scope o f  a modal op era tor  and o u ts id e  o f  an
i d e n t i t y  and i  7  ^ n , then A p^ .
(Cc<>*) I f  <>A e p^e f t  then th ere  i s  in  JQ. a t  l e a s t  one model
s e t ,  such as  u , such th a t  A e u and u i s  anim — rm f m
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a l t e r n a t i v e  to  i n  ,
(Co O ) I f  OA e p^e n  then  A e p^ .
( C . o a * )  I f  OA € p ^ a H  then i f  p^ i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p^ ^
in  XI then □ A e u .— * m
(C .D D  I f  QA e p^e D. and p^ i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p^ in
then D  A &; p  .”  r m
(C oD O i) I f  a  A e  u fc'n. and u i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  p in  XI' — rn  ' m J n
or u i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to u in  Xl_ , then i f  A r n rm —
c o n ta in s  o ccu rr en ces  o f  the k in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  
^  f ,a^? then  f o r  some k in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts1-1 Ji'km
4 /  I'm ' a^'k m
Let M-'= { (Cc <>*),(C. a ) , ( C * a a ^ ) , ( c . a a ^ ) ] then
U M
.2(C^ -  [ ( C .p n ) ] )  u ((C.pj>)^ U M 
U M U [ ( C . a o i ) ^
(c4 _ [ ( G .p ^ ) ï )  U &C.pj>)^ U
We can now shov; th a t
( 1 ) Q ( a ^ - b ^ )
i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  i n  a l l  the  system s M^ Q™ (1< i<4)
1o n ( a S  ) e Hn Assumption
so e i t h e r :
2a . e Pn
3a , ~0(a^“  b h G Pn
4a, o~  ( X = b h Pn from 3a by d e f . 0
5a o b^ € Pm from 4a by (C. ^)
6ao G Pm from 2a and 5a by (C.p
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ;
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e p
G p^ from 3b by ( C . O )
or;
2b o b^
3b. a ( F “ b b  
4b. f = b ^  
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y .
A l l  the r u le s  c i t e d  are common to  a l l  sy stem s, so (1 )  i s  
s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  b eca u se ,  s in c e  a l l  i t s  atom ic p a r ts  are i d e n t i t i e s ,  
i t  i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  in  a l l  sy s te m s.  We can a l s o  show th a t
( 2 ) a V b ^ ^  n ( a V b ^ )







d e f ,  ^
from 4a by (C, ^
from 2a and 5a by ( C ,p ~  )
1, a V  b  ^ a  ( a V  b  ^)
so e i t h e r :
2 a ,  a V b ^
3a, ~ C l ( a V b ^ )
4 a ,  O - ( a V b ^ )
5 a , a^— b^
6a 8 a^ :gA
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ;  
or:
2 b . b^
3b. Q ( a V b h  
4b. aV-b.3  
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ,
( 2 ) ,  l i k e  ( 1 ) ,  i s  s a t i s f i a b l e  i n  a l l  system s and i s  th e r e fo r e
s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,
2 3In  both  M Q ~  and M Q«= the form ula
(U x )(F a ^ 3 F a ^ )
2 3i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  where i  “  0 f o r  M Q= and i  ^  1 f o r  M (
 ^ Pn 
" Pn 
Pn from 3b by (C, n )
2 0 2 .
1 - -  n ( U x ) ( F a ^ 3  Fa^) ^ Pn Assumption
2 . 0 ~ ( U x ) ( F a ^ 3 F a ^ ) ® Pn from 1 by def « <)
3 , - ( U x ) ( F a ^ 3 F a ^ ) *-= Pm from 2 by (C, <> *)
4 o (Ex) ' -(Fa^DFa^) Pm from 3 by d e f ,  E
5 c - ( F a ^ D F a ^ ) ^ Pm from 4 by (C,E°)  o r  (C,E)
6 o Fa^‘ & -Fa^ 
which i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
Pm from 5  by d e f , &
Since t h e r e  i s  no r u l e  to  p re v e n t  the formula b e in g  s a t i s f i a b l e
i n  some i t  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
For  the  Barcan Formula and i t s 1converse  i n  M Q —
1, - ( ( U x ) n F x  D Cl(Ux)Fx) ^ Pn Assumption
2 , ( U x ) a F x ^ Pn 1 ( C . - 3 )
3,  - P ( U x ) F x ^ Pn 1 ( C , - 3 )
4* <)-(Ux)Fx " Pn 3  d e f ,  <)
5 » '^(R^x)Fx Pm 4  (C. <>*)
6 o (Ex)*"Fx '  Pm 5 d e f ,  E
7 . - F a ^  Pm 6  (C,E)
8 , 0  Fa ^ Pn 2 (C.U)
9 ,  a  Fa ^  Pm 8 ( c ,  oa^^)
10, Fa ^ Pm 9 (C, □ )
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y .
The Bar can Formula i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  m"*Q-= 
For i t s  c o n v e r s e ; -
1 , n (U x )F x € P nlI Assumption
2 , . (Ux) a  Fx € Pn^
3o (Ex)- n F x G Pn 2 d e f ,  E
4o -  DFa € Pn 3 (C,E)
5c *0 G Pn 4 d e f ,  <3
6  o - F a G ^^ m 5
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7c D (Dx)Fx G Pm 1 , 6 (C.DQ *)
8 0 (Ux)Fx G Pm 7 (C. □ )
9o % & Pm 6 (C.U)
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y .
The converse  o f  the  Barcan Formula i s 1s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  K Q =» .
So (Ux) □ Fx o(Ux )Fx i s s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
For (Ex) n Fx “ n(Ex )% in
I 0
2 ,
(E x ) 0  Fx 




3c <)-(Ex)Fx ' G Pn 2 d e f .  0
4o □ Fa <= Pn 1 (C.E)
(Ux)-Fx G ^^m 3 ( c .  0 * )
6  e D Fa <£ Pm 4 ( c . a q * )
7c Fa e ^m 6 (C. P )
8 , -F a G Pm 5 (C.U)










3c (Ux)- □ Fx G Pn 2 def .  E
4 . (Ex )Fx € Pn 1 (C. □ )
5c Fa G Pn 4 (C.E)
6 , -  DFa e Pn 3 (C.U)
7c O' ~Ea e Pn 6 d e f . 0
8 0 -F a G Pm 7 ( C . 4 * )
9c (Ex)Fx G Pm 1 (Co a n ^ )
which i s  not c o n tr a d ic to r y *
So a lth ough  (Ex )Q Fx 3 a (E x)F x i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
the converse i s  n o t .  A cou n ter - model for the c o n v e r se ,  i . e .  a




n=| 0^ (Ex)Fx , - ( E x ) O P x  , (Ex)Px , Fa^ , O E_a^  } 
Pg -•=[□(Ex)Fx , (Ex)Fx , -Fa^ , Fa^ }
For (Ux) □  (x  =  a ) s a(Ux)(x--== a) i n  M^ Q =- ; -
1 . (Ux)cl (x  =  a) G Pn"i-Assumption
2o -  U (U x)(x  =  a) G. Pn-
3 . 0  " (U x )(x  =  a) G Pn 2 d e f .
4 0 U (a  a) G Pn 1 (C.U)
5o (Ex)- (x  a) G 3 ( C .O * )  d e f .  E
6 o (b -jA a) G 5 (C.E)
7c [ l(b  — a) G Pn 1 (C.U)
8 ,  (b — a)
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y .
e Pm 7 ( c . a o * ) ( c .  a  )
U a ( U x ) ( x “ a) c Pn- f AssuEiption
2o -  (Ux) D (x  ™ a ) e Pn'i
3c (Ex)- C l ( x  =  a) G Pn 2 d ef .E
4 .  ■ ^  « (b «= a) G Pn 3 (C.E) d e f .  0
5 c (b *7  ^ a) G Pm 4 (C. 0 * )
6 . (U x)(x  := a) G 1 ( c . a a * ) ( c .  □ )
7 c (U =  a) G Pm 6 (C.U)
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ,
1So the eq u iv a len ce  t e s t e d  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  M Q 
For (Ex) a  (x  =  a) ™ p(Ex) (x  =  a)
1o (E x ) a  (x  =  a )  G pn
2 .  -  D (Ex) (x  •-= a)
3 .  0  ~ (E x ) (x  ^  a)
4 ,  D (b ^ a )




e p^ 2 d e f ,
G p 1 (C.E)
Ê K  3 ( C . o * )
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6 . (Ux)(x 7A a)
7 o ( b — a) 
8 0  (b -A a)
v/hich i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  
1 , □ (Ex)(x  =  a)
2c -  (Ex) □ (x •-= a)
3o ( U x ) - □ (x ■•== a )
4o 0  (&
5 c (^  7^ a)
which i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,
c |Li^  5 de f  cE
€ 4 (C. OQ*)(Ccq )
G p 6  (C.U)
n I  Assumption
Pn
G 2 defcE
e 3  (C.U) d e f . O
e 4 ( C . O * )
So the  equ iva lence  t e s t e d  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  i n  M










3. -  (Ux)Fx G Pn 2 def c^
4e - (Ux )Fx G Pm 3 (C. 0 * )
5» (Ex)-Fx G Pm 4 def ,E
6  0 -F a “ G Pm 5 (C.E^)
7e a  Fa^ G Pn 1 (C.U^)
8 0 Fa^ G Pm 7 (CoQD*) (C. P )
9c (a " " -  b"") 6 Pm 7 (CcQû i )










3c (Ex)~ a  Fx G Pn 2 def .E
4o 4)-Fa^ e Pn 3 (C.E^) d e f . ^
5c -Fa^ g: Pm 4 (C cO *)
6  c (Ux)Fx G Pm 1 ( c , n a * ) ( c , a  )
7c F ^ e Pm 6 (C.ïï^)
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which i s  n o t  c o n t r a d ic t o r y .
So the Barcan Formula i s  n o t  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  nor i s  i t s  converse
3s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  in  M Q— .
For (Ex) n F x  s  o(E x)F x  i n  M^Q—
1o
2o





3c <) -  (Ex)Fx e Pn 2 def
4c a  Fa^ e Pn 1
5c '“ (Ex )Fx ë Pm 3 ( c . ^ * )
6 e Fa^ € Pm 4 ( C , n a * ) ( c . a  )
7c G Pm 4 (O .O Q i)
8 . (Ux)~Fx G Pm 5 d ef .E  ■
9c -Fb™ G Pm 8 (c -u * )
lOo -Fa^ €• Pm 7 ,9 ( C e - )
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y •
1o
2o
n ( e x )fx 
- (Ex ) □ Fx
e
G :j! Assumption
3c (U x )-U F x e Pn 2 d ef .E
4 o (Ex)i^x c Pn 1 (C.O )
5c Fa^ G Pn 4
6 , 0 G Pn 3 (CcU^) d e f . 0
7c -Fa^ G Pm 6 (C. <)*)
8 , (Ex)Fx G Pm 1 ( c . o a . * ) ( c .  a  )
9o Fb"^ G Pm 8 (C.E^)
which i s  n ot c o n tr a d ic to r y .
So (Ex) P Fx D Q(Ex)Fx i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g
i n 3M Q =  , but i t s  converse i s  n ot
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For (Ux)a  (x  — a) :— [((Ux) (x =  a) i n  M^C
1 0
2 o
(Ux) Q (x a^)






3c 0  ~ (Ux)(x ^  a^) G Pn 2 def oj)
4o (S x ) (x  7^ a^) e Pm 3 (Co'^i^) d e f .E
5o e Pm 4 ( C . E J
6 , 0  (b ' '  =  a^) G Pn 1 (C o U j
7. ( f  -  a"") e Pm 6 (Co 0 0  ■«-) ( c . n  )
which i s  no t  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
1 o 
2 o
□ (Ux)(x =  a^)






3c (Bx)<> (x T^a^) G Pn 2 de f .E  defo-0
4c <y(b^®7^a '" ) G Pn 3 (C.E^)
5o ( b ^ ' ^ a ' ' ) e Pm 4
6  o (Ux)(x =  a^) G Pm 1 (CoUd *) ( c . a  )
7c (a"L a“ ) 6 Pm 1 ( c . a a i )
8 . G Pm 6 ( C . ü J
which i s  no t  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,
So the  equ iva lence  t e s t e d  i s n o t  s e l f - - s u s t a i n i n g .
For the  fo rmula  (E x )0 (x =  a^) a ( E x ) ( x - =  a^)  i n  M^ Q
1 .
2 ,
(E x ) d  (x =  a^)






3. a ( b P = a ^ ) G Pn 1 (C,E^)
4c ^  (Ux)(x 76 a^) € Pn 2 d e f .E  def. 'v'
5c (Ux)(x --A a^) e Pm 4 ( C . O * )
6 , (b -  a^) e Pm 3 ( c .  Q a * ) ( c ,  a  )
7o e Pm 3 ,5  (C.DD i )
Bo (b'^T^a"') «Sf Pm 5 (c .u^)




0 (Ex)(x  — a )




3o (Ex) (X — ) . G Pn 1 (C.Q )
4o a"") e Pn 3 (0.3%)
5c (Ux)0  (x -A a^) G Pn 2 d e f .E  def.O
6 « OCbVa"") Pn 5 (C.U^)
7c (b^'A a"") G Pm 6 ( C . O * )
8 . (b""- a"") G Pm 4 ( c . jr =  )
which i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .
So the  equ iva lence  t e s t e d  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
Since i n  M^ Q =  th e r e  a r e  no formulae  of the  form 
(Ex)OA(x) nor  of the  form (Ux)OA(x) where 0  i s  e i t h e r  □ o r  0  » 
and A(x) means t h a t  A c o n ta i n s  x ,  th e re  i s  no p o in t  i n  look ing  a t  
any of the  e q u iv a l en c es  we have cons ide red  above i n  te rms of
1Yi'e t h e r e f o r e  t e s t  more formulae of i n t e r e s t  i n  M Q =
and
( i )  
1 .
(U x)(U y)(x  =- y  & Fx . 3  
- (U x ) ( U y ) ( x  — X & Fx . 3  Fy)
Fy)
^ Pn As: sumption
2 . ( % ) ( E y ) ( x  y  & Fx & -F y ) ^ Pn 1 d ef.E  d e f .&
3 . & - % ) ^ Pn 2
4 , b^ & Fa^ k  ~Fb^ ® Pn 3 (C,E^)
5c Fa^ ^ Pn 4 def ,&
6 . "Fa^ Pn 4 d e f .& ( C . - )
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ,  so ( i )  i s s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
( i i )  
1 8
(U x)(U y)(x  =  y  3  D (x  
~ (Ux) (Uy) (x  ^  y  3  0 ( x - = - y ) )
z ) )
^ Pn Assumption
2 . (E x )(E y )(x  y  & - q  (x  =  y ) )  ^ Pn 1 d ef .E  def.&
3® b^ ~ □ (a^— b^) Pn 2 (C,E^)
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4® £ Pn 3 d e f .&
5o 0  ” ^  ) € Pn 3 def.&  d ef .O
6 e <£ Pm 5 (C. 0 * )
7 . a^l= b ^ G Pm 4 , 6 ,  (C .p ~  )
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ,  so ( i i )  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
( i i i )  (% )(U y )(F x y 3 OFxy)
1. " (U x)(U y)(F xy  3  OFxy) €. Pn Assumption
2o (F x ) (E y ) ( fx y  & -  OFxy) <S Pn 1 d e f .E  defo&
3® F a V  & -  O F a V G Pn 2 (G.S^)
4o F a V G. Pn 3 def.&
5o 0  - F a V G Pn 3 def.&
6 . - F a V 6 Pm 5 ( C .O * )
which i s  not c o n tr a d ic to r y , so ( i i i )  i s  no t s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
( i v ) 0 (a P = a ^ )  3  (E x )a  (% — a^)
1 c 
2c
0 ( a " L a ' ' )






3® (Ux) 0  (x  A  ) € Pm 2 d e f .E  d e f . 0
4® XXaVa"") G Pm 3 (C.U^)
5o ( a V  a^) C P i 4 (C. 0 * )
6 « (a^V a^) G P i 1 ( c . a p * ) ( c , n
which i s  not c o n t r a d ic t o r y , so ( i v )  i s  n ot s e l f - su sta - in in g .
( x i ) ( E ! x ) n A  3  (E!x ,)A
1c
2 .
(E y)(U x)(Q  A s  X y )  






3« (Uy)(Ex)(A A  X —-y) <£ Pn 2 d e f .E  def
4c (Ux) ( □ A X =  a^) e Pn 1 (C.B^)
5c (Ex) (A # x  a^) « Pn 3 (C.U^)
6 0 A T^b^— G Pn 5 (O.E^)
7c DA ; ^ b ^  a^ € Pn 4 (O.U^)
which i s  not co n tra d ic to ry , so (x i)  i s  not s e lf - s u s t a in in g ,
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3Without s e t t i n g  out the system M Q I ' , but r e l y in g  on the  r u le s
and o th er  d e t a i l s  a s  s e t  out i n  the main body o f  the t e x t  (pp.
v/e t e s t  formula ( x i i )  i n  M^QI' .
1 ® ( I s ) [ n x ,  X = y ] ]  c
Assumption
2 .  ~ ( E x ) 0 ( I y ) [ N y ,  x  =  y ]  c n
3® (U x )0 ~  ( I y ) [E y ,  X =  y  ]  g 2 d e f .E  d e f .O
4o aP==y ]  G 3 (C.U^)
5® ^ 4 ( C . O * )
6 ® (Uy)(Ny & a4=  y  . 3  ( % ) ( % =  y  A  %)) « 5 ( C . - I )
7® ( ly ) L X i ,  ( I x ) [ n x .  X — y ] ]  « Fni  ^ ( c . a o * ) ( c . o  )
8 . Na "^ ^  Pm
9 .  Na^ & a P = a ^  . 3  ( E z ) ( % : s a % ^ z )  G u 6 (C.U )
10. aP=^  3  (E_z) (Nz ~  z)  G u 8 ,9
which i s  not c o n tr a d ic to r y ,  so ( x i i )  i s  not s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
The system s M^ QP (']<i<‘4)
i  iThe system s M QP have the same symbols as  M Q== ( K i < 4 )
r e s p e c t i v e l y  but w ith  the a d d it io n  o f  the two improper symbols :
TL S
The form ation  r u le  to  be added to  the r u le s  f o r  IvAq ™ (2< i< 3 )  i s :  ! 
6P. I f  A i s  a w ff  and x i s  any in d iv id u a l  v a r i a b l e ,  then,  
provided  th a t  a l l  the in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  in  A have the  
same s u p e r s c r ip t ,
( f t  x ) ( A ( x / / a ) )
i s  a w ff  o
-1The form ation  r u le  to  be added to  the r u le s  f o r  M Q - i s  :
6 'P . I f  A i s  a w ff  and x i s  any in d iv id u a l  v a r ia b le  then
(T C x )(A (x / /a ) )
i s  a w f f .
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The form ation  r u le  to  be added to  the r u le s  f o r  M Q— i s :
6M'h I f  A i s  a w ff  and x i s  any in d iv id u a l  v a r ia b le  and
a i s  any in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t ,  then provided th a t  a l l  the  
in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  in  A have the same s u p e r s c r ip t  and 
provided th a t  no modal o p era to rs  occur  in  A,
(Jf x )  ( A ( x / / a ) )
i s  a w f f .
We a l s o  d e f in e :  (D x)A ~ (h  x)~A
For th e se  system s we denote the s e t s  by ' ( 1 ^ü 4 )
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The s e t s  (l-<i<4) are made up as  f o l l o w s :  f i r s t  
v/e r e p la c e  each occurrence  o f  *E’ w ith  ’ 2 } ’ and each occurz’ence  
o f  'U' v/ith  ’ T t ’ in  each o f  the  s e t s  ( I4 i< 4 )  to g iv e  the  
s e t s  (1< i<4) r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  then to  th e s e  s e t s  are added the
r u le s  s e t  out belov/ as  in d ic a t e d .
We add to each C^^(1^i44) the r u le s :
(C.E S  ) I f  (Ex)A e then (Z: x)A e
(C .lIU )  I f  (TTx)A ju t^' O.  then (Ux)A e  ju  ^ .
to  g iv e  the s e t s  C ^*(l4 i^ 4) r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
1 1The s e t  C c o n s i s t s  o f  the s e t  C_^ to g e th e r  w ith  the r u l e s :JJ I  "
(C,E^) I f  (Ex)A £ n  then  (Ex) (x  ^  a )  e. and
(6.(&/2S) )  ^ f o r  in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t  a ,
(C.U ) • I f  (Ux)A e; u c -Cl and i f  (Ex) (x  a) e u  theno — ' n
(A(&/z) ) « p% ®
2 2The s e t  C^ , c o n s i s t s  o f  the s e t  C^  ^ to g e th e r  w ith  the r u le s :
(C.Eg) I f  (Ex)A e jQ. then  e i t h e r  (Ex) (x — a^) e  p.n
mdand (A (a^ /x )  ) c  u or  (E x)(x  «  a ) e u 
( A (a ^ /x ) ) £ p Ç f o r  some in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t  a^ or
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(C.U ) I f  (Ux)A £ Cl and i f  (E x ) (z  =  a ) e 
th en  ( A ( a ^ /x ) ) e ,
3 3The s e t  c o n s i s t s  of the  s e t  t o g e t h e r  w i th  the  r u l e s
(C,I3°) as above and
(C«E°) I f  (Ex)A G p^e-CI then (Ex)(x  = . a ^ )  G p^  and
( A ( a ^ /x ) ) G u f o r  some i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s t a n t  a^ ,
The s e t  c o n s i s t s  of  th e  s e t  t o g e t h e r  w i th  the  r u l e s  (C,U°)
and (CeE^) a s  s e t  out above.
Consider  the  formulae
( x i i i )  (Ux)<> (Ey)(y  := x) and
(x iv )  (Ux)0<>-(Ey) ( y x )  
i n  the  systems rA qP ( I4 i< 4 )
-jVi/e t e s t  to see i f  ( x i i i )  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  i n  M QP.
1 o ~ (Ux)<>~ (Ey) (y  ^  x) ^  p^  Assumption
2o (E x )a  (E y) (y  =  x) e p^  ^ 1 de f .E  d e f «ÿ (C,— )
3® q  (Fy) (y  — a ) G p^  2 (C.E )
4® (Ey)(y  =  a) € p^ 3 ( C . o  )
This  w i l l  no t  l e ad  to  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
S i m i l a r l y  wi th  ( x i v ) .  N e i th e r  a r e  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g .
APPENDIX III
Epls tem ic  Logics
In  the t e x t  we in d ic a te d  th a t  in  H in t ik k a ’ s HS4 two
new improper symbols ’K’ and ’P ’ are  added to  the n o ta t io n  s e t  out
there  f o r  u Q * There are o th e r  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  symbolism which
should be n o ted .  I n d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  and v a r i a b l e s  come i n  two
c a t e g o r ie s ,  there  are p erso n a l and im personal in d iv id u a l
1c o n s ta n ts  and v a r i a b l e s  , Furthermore, in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  have 
no s u p e r s c r ip t s .  B ecause there  are  no f r e e  in d iv id u a l  v a r ia b le s  
i n  HS4» j u s t  as th ere  are none in  our system s, what v/e c a l l  
• in d iv id u a l  v a r i a b l e s '  H intikka c a l l s  'bound v a r i a b l e s ' ,  and 
what we c a l l  ' i n d i v id u a l  c o n s t a n t s ’ he c a l l s  ' f r e e  v a r i a b l e s ' .
In  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  in  term inology  we can  
s e t  out the p r im i t iv e  symbols f o r  HS4 as:
Improper symbols: ' - D U E K P ( )
P r e p o s i t i o n a l  v a r ia b le s :  1 P2 »^2*^2'^3'
I n d iv id u a l  v a r i a b l e s  ( p e r s o n a l ) : x
In d iv id u a l  v a r i a b l e s  ( im p erso n a l) :  t  
I n d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  (p e r s o n a l ) :  a
I n d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n ts  ( im p erso n a l) :  i  
n -a r y  p r e d ic a te  v a r ia b le s :  F




,  z ^ , %2 Î y 2  s ^ 2  • ^ 3  * * * * 
, c , a ^ }b^ j c ^ 9a 3 , =, *
. . .  (n>1)
The form ation  r u le s  are  r u le s  1, 2 , 3 , 4 and 6' from p a g e s  193-194  
o f  Appendix I I ,  to g e th e r  w ith :
5 , I f  A and B are w f f s  then  so i s  (A 3  B) , .
7 , I f  A i s  a w ff  and a_ i s  any in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t  (p e r so n a l)
then  K^ A i s  a w f f .
1, J ,H in t ik k a  Knowledge and B e l i e f  p . 128
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T« Terminal c la u se ,
We d e f in e :
We r e t a i n  the same d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  model s e t ,  model system ,  
s a t i s f i a b l e  and s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  as f o r  the system s in  Appendix I I .
The s e t  i s  made up from the c o n d it io n s  (C.~ ) , (C , (C . ,
(G .-D) from Appendix I I ,  to g e th e r  w ith  (C .E^), (C ,U ^ ), ( C . s e l f  
and the fo l lo w in g :
(C.K--=) I f  A e  and (a ~  b) e  p.  ^ and A i s  an atomic
formula or i d e n t i t y  then ( A (a / /b ) )  e
(C .“K) I f  K A € u and ( a ~ b )  « u then K, A <? u ,-a-" i n  "n - p — >n
(G.=P) I f  P A c£ u and (a  —b) e u then P, A u““a— «^ n — — i n  “ b-- “ n
(C.P*) I f  P^A e p^c-Q. then  there  i s  in  iZ a t  l e a s t  one model
s e t ;  such as u , such th a t  A g- u and u i s  anrm ' — Tm / m
a l t e r n a t i v e  to w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a i r  XI »
(C«K) I f  K A (g u e XI then  A e  u «—a— i n  — ^n
(C.KK*) I f  K A s  u <= XL and u i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  to  u in  XI■“■a*” I n i m '  ; n
w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a then K A e u ,
Form ulae:-
( i )  A countermodel f o r  (Ux)K FxhK (Ux)Fx—a — *~a — —
would c o n s i s t  o f  the f o l lo w in g  s e t s  u and u :I n ' m
[  ( U x ) K / S  . -K 3 (U x )F x  , l ^ ( E x ) ~ F x  ]
F„,~ p E x ) ~ ï x  , (E x ) (x  =  b) , ~ P b ]m
Note: we cannot i n s t a n t i a t e  (Ux)K^Fx because th ere  i s  no formula  
o f  the form ( E x ) ( x = b )  in  p^ .
( i i )  A countermodel f o r  K^(Ux)Fx D (Ux)K^Fx
would c o n s i s t  o f  the fo l lo w in g  s e t s  p^ and :
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[ % ( % ) %  » '“ (Ux)K^Fx , (Ex)P^-Fx , ( E x ) ( x - = b )  , P^-Fb ,
(Ux)Fx , Fb
, K^(U%)Px , ( % ) % ]
Note: we cannot i n s t a n t i a t e  (l}x)Fx in  because th ere  i s  no 
formula o f  the form ( E x ) ( x .=  a) in  p^  ^ ,
( i i i )  A countermodel f o r  (Ex)K^Px D K^(Ex)Px
c o n s i s t s  o f  :
p =  r (Ex)K Px , ~K (Ex)Fx , P_ (%)-"% s (F x ) (x  — b) , K Pb ^
, K^Fb . P b ]
( i v )  A countermodel f o r  K^(Ex)Fx 3  (Ex)K^Fx
c o n s i s t s  o f  :
Li ^ f K  (Ex)Fx , ~(Kx)K Px , (bx)P -F x  , (Ex)Fx , (E x )(x  =  b) ,
Fb , P ~Fb 1— ' —a -I
p^==[~Fb , K^(Ex)% 5 (Ex)Fx , (% ) ( x  =  j
(v )  A countermodel f o r  (Ex)Ka(b =  x) 3  Ka(Ex)(b ==> x )
c o n s i s t s  o f  :
P£=-{'(Ex)Ka(b-= x) , ~K ^(Ex)(b=  x) , (Ex)(b =  c) , K^(c b) ,
PjiP Î (% ) (b x) * % (c . =  b) Î
( v i )  A proof th a t  (Ex) (b •■= x ) ^ (Ex)E^(b =  x )  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ;
1 . K ( E x ) ( b . =  x) G j ü .
— > Assumption
2  c ~(Ex)K^(b =  x)  ^ p^ J
3 .  (Ux)P (b ^  x) 6 p^ 2 defoE d e f .P
4 .  (E x)(b  := x )  p^ 1 (CcK)
5 . Z aC kif b) a  p^ 3 , 4 ,  (C.U^)
6 .  ( b f . b )  G p^ 5 (C.P*)
which i s  c o n tra d ic to r y o
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( v i i )  The argument (A) on page 168 o f  the t e x t  i s . shown to  be 
v a l i d  by the p roof
1. ■— c ) G Premise
2 , (E x ) (x  — b) C Fn Premise
3c ~ (Ex)K (x  '== c) G Fn Negated C onclusion
4c (Ux)P^- (x  cX & Fn 3 d e fo E ,d e f .P
5c (b c ) e Fn 2 ,4  (C.U^)
6 . ~ (b =  £ ) <& Fm 5 (C.P*)
7c (b c ) e Fm 1 ,5  (C. K'<*)(C. K )
which i s  c o n t r a d ic t o r y 0
( v i i i )  A countermodel f o r  argument (B) on page I 6 9  o f  the  t e x t  i s :
H n - [A^(b -  c ) , ( E x ) ( x - b) ,~K^(Ex) ( x - c )  ,p^(bx)~ (x -  c ) , (b c ) ]
£.) s (b — ^) } (Ux)~ (x —
The system HK
In  th e  t e x t  we in d ic a te d th a t a m od ified  ep is te m ic  l o g i c
1cou ld  be c o n s tr u c te d ,  Vve nov/ s e t  out th a t  system -  HK :
The p r im it iv e  symbols o f  HK are those  o f  HS4 to g e th e r  w ith  one 
a d d i t io n a l  improper symbol :
The form ation  r u l e s  f o r  HK are  those  o f  HS4 to g e th e r  w ith :
8 < I f  A i s  a w ff  and a i s  any in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t  (p e r s o n a l)
then P A  i s  a w ff, *~a—
We d e f in e
K A i s  read as  "a knows th a t  A"
i s  read a s  " I t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  a l l  th a t  a knows,
th a t  A"
1o This system  i s  taken d i r e c t l y  from the a u th o r ’ s paper "Epistem ic  
L ogic ,  Language and Concepts" Logique e t  A nalyse 64 (1973)
2 1 8
P A  i s  read as  -'K '-A , and A i s  read as  -^P -A ,■*”a~ —a  — “~ar" —a  —"
The s e t  o f  r u le s  i s  made up as f o l l o w s  :
from Appendix I I  th e  r u le s  (C «^), (C .~ D ) , (C .E^),
(C.U^), and ( C , s e l f  -7^), 
and from Appendix 111 the r u le s  (C .K-™) , (C. ~ K )  and (C. — P) .
A lso  v/e c o n s tr u c t  the r u le s  (C .^ P * ) , (C .^K), (C.^K^’K*) , (C, ~^K)
and
from the r u le s  (C .P * ) , (C ,K ), (C,KK*),
( C. =  K) and (C. ^  P) r e s p e c t i v e l y  
by s u b s t i t u t in g  f o r  K and ^P 
f o r  P wherever K and P o ccu r ,
(In o th er  words, v/e take HS4 and convert i t  in to  an e p is te m ic
l o g i c  f o r  ^P o What we now need are r u le s  f o r  K , and r u le s  to
l in k  the l o g i c s  f o r  ^P and K t o g e t h e r . )
The f o l l o w in g  r u l e s  are a l s o  added;
(C .P) I f  P A <j ju e fb th ere  i s  a t  l e a s t  one member o f  -0- ,—a~ r n *
such as u ; such th a t  A e u and u i s  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  i^ m* -* rm m ----- ----- -------- -
to  u w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a in  f i  provided th a t  u i s  not'—  n ---------------- --- — —- — —  ^n
an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to any member o f  XI w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a ;
but i f  u i s  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to  some member o f  XI w ith  ' n
r e s p e c t  to a. then th ere  i s  a t  l e a s t  one member o f  XI ,
such as , such th a t  -A & and i s  an ^a l t e r n a t i v e
to  u w ith  r e s p e c t  to a i n  XI .
(C.K'-) I f  K A 6  u e ,CI and u i s  not an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to  any“âT' 1 n < n
member o f  XT w ith  r e s p e c t . t o  a and p^ i s  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  
to  p^ w ith  r e s p e c t  to  a. in  -0. then A e p^ j
but i f  u i s  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to  some member o f  XI w ith  1 n
r e s p e c t  to  a and p^ i s  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to  p^ w ith
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r e s p e c t  to  a. in  XI then ~A e «
(C.K) (a s  in  Appendix I I )
(C c ^ P )  I f  A G u 6 XI then  P A « u ' * “-a;*” / n ““æ“ rn
( C c A )  I f  K A Ç. u e XI then \  K A g: u —a“" r n  “ ST'fT' ' n
(The l a s t  two r u le s  l i n k  the  e p is te m ic  m o d a l i t i e s )
I t  must be noted th a t  in  t h i s  e p is te m ic  l o g i c  i t  w i l l  be n e c e s s a r y ,
when showing th a t  a form ula i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g ,  to  t e s t  i t s  n e g a t io n  f o r
membership o f  both ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  s e t s  and n o n -^ a lte r n a t iv e  s e t s .
For example, i f  we t e s t  th e  formula;
K A & K (A B) . 3  K B•“a.— ""u "  ~âT**
we' f i r s t  take an a r b itr a r y  s e t  p^ which i s  n o t  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to
any s e t : -
1,  K A & K ( A 3  B) e  ju—a— —a — — nn
2o -K B—a"-
'  " l  . . .fA ssum ption
3 .  Pg~B e  2 d e f .P
4 .  ~B e 3 (C .P)
5 . A e  u 1 def.&  (C.K~)—> ' m
6o (A 3  B) Ç p  1 def.&  (C,K~)
which i s  c o n tr a d ic to r y ;
but s in c e  the n e g a t io n  o f  the formula b e in g  t e s t e d  m ight be 
s a t i s f i a b l e  in  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  s e t  v/e take an a r b it r a r y  s e t  
u^ which i s  an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  to  some s e t  in
1. K A & K (A 3  B) G u—a— In /— — V Assumption
2 ,  B G u •)“ JT* i n
3" Pg-B Fn  ^ d e f .P
4 .  ~~B e p^ 3 (C.P)
5. ■ B ^ p^ 4 ( C. )
6 .  ~A e  p 1 def.&  (C.K~)
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7o - ( A 3  B) G 1 def.&  (CoK-)
8 .  A 7 (G.~ )
which i s  co n tra d ic to ry »
So the formula t e s t e d  i s  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  i n  HK»
On the o th er  hand, i f  T i s  a ta u to lo g y  then K^T w i l l  n o t  be 
s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  i n  HK, Although the n e g a t io n  o f  cannot
be a member o f  a n o n - ° a l t e r n a t iv e  s e t ,  i t  can be a member o f  
an ^ a l t e r n a t iv e  s e t .
Assuming p^ to  be an ^ a l t e r n a t i v e  to some member o f  XT 
1 o ~K T e ju Assumption
2 ,  P ~T & n   ^d e f .P—a i n * ™
3 ,  — T G p^ 2 (C .P)
4c T e p^ 3 (G.~~)
which i s  n ot c o n tr a d ic to r y .
The system  HK can be ax iom atized  as f o l l o w s :
I f  A , B and C are w f f s  o f  HK, and X and Y are in d iv id u a l
v a r i a b l e s ,  and a , b and c are in d iv id u a l  c o n s ta n t s ,  and K
i s  e i t h e r  K or , then the axioms are
(A1) ( A 3  (B 3  A) )
(A2) ( ( A 3  (B 3  C) )  3  ( (A 3  B) 3  (A 3  C) ) )
(A3) ( (~A 3  -B )  3  (B 3  A))
(A4) (K^A 3  A)
(A5) (K (A 3 B) 3 (K^A 3 K B ) )
(A6) ( % A  d \ \ a )
(A7) (EgA 3 \ a )
(A8) (K^A 3  % % A )
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(A9) ((UX)A 3  ((EX)(%:™ a) 3  ( A ( a / / Z ) ) ) )
(A10) ((UX)(A 3  B ) 3 ((UX)A D (UX)B))
(A l l )  (UX)(EY)(X— Y)
(A12) (A 3  (UX)A)
(A13) a — a
(A14) (a =  b 3  (B 3 ( B ( a / b ) ) ) )  p rov ided  B c o n ta i n s  no modal
o p e r a t o r s .
Nothing e l s e  i s  an axiom.
The r u l e s  of i n f e r e n c e  a re
A , (a 3  B ) —> B
A \  A“ a
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